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The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Working 
Capital of SMEs: A Panel Data Analysis 
 
Gerard McGuinness 
 
Abstract 
The thesis examines the financing behaviour of Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) over the business cycle, focusing on the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis, using panel data analysis. The analysis is presented in three 
studies. Study 1 is a position paper which compares the effectiveness of pecking 
order theory with the trade-off theory in explaining the changes in SME capital 
structure over the crisis, using a sample of Irish and UK companies. The 
findings indicate a significant deleveraging in SMEs in the immediate aftermath 
of the financial crisis, using a modified flow of funds methodology. Given the 
declining role of debt, Study 2 examines the role of trade credit in the 
adjustment process in the sector via redistribution and substitution effects, in a 
panel of over 7600 SMEs in Ireland, over the period 2003 to 2011.  While there 
was a net reduction in trade credit in the sector in the aftermath of the banking 
crisis, the findings show that financially weaker firms received significantly 
more finance in the form of trade credit coinciding with the dramatic reduction 
of bank credit extended to the private non-financial sector. In terms of a 
redistribution effect; financially stronger firms extended relatively more trade 
credit to financially weaker SMEs, and most likely on an involuntary basis. 
Finally, using an extensive panel of over 280,000 SMEs across 15 European 
countries, Study 3 confirms the domestic results in a cross country context and 
shows that trade credit has played a pivotal role in the financing of financially 
weaker SMEs over the crisis. Firms with the greatest level of cash reserves 
became net financiers of credit. The results also show the relation between trade 
credit and SME survival as well as the role of institutional and country level 
factors in explaining trade credit use.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Few would dispute the importance of the SME sector in developed economies, 
for output growth, employment creation and sustainability (OECD, 2006; EIM 
Business and Policy Research Report, 2011). According to the European 
Commission (2005) SME criteria, SMEs are defined as enterprises which 
employ less than 249 workers in a given year and have either an annual turnover 
of less than €50m or a balance sheet total of less than €43m. This group is 
further divided into three separate groups based on employee numbers, annual 
turnover and level of assets1. Within the European Union alone, it is estimated 
that SMEs provide two out of every three jobs and account for more than 58 
percent of gross value added (IIF Bain and Company, 2013). However, the 
period since 2008 has proved to be very challenging for SMEs with an 
estimated 1.5 million SME jobs lost across the EU 27 countries between 2008 
and 2010 (European Commission, 2013). For these reasons, the viability and 
sustainability of SMEs in the aftermath of the financial crisis has been at the 
forefront of public debate.  
A major factor in the growth and sustainability of SMEs is access to finance 
(European Commission, 2008). While, decreased access to funds by banks 
throughout the crisis has restricted lending and impacted on firms of all sizes, 
the impact of decreased lending has been most visible in the SME sector. Since 
                                                          
1 . Micro enterprises employ less than 10 employees annually and have an annual turnover of 
less than €2m. Small firms are defined as employing between 10 and 49 employees with an 
annual turnover of between €2m and €10m, while Medium sized enterprises employ between 50 
and 249 each year and have annual turnover of less than €50m and a balance sheet total of less 
than €43m. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-
definition/index_en.htm [Accessed 02.05.2012].  
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2008, SMEs across Europe have been adversely affected by dramatic reductions 
in both aggregate demand and bank lending, upon which most SMEs are heavily 
reliant. According to European Commission data, since 2008, loans of less than 
€1 million to SMEs have declined by an average of 47 percent since the pre-
crisis peaks, with falls in the region of 66 percent in Spain and 82 percent in 
Ireland. The following figure illustrates the severity of the banking crisis on 
lending to SMEs since 2008. 
 
Figure 1.1. Lending to SMEs (< €1m) across Europe 
 
 
Understanding the decision making process in SMEs under financial constraints 
and economic contraction is crucial for informing policy makers and improving 
our understanding of the SME sector. While research to date has focused on the 
supply of bank finance to the sector in the aftermath of the financial crisis, this 
research considers the hitherto unexamined role of trade credit in the adjustment 
process within the sector in Ireland and across several European countries. The 
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research focuses in particular on the financing behaviour of SMEs in the 
aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crises. 
In Ireland, prior to the crisis of 2008, research and data on SME financing was 
sparse. This observed lack of research was highlighted in a number of reports in 
the 1980’s and 90’s (NESC, 1983, 1984, Kinsella, Story, Mulvenna and Coyne, 
1994). Since 2008, however, there has been a growth in the number of state 
agencies and institutions publishing research on SME finance. In line with the 
work of the European Central Bank, the Irish Central Bank has increased the 
level of designated research on SME finance. Similarly, other banks and 
economic institutions including, the Central Statistics Office (C.S.O), Forfás, 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Inter-Trade Ireland, Department of 
Finance have all increased the level of research on the SME sector. In addition 
to this growing level of research, there has been the introduction of new surveys 
on the topic of access to finance for SMEs. These surveys include the Red C 
Credit Demand Survey by the Department of Finance2. Non Government 
agencies including the Small Firms Association, Mazars Ireland, the Irish Small 
and Medium Enterprises Association (ISME) have also conducted similar 
research on access to finance for SMEs and lobbied on behalf of SMEs in 
Ireland.  
It is estimated that SMEs in Ireland account for approximately 99 percent of all 
enterprises, three quarters of all private sector employment and approximately 
half of the economy Gross Value Added (C.S.0. data).  While composition of 
the sector has changed since the crisis, a significant proportion of the 
                                                          
2 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/Dept%20of%20Finance%20SME%20Credit%20De
mand%20Survey%20Report%20-%20Apr-Sep%202013.pdf  
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employment created by SMEs is in the distribution, accommodation and food, 
construction and manufacturing sectors. Figure 1.2 below shows the 
composition of SMEs in Ireland in 2012. 
Figure1.2  SME employment by sector in Ireland 
Source: Central statistics office Ireland 
The SME sector is also found to be quite a dynamic sector, with over 50% of 
SMEs reported active between the years of 2001 and 2010 were less than 10 
years in age (C.S.0. data). It is also noted that on average 18% of SMEs in a 
given year are comprised of new entrants and exits (CRO, 2013). 
Since the year 2000, the composition of new lending and stocks of the finance 
outstanding has been analysed (see Menton and Sherman, 2014; Kelly and 
Everett, 2004). Official Central Bank of Ireland data on bank lending shows that 
the flow of credit extended by the banking system became disproportionately 
concentrated on property, real estate and construction sectors from the years 
2000 to 2008. Since the financial crisis, however, primary industries of 
agriculture, wholesale and retail trade now account for the largest share of new 
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lending in the economy (Menton and Sherman, 2014). Official banking data 
also shows that repayments of bank debt have outstripped new lending in every 
quarter since Q1 2010, when the exception of Q3 2011.  
As regards European employment, SMEs have been hit hard since 2008, but 
have proved to be more resilient in terms of employment numbers. In 2009 
alone, large firms across Europe lost almost 1.7 million jobs in comparison to 
just 677,000 for SMEs which account for the majority of European employment 
(European Commission, 2013). Despite this resilience, large firms have proved 
to recover much quicker in the subsequent years in terms of employment in 
comparison to SMEs. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 describes the research 
field of this thesis and the rise of SME finance research. Section 1.3 provides a 
theoretical background to the research and the basis for this study. This section 
details the traditional theories of SME finance and details the recent movement 
in emphasis away from these traditional theories towards a new focus on 
working capital finance behaviour in SMEs. Section 1.4 outlines the research 
aims of this thesis, while Section 1.5 details the research methodology. In this 
section, the current trends in methods to analyse SME finance are detailed as 
well as the limitations and strengths of existing research methods. Section 1.5 
also provides a detailed account of the processes involved in preparing and 
analysing data for the research. Finally, the section will highlight the benefits 
and limitations of the methodology chosen for this thesis. Section 1.7 outlines 
the structure of the thesis, detailing each of the chapters, while Section 1.8 
details the output to date of this research in terms of publications, conference 
acceptances and working papers.  
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1.2 The research field: The rise in the importance of SME finance research 
 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a noticeable 
rise in emphasis on research and policy aimed at the SME sector internationally. 
At a European and international level, research has been carried out by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED, 2013), most 
noticeably the OECD Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs Scoreboard (2013), 
Bain and Company and the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2013), The 
World Bank, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission 
(EC) (2012) among others. There has also been a rise in the number of academic 
published papers on SME finance in peer-reviewed journals such as the 
International Small Business Journal, Small Business Economics and Journal of 
Banking and Finance.  
One of the first steps in understanding SMEs is improving the quality and scope 
of data available to policy makers and academics. In terms of improved data, the 
establishment of EU/ECB Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises, also 
known as SAFE has been a major step forward in facilitating policy based 
research in the area of SME finance over the past 5 years. In addition to the 
increased focus on SME finance by policy makers and practitioners, there has 
also been a significant number of policy tools introduced at both country and 
EU level. Many of these instruments are referred to later in the thesis. While a 
significant restructuring has taken place by both ECB and domestic Central 
banks to deal with the banking sectors, domestic policy makers have introduced 
various instruments to encourage and facilitate lending and access to finance for 
credit constrained SMEs over the crisis with most countries introducing some 
form of loan guarantee scheme (OECD scoreboard, 2013).  
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1.3 Theoretical background 
 
Table 1.1 Studies explaining capital Structure and financing behaviour 
 Studies adopting the theory approach of explaining financing behaviour. 
Author 
  
Journal of 
Publication 
Country, 
sample 
size, and 
Data 
Method Theoretical 
perspective 
Principal findings 
Large firm and 
listed firm 
studies 
 
     
 
Myers and Majluf 
(1984) 
 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
 
- 
 
Theoretical 
model 
 
 
 
Pecking Order  
Due to assumptions of asymmetric 
information between firm 
managers or ‘insiders’ and that 
managers act in the interests of 
existing shareholders, firms prefer 
to finance investment opportunities 
through internal finance, then 
external debt and only external 
equity as a last resort.  
 
 
Titman and 
Wessels. (1988) 
 
Journal of 
Finance 
 
U.S. 
Compustat 
data (469) 
 
Lisrel 
system and 
empirically 
tests 
various 
theories of 
capital 
structure 
 
Agency theory 
Debt tax shields 
Innovation 
Pecking order 
 
 
Findings show the importance of 
transaction costs, past profitability 
and current debt levels, collateral 
value or future growth 
opportunities expenditure as 
determinants, while transactions 
costs are more significant small 
firms. 
Rajan and 
Zingales. (1995)  
Journal of 
Finance 
Internationa
l, Global 
Vantage 
data. 
1987-1991 
Cross 
sectional 
regression 
model and 
Tobit 
model 
Empirical 
examination into 
the role of 
institutional 
factors 
Findings indicate that differences 
in leverage are not easily explained 
by differences in institutional 
factors. 
 
Shyam, Sunders 
and Myers (1999) 
 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
 
US 
157 firms 
continuousl
y listed 
between 
1971-1989 
 
Flow of 
funds, OLS 
regression 
 
 
Pecking Order 
 
Finds that the pecking order is an 
excellent first order descriptor of 
observed capital structures. 
 
Fama and French. 
(2002) 
 
The Review 
of Financial 
studies 
 
3,000 US 
listed firms 
1965-1999 
 
Theoretical 
and 
empirical 
 
Pecking order 
Trade off theory 
 
Find support for both pecking 
order and trade off theories.  
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Frank and Goyal. 
(2003) 
 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
 
US 
Compustat 
data 
1971-1998 
 
Empirical 
regression 
analysis 
 
Pecking order 
static trade off 
Mean reversion 
 
Find that little or none of the 
predictions of the pecking order 
hold, especially for small firms. 
Small high growth firms are the 
primary issuers of equity in the US. 
Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
Compustat 
data on 
12,919 
public 
firms for an 
average 9.6 
years each 
over the 
period 
1965-2001 
Dynamic 
leverage 
modelling 
Trade off theory This study adds to the empirical 
findings on Capital Structure 
theory in favour of the Trade-off/ 
partial adjustment theory. The 
empirical findings demonstrate that 
constant unmeasured firm specific 
effects accounts for a large 
proportion of cross sectional 
variation in firm leverage, not 
previously accounted for within the 
literature. Huang and Ritter. 
(2009) 
Journal of 
Financial and 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
US 
CRSP and 
Compustat 
data 
1963-2001 
Time series 
leverage 
regressions 
Market timing 
hypothesis 
Pecking Order 
Finds diminishing support for the 
pecking order theory over a 30 year 
period, support the market timing 
hypothesis. Historical values of the 
cost of equity finance have long 
lasting effects on firms’ capital 
structures. 
 
Lemmon and 
Zender (2010) 
 
Journal of 
Financial and 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
 
CRSP and 
Compustat. 
US data 
1971-2001 
 
Simulations 
OlS 
regressions 
 
Pecking order 
Debt capacity 
 
 
After accounting for debt capacity 
issues, the pecking order is a good 
descriptor of capital structures. 
 
 
 
 
Leary and 
Roberts  (2014)  
 
Journal of 
Finance 
 
CRSP 
Compustat 
data: 9,126 
firms   
1965-2008 
 
 
Panel data 
regressions 
 
Industry average 
effect on Capital 
Structure 
decisions and 
Peer effects 
 
Capital structure decisions are 
significantly affected by Peers. 
Firms’ financing decisions are 
responses to the financing and 
characteristics of Peers.  
Small firm 
(SME) based 
studies 
     
Chittenden et al. 
(1996) 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
UK Private 
+ database 
of firms 
employing 
less than 
100 people. 
(3408) 
Panel data 
analysis 
OLS 
Agency, 
Pecking Order 
Trade off theory 
Financial structures of firms reflect 
rational trade-offs of costs, but 
overall reliance on internal finance 
and collateral as a means of 
obtaining debt finance dominate. 
Cressy and 
Olofsson. (1997b) 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
Sweden.  
(285) 
survey 
responses 
Survey 
questionnai
re and 
tested 
hypotheses 
Pecking Order 
theory 
Existence of finance demand 
constraints, returns from profits, 
growth and survival are not enough 
to offset the utility of control loss. 
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Berger and Udell 
(1998) 
 
Journal of 
Banking and 
Finance 
 
US( 
NSSBF 
data 1993) 
 
 
Descriptive 
analysis 
 
 
Pecking Order 
Agency theory 
Financial growth 
life cycle 
 
Capital structures vary with age 
and size of firm and can be 
analysed from a life cycle 
perspective. 
Jordan et al. 
(1998) 
Journal of 
Business, 
Finance and 
Accounting 
South East 
England. 
(275) 
FAME 
Heckman 
procedure 
with a 
Logit 
model 
 
Pecking order 
and Strategy  
Finds no evidence for industry 
effects in explaining capital 
structures, however competitive 
strategies are important. Finds 
support for the pecking order. 
Finds that turnover and sales are 
positively related to debt levels. 
SMEs are defined as employing 
less than 100 employees. 
 
Michaelas et al.         
(1999) 
 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
UK 
(3500) 
 
OLS 
regressions 
 
 
 
Trade off , 
Pecking Order 
and agency 
theory 
 
Capital structures of small firms 
are time and industry dependent. 
 
Berggren et al. 
(2000) 
 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
 
Sweden 
(281) 
 
Structural 
Equation 
modelling 
 
Asymmetric 
information. 
Control aversion 
Pecking order 
Widespread scepticism among 
SMEs about external control. But 
technological development, 
financial strength and the perceived 
need to grow changes attitudes 
towards external finance.  
Hall et al (2000) 
 
International 
Journal of 
the 
Economics 
of Business 
 
Lotus One 
database 
UK 
Taken in 
1995 
(3500) 
 
 
Cross 
section 
regressions 
with 
measures of 
leverage as 
dependent 
variables. 
 
Trade off theory 
Pecking Order 
theory 
Finds long-term debt to be 
positively related to firm asset 
structure and size but negatively 
related to age, while short-term 
debt was found to be negatively 
related to asset structure, 
profitability, size and age, it was 
found to be positively related to 
growth. 
 
Watson and 
Wilson (2002) 
Journal of 
Business, 
Finance and 
Accounting 
 
UK 
(626 
SMEs) 
Sample 
po tion d 
into low 
and high 
information 
asymmetry. 
Cross 
sectional 
regression 
analysis. 
Trade off theory 
Pecking Order 
and Agency 
theory 
Finds that closely held SMEs 
(primarily manager owned) differ 
in their financing preferences over 
other types of SME ownership 
(more widely held). There is a 
preference among closely held 
managerial structures to be highly 
reliant on short-term debt financing 
rather than long term debt. This is 
due to the higher information 
requirements and costs associated 
with long term debt. Widely held 
firms are better placed to meet 
these information requirements. 
The perceived high risk of lending 
and high monitoring costs means 
that suppliers of finance will 
require a much higher premium. 
 
Hogan and 
Hutson. (2005) 
 
Global 
Finance 
Journal 
 
Ireland 
(175 
SMEs) 
 
Descriptive 
analysis of 
primary 
survey data 
on NTBF’s 
 
Modified 
Pecking Order 
theory 
This paper finds that among the 
sector of new technology based 
firms, internal funds are the most 
important source of finance, with 
debt rare and equity finance 
dominating external financing 
needs. 
 
Johnson and 
McMahon. 
(2005) 
 
Small 
Business and 
Enterprise 
Development 
 
Australian 
Government 
longitudinal 
survey 1994-
1998  
 
Logistic 
regression 
 
Industry average 
effect 
 
The paper finds that even after 
controlling for characteristic such 
as size, age, profitability, growth 
asset structure and risk, cross-
industry differences in SME 
financing behaviour do exist. 
López- Gracia 
and Sogorb- Mira 
(2008) 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
Spain 
(3569) 
Generalised 
method of 
moments( 
GMM) and 
two stage 
least 
squares 
 
 
Trade Off and 
Pecking Order 
theory 
Results support trade off theory, in 
that SMEs aim to reach a target 
(optimum) level of leverage. 
NDTS, growth opportunities and 
internal resources all determine 
capital structures. 
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Cotei and Farhat. 
(2009) 
North 
American 
Journal of 
Finance and 
Banking 
research 
 
US  
Compustat 
and CRSP 
data 
 
Multivariat
e regression 
analysis 
 
Pecking Order 
Trade off theory 
Aims to determine are both 
theories exclusive. Find that both 
theories are not mutually exclusive, 
but both serve a role in explaining 
capital structure decisions. 
 
Psillaki and 
Daskalakis. 
(2009) 
 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
 
Panel data 
1997-2002 
Amadeus 
 
Tests a 
series of 
hypotheses 
using a 
panel 
dataset 
 
Pecking order 
Static trade off 
theory 
SME capital structures across 
countries are determined in a 
similar way, primarily due to civil 
law systems. Differences arise due 
to firm specific effects. Size is 
positively related to leverage, 
while asset structure, profitability 
and risk is negatively related,  
 
Mac an Bhaird 
and Lucey. 
(2010) 
 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
 
Ireland  
(299 survey 
response) 
 
OLS with 
seemingly 
unrelated 
regression 
(SUR) to 
examine 
industry 
effects. 
 
Agency theory 
Pecking Order 
theory 
 
Finds that Age, size, ownership 
structure are all important 
determinants of SME capital 
structure and the provision of 
collateral is very important across 
industries, implying a universal 
effect of information asymmetries. 
 
Vanacker and 
Manigart. (2010) 
 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
 
Belgian 
accounting 
data 
covering all 
firms > 10 
employees. 
(32000) 
 
Splits 
sample 
between 
high and 
low growth 
firms. 
Logistic 
regression 
applied. 
 
Static trade off 
Pecking order 
theory 
 
Finds that for high growth firms, 
new equity issues are important for 
them to grow beyond their debt 
capacity level. High growth, firms 
with low cash flow, intangible 
activity or high risk have low debt 
capacity have greater reliance on 
external equity. 
 
 
Table 1.1 displays the most prominent studies in capital structure theories of 
both large and small firms in the literature as well as their empirical findings. 
The table presents papers dating from Myers and Majluf (1984) to Leary and 
Roberts (2014) detailing the development of both theoretical and empirical 
evidences for large firm. This is then followed by the theoretical and empirical 
developments in the literature on SME capital structure from Chittenden, Hall 
and Hutchinson (1996) to Vanacker and Manigart (2010). Many of the studies 
on SME finance are based on the theories of capital structure applied to and 
empirically tested in the case of large firm. Section 1.3.1 details the 
development of theoretical knowledge on capital structure and its application to 
the study of SMEs. These theories are further developed and explained in 
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Chapter 2 of this thesis, while section 1.3.2 details the more recent 
developments in SME finance literature.  
 
1.3.1 Capital structure theory in SMEs 
 
Research indicates that capital structure theory in small firms originates from 
corporate finance theory and specifically the Modigliani and Miller 
contributions (1958, 1963). Two key propositions that highlight that firm 
financing choices are based on the difference between the cost of debt and 
equity finance, the role of tax deductibility of debt finance and ultimately the 
impact of financing choices on firm value. Established financial literature has, 
however, highlighted a significant wedge between the costs of internal and 
external finance for small firms (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, Berger and 
Udell, 1998), with asymmetric information being the most significant reason 
why the costs of external funds are significantly greater than internal funds 
(Berger and Udell, 1998).  Information asymmetries refers to the differences 
between the knowledge and information among business owners/ managers 
about the value of assets and future growth opportunities of the business that 
outsiders can only estimate based on their observed information on the business. 
As a result, the use of external finance by firms comes at a cost and is 
conditional on the severity of agency costs between the borrower and the lender 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theory has been found to be particularly important in determining the 
financing of SMEs, as agency costs come in the form of information 
asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazards that arise as a result of the 
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contractual agreements between the providers of external finance and the firm 
(Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
problem of agency costs come in the form of monitoring, which maybe more 
costly for banks to obtain from small firms given the lack of requirements to 
disclose information pertaining to them (Bass and Schrooten, 2006). As a result, 
moral hazard maybe a greater issue for small firms. Given that information and 
data on contractual arrangements has been historically limited for the purposes 
of financial research, efforts to test the degree of agency problems has been 
difficult and restricted (Walker, 1989). 
As a result of the perceived adverse selection among the providers of external 
finance, a premium on the funds lent to small firms applies, and the higher this 
premium, the greater the level of discouragement from debt finance (Myers 
1984). Ultimately, firms and, in particular SMEs will chose sources of finance 
least subject to information asymmetries, therefore avoiding external funds 
where possible (Cressy and Oloffson, 1997). Similarly, due to the preference to 
retain ownership among SMEs, when external financing is required, debt 
financing is often preferable as its least subject to information asymmetries, 
therefore requires a lower premium and avoids existing shareholders having to 
relinquish their share of ownership of existing assets (Watson and Wilson, 
2002; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, the implications of asymmetric 
information and agency costs means that SMEs prefer to finance according to a 
pecking order, whereby internal finance is the most preferable source of finance, 
followed by debt finance and external equity finance as a last resort (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003). 
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Over time, the Pecking Order has emerged as the primary theoretical lens to 
view SME/ small unlisted firms’ capital structure, and has been cited 
extensively in research as an excellent descriptor of capital structure and 
financing decisions among SMEs (Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Berggren et al., 2000; Watson and Wilson., 2002 and Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 
2010).  Accordingly, capital structure theory has focused on three strands 
including, firm specific, country specific and the impact of macroeconomic 
factors, with firm specific factors occupying the majority of interest within 
academic research (Titman and Wessel, 1988; Berger and Udell, 1998, 
Michaelas, Chittenden  and Poutziouris, 1999) . Due to the heterogeneity of the 
SME sector and their observed characteristic differences to that of large firms, 
the age, ownership structure, industry setting etc have all been analysed as 
important determinants of financing choice.  The capital structure of SMEs is 
likely to differ from large firms for a number of reasons, including the greater 
degrees of informational asymmetries and reliance on internal funds among 
SMEs. SMEs often have less collateralised assets, hence obtaining bank finance 
is challenging. Often they are not as diversified as large firms, thus there is a 
greater level of risk and bankruptcy associated with them.  
More recently, primarily due to improvements in data availability, a growing 
number of studies have analysed the relationship between country specific 
characteristics and firm level characteristics and SME finance. Some studies 
highlight that country effects outweigh the influence of firm specific effects in 
access to finance, particularly for small firms (Joeveer, 2013; Frank and Goyal, 
2009), while other studies maintain that firm specific effects outweigh country 
specific effects in determining firm leverage (Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; 
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Hall et al., 2004), however there remains no consensus on this issue within the 
literature. It has also been shown that country and firm specific effects are not 
mutually exclusive, but country effects have direct and indirect influences on 
firm level outcomes (De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008; Korajczyk and Levy, 
2003). Despite these studies, very few studies have examined the role cross 
country and institutional effects over time on unlisted SME financing behaviour, 
and this research aims to fill that gap in the existing literature. Table 1.1 above 
summarises the papers, empirical methodology, data, theoretical findings and 
contextual settings based on the findings for capital structure and financing 
decisions of small and large firms. 
While the Pecking Order theory is a valid explanation of observed capital 
structures among SMEs, recent developments in SME finance literature have 
moved to focus more on the working capital behaviour of SMEs (Vermoesen, 
Deloof and Lavern, 2013, Banos-Caballero, García-Tereul and Martínez-
Solano, 2012 among others). New data sources inform us that approximately 
only 5 percent of European SMEs surveyed are reported to have used equity 
finance in the past 6 months, whereas 45 percent have used or have experience 
in using trade credit (Survey on Access to Finance, 2013), indicating that equity 
finance is not a major finance source for SMEs, with the possible exception of 
high tech software firms. Similarly, other data sources indicate that as many as 1 
in 3 SMEs have no outstanding debt (Central Bank, 2014). 
Given the fact that almost one in three SMEs have no debt finance (Central 
Bank, 2014, B.I.S., 2012), this research aims to not only empirically test the 
conventional theories describing SME financing behaviour, but to offer a new 
approach in understanding the financing behaviour of SMEs. Among the aims 
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of the research are to analyse the recent movement in emphasis in SME finance 
literature away from traditional theories of capital structure based on debt versus 
equity financing in the SME context, but towards theory which focuses on the 
working capital and short-term operational financing behaviour of SMEs.  
1.3.2 Working capital in SMEs 
 
Table 1.2 below displays some of the most prominent studies in SME working 
capital literature over the past few years. These studies are the closest in 
relevance to this thesis in that they use actual firm level accounting data (with 
the exception of Casey and O’Toole, 2014). Despite this, none of these studies 
contain the scope of the data used in this thesis. Carbo-Valverde, Rodriquez-
Fernandez and Udell (2009) examine the role of working capital and investment 
among SMEs over the period leading up to the crisis. Despite the conventional 
belief that trade credit is primarily short-term source of finance (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997), their study finds that trade credit plays a significant role in 
investment among credit constrained Spanish SMEs. Similarly, for a sample of 
Spanish SMEs, Martínez-Sola and Garcia-Tereul (2013) and Banos-Cabellero, 
García- Tereul and Martínez-Solano (2012) also find that working capital 
management and the use of trade credit among SMEs played a significant role 
in sustaining sales and profitability for SMEs in financial distress. A major 
advantage of this research is the inclusion for the first time a cross-country 
analysis of the working capital management and analysis of trade credit use 
among SMEs, and its importance over the financial crisis period and beyond 
(2008-2012).  
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Table1.2 Existing panel studies using balance sheet firm level data on the 
working capital of SMEs 
Paper Database   Countries Time 
Period 
No. of 
SMEs 
Carbo-Valverde 
et al. (2012) 
Amadeus Spain 2004-
2008 
3,404 
Psillaki and 
Daskalikis(2009) 
Amadeus Four 
western 
countries 
1997-
2001 
11,654 
Martínez- Sola 
et al. (2013) 
SABI 
database(BVD) 
of Spanish 
SMEs 
Spain 2000-
2007 
11,337 
Banos-
Cabellero, 
García-Tereul 
and Martínez-
Solano (2012) 
SABI 
database(BVD) 
of Spanish 
SMEs 
Spain 2002-
2007 
1008 
Spanish 
SMEs 
Casey and 
O’Toole (2014) 
SAFE Data 11 Western 
countries 
2009-
2011 
3,500 
 
As the first study to examine the working capital behaviour of SMEs in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis this thesis adds to the emerging field.   The 
thesis is the first to empirically test for and quantify the redistribution of credit 
for SMEs over the financial crisis based on actual firm level accounting data. 
The research demonstrates that the financial position is the key determinant of 
trade credit use and in SMEs. It is also the first to demonstrate the relation 
between trade credit use and the probability of survival among SMEs.  
 
1.4 Aims and objectives of this thesis 
This thesis aims to examine the impact of the financial crisis on the financing 
behaviour and decisions of SMEs. In particular, the thesis focuses on the role of 
trade credit in SME finance.  In doing so, the research aims to examine the link 
between the restrictions in bank finance and the financing decisions of SMEs in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. The study aims to demonstrate the 
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transmission of credit restrictions to SMEs from the banking sector and its 
influence on inter-firm financing via trade credit. 
More specifically it addresses the following three questions within the debate on 
SME finance. 
First, from a theory perspective, how can we best understand the financial 
decision making of SMEs with regard to working capital over the business 
cycle? This first of all, I test the applicability of existing theory regarding 
financing decisions among SMEs. This involves scrutiny of the existing theories 
of SME capital structure and financing decisions and how they perform over the 
business cycle and financial crisis period, in particular, the examination of the 
performance of Pecking Order theory.  Second, given the reliance of SMEs on 
bank finance, what has been the role of alternative funding throughout the crisis 
period and, in particular, what has been the role of trade credit finance? Third, 
what other factors including firm specific, financial position, industry specific, 
country and institutional characteristics and macroeconomic factors affect trade 
credit use?   
To answer these questions, the research accesses a unique panel of financial 
statement data for SMEs over the years 2004-2012. The findings of this research 
are not only relevant for Irish and European SMEs, but relevant elsewhere given 
the global nature of the financial crisis. 
A key contribution of the research is the use of panel data analysis based on real 
accounting data as opposed to survey estimates to provide both cross sectional 
and longitudinal analysis of SME financing behaviour. An acknowledged 
weakness in SME research to date is the lack of research based on standardised 
SME data internationally and in particular on small firms (OECD, 2013). For 
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this reason, many studies have tended to rely on survey data with limited 
coverage and accounting measures. In addition to this, many of the existing 
studies on SME finance are based on very small sample sizes upon which 
inferences are drawn, therefore inadequate to capture changes over time, firm 
heterogeneity as well as shocks to the financial system. This analysis 
demonstrates that panel data is now a pre-request for the study of SME finance. 
Panel data has several advantages, including the ability to control and account 
for omitted variables and unobservable firm heterogeneity that influences results 
using detailed values of many balance sheet variables across firms and over 
time. As well as methodological and statistical benefits, the data also has the 
advantage of differentiating surviving and non-surviving firms over a period of 
time.  
1.5 The research methodology 
 
1.5.1 Current trends  
 
One of the major contributions of this research, apart from the focus on short-
term finance decisions of SMEs, is the scope of the firm level data upon which 
this research is based and its advantages over other self-reported data, such as 
SAFE. One of the major benefits of SAFE data has been to highlight the 
changes in perceptions among SMEs regarding their access to finance over the 
crisis period.  The most recent SAFE survey findings report that the highest 
levels of reliance on internal funds amongst European SMEs was in Hungary 
and Slovakia. In terms of trade credit use, applications for trade credit were 
reported to be highest among SMEs in Spain, Italy and Greece and lowest in 
Latvia, Estonia and Hungary (European Commission, 2013). Overall, trade 
19 
 
credit use across the EU was reported to be 32 percent in 2013, same as in 2011, 
while applications for new or renewed bank loans were 32 percent very close to 
the 2011 level of 30 percent. 
Figure1.3  Types of external finance applied for by SMEs according to SAFE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, over time it has become clear that SAFE data alone provides an 
insufficient description of the actual financing of SMEs and consequently 
cannot be solely be relied on to inform policy from the reasons outlined in 1.5.2. 
1.5.2 Limitations of existing data 
 
Since the onset of the financial crisis reference has been made to the lack of 
quantitative data on SME finance research (OECD, 2013). Despite the changes 
in policy and availability of finance over since 2008, there appears to be little  
 
                                                          
3 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/files/2013-safe-analytical-report_en.pdf 
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change in terms of SMEs’ responses regarding access according to SAFE. This 
is evident from the construction and context of SAFE data. For example, a 
recent report in 2013 titled ‘SME Access to Finance Survey’ compared 
responses of SMEs across Europe from the first wave of the SAFE survey in 
June 2009 to that of the responses of SMEs sampled in the June 2013 wave of 
the survey. The results contained little variation over the crisis period in terms 
of the responses of SMEs. One in five SMEs survey responded as not using any 
source of finance in the past 6 months, and this figure was the same in 2009 and 
in 2013. When asked in both periods on a scale of 1-10, what is the most 
pressing problem for their firm? Out of a list of 8 factors including finding 
customers, availability of skilled labour, regulation, competition, costs of 
production and other factors, 15 percent of respondents across EU 27 stated 
access to finance as the most pressing problem in both 2011 and 2013, despite 
variations across countries. 
 In each wave of the survey access to finance was cited in second place after 
finding customers as the most pressing problem for SMEs. As regards SME 
views in terms of accessing bank finance, the results over the two periods were 
broadly similar with the proportion of SMEs not confident in accessing bank 
finance in 2009 at 25%, while this figure fell to 24% of respondents in 2013 
despite the widespread policy measures in the intervening period.  Given that 
the results from SAFE illustrate that financing conditions are broadly unchanged 
over the crisis period, the figures do illustrate substantial cross country 
differentials. Accessing finance is reported to be the most pressing problem for 
40 percent of the SME surveyed in Cyprus and Greece, while only 6 percent of 
SMEs in Luxembourg report access to finance as the most pressing problem 
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facing them. Similarly, SMEs that applied for a bank loan in the past 6 months 
were most likely to be successful in Germany, Austria and Finland and least 
likely to be successful in the countries of Greece, Lithuania and Cyprus. 
Despite this, there has been a major development in terms of the quantity of new 
research and data on SMEs financing many through sourcing SME accounting 
data. Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010) and Hogan and Hutson (2005) are some 
examples of research on SME finance whereby the researcher has 
commissioned their own surveys and interviews to gather data for the purpose 
of SME finance research. In addition, studies examining SME capital structure 
using cross sectional data can be found in Watson and Wilson (2002), Jordan, 
Lowe and Taylor (1998), Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2000) and Danielson 
and Scott (2007) among others.  These studies have proved to be very important 
in informing policy and debate on SME finance. One criticism, however, is that 
the scope of these studies has been somewhat limited due to the quantity and 
cross sectional nature of the data available to the researchers. Some other 
studies, such as Johnson and McMahon (2005) have gathered longitudinal data. 
Longitudinal data is useful in examining the changes in financing structure of a 
cohort of enterprises over time. These studies have tended also to be one 
country focused, therefore little research has tended to focus on cross country 
differences with the exception of Psillaki and Daskalikis (2009) and Hanader, 
Brocardo and Bazzana (2014).  
Limitations of SAFE and other existing Survey Data 
As stated, one of the most prominent surveys of access to finance for firms 
commissioned since the start of the financial crisis is the ECB Survey on Access 
to Finance, also known as SAFE data. The survey has been carried out every six 
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months since June 2009 to assess the financing conditions of firms across the 
Euro area4 and contains on average the responses of 6,000 SMEs across the 
Euro area, however the level of responses to many of the specific questions 
often amount to over half of the enterprises surveyed. The survey questionnaire 
asks respondents to reply to a number of finance related questions with a set of 
provided options to which respondents answer to. The data generated from the 
survey is therefore categorical and ordinal in nature.5 Categorical data limits the 
scope of SME finance research from a number of perspectives. 
a) The SAFE questionnaire does not provide information on the financial 
structure of SMEs in terms of actual amounts, only in terms of amounts that 
accounts to categorical ranges. The data obtained from the survey therefore 
does not detail the level of profitability, level of indebtedness or the cash 
position of the firms. This limitation is significant in assessing the change in 
the financial position of firms. 
b) The data from SAFE is derived from a telephone survey and represent the 
views and beliefs of enterprises at a particular point in time. Opinions and 
perceptions are not ordinal and often are subjective in nature (Fernando and 
Mulier, 20136)   and furthermore cannot be equitable over time.  
                                                          
4 See latest SAFE report: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/accesstofinancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201
404en.pdf??da920468528300ff549d8cc95522eb81 [ Accessed: 10th September 2014] 
 
5  Please see Access to Finance survey questionnaire: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html [ Accessed 10th 
September 2014] 
 
6 http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/eea-
esem/2012/429/financial_constraints_FerrandoEEA.pdf [Accessed 9th September 2014] 
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c) Given that the data is categorical in nature, empirical estimation is limited to 
binary choice estimation, whereas traditional regression estimation such as 
least squares based on continuous data is not possible. 
d) There may be response bias, in that certain enterprises are influenced by the 
wording and phrasing of the questionnaire. As true with any self-reported data, 
the responses will be influenced by views of the SME manager on the day. 
e) SAFE data only asks respondents what is the most pressing problem regarding 
access to finance. A firm cannot signal more than one problem for a specific 
question.  
f) Panel data analysis is restricted with SAFE data as a different sample of firms 
in sampled in each panel. While this does not prohibit panel analysis, it makes 
the estimation of firm fixed effects impossible as firms are not uniquely 
identifiable; therefore the ability of the research to follow the changing 
circumstances for a particular firm over a period of time is restricted. Firm 
fixed effects have been shown to account for a significant proportion of the 
variation in listed firms capital structure (Flannery and Rangan, 2006), so 
failure to account for this likely leads to model misspecification ( Baltagi, 
2008). 
The empirical analysis in this research is based on direct balance sheet and 
profit and loss accounts of enterprises over the period 2004-2012. The benefits 
of this are that the analyses upon which findings are based are sourced from the 
actual company account figures and contain direct measures of the actual 
financial position of SMEs during the financial crisis. This, I believe makes this 
research practical and reliable for informing policy. 
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1.5.3 Data sources and preparation 
 
As highlighted thus far, one of the major contributions of this study is the size 
and scope of the data analysis on SMEs. To the best of my knowledge, there is 
no existing study on SME finance which covers a comparable sample of 
primarily unlisted SME profit and loss and balance sheet data. The data for this 
study was obtained from the FAME and the AMADEUS databases, 
respectively. Both of which are supplied by Bureau Van Dyk. FAME, short for 
‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’ database contains data on firms from the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The data used in this research are 
derived from firm accounts filed at the official Irish government’s Companies 
Registration Office (CRO).  The benefits of this mean that the findings of this 
research are based on actual financing decisions and behaviour over a ten-year 
period. While the data supplied by firms is limited to Irish and UK companies, 
Amadeus database contains financial and firm level data on both private and 
publicly traded firms from across Europe. The data however, varies in quality of 
coverage depending on firm, region and across variables. 
The data obtained from Amadeus also known as ‘Analyse Major Database from 
European Union Sources’ for this study was downloaded in May 2013, which 
means the latest year of firm level data is 2011, with some coverage of 2012. 
When selecting data for download, data was chosen from each individual 
country of interest, including all the main financing variables of interest and 
proceeded to download. Due to the difficulty restricting the criteria for 
download, downloading and cleaning of this data took a lot longer than had 
been originally anticipated. In total, information on almost half a million firms 
were downloaded in separate excel files containing approximately 3,500 firms. 
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These excel files were combined and merged to single excel files for each 
country, resulting in 15 separate country excel files containing a mixture of both 
core and peripheral European countries.  
With each excel file, the data was initially cleaned. To work with this data in 
STATA (the software used in this study’s analysis), all data must be in long 
format, this meant that all written letters for missing data such as (n.a.;s.a.;s.n.; 
n.s.;) had to be removed. In addition all data was formatted to round up decimal 
places to whole numbers. Once this was done, the individual excel files were 
saved in comma delimited format to be ready for import in STATA. 
Subsequently, it was necessary to construct the variable of interest for the study. 
For example, while the data downloaded contained relevant balance sheet and 
profit and loss account data and approximately 15 variables for each country, it 
was necessary to create specific variables for the study that were not readily 
available from the database. These would include the creation of ratio variables 
such as the ratio of firm sales, cost of sales and other financial variables by firm 
assets for the purpose of later regression analysis. In addition variables such as 
firm age were constructed from incorporation dates of firms stated in 
downloaded data. Data was separated for each individual variable and for each 
country and combined together to create a single file and then transformed from 
wide format to long format for the purpose of panel analysis. All financial data 
was winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile level to mitigate the effect of extreme 
outliers. Once this was done each of the transformed variables were merged 
together in a panel data and analysis was ready to begin. 
Given the complexity in the estimation and study of panel data, it was necessary 
to take a number of courses in preparation of this research. Since finishing my 
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masters’ degree in 2008 and prior to beginning my PhD studies in early 2011 
until submission, I have taken a number of academic courses particularly in the 
area of Finance and econometrics to facilitate the research. These include 
 Dynamic and non-linear Panel data Analysis using Stata with Sergi Jiminénez-
Mártin, GSE Economics Summer School, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 
Barcelona (July 2014). 
 Linear Panel Data Analysis with Badi Baltagi, GSE Economics Summer 
School, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (July 2013). 
 GMM for Panel Data using STATA with assessment, Steve Bond (University 
of Oxford). UCD April 2012 
 Econometric Applied Causal Analysis in U.C.D. (June 2010).  
 Financial Crises by Professor Jerry Caprio, Trinity College Dublin (Autumn 
2009/2012) 
1.5.4 The benefits of panel data 
 
This study is the first that applies panel data analyses using the FAME and 
Amadeus data to examine SME working capital behaviour over the financial 
crisis. The advantages of panel data in this study are significant. Panel data 
allows for the study of the changes in financing over a period of time and 
ultimately, gives the researcher more information, more variability, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficient coefficient estimates (Baltagi, 2008). 
Most importantly in terms of estimates, panel data allows for the control of 
unobservable and individual heterogeneity (Askildsen, Baltagi and Holmas, 
2003) which often leads to biased results with other forms of data. In addition, 
panel data is most appropriate in studying the dynamics of adjustment 
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(Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2006), which is particularly important since my data 
covers a period of significant change in financing behaviour.  
In employing Fixed Effects estimation, the analysis captures the net effect of the 
financial crisis on trade credit use and other sources of financing. Similar to 
Love et al. (2007), Fixed Effects estimation allows for the controlling of time 
invariant and unobservable firm specific characteristics influencing SME 
financing decisions and trade credit use. This is particularly important given the 
dynamic behaviour and diverse characteristics of the SME sector (Jordan, Lowe 
and Taylor 1998; Berger and Udell 1998).   
For example, to illustrate the benefits of Fixed Effects, take a simple static 
estimation where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable capturing finance received of the 
firm i at time t, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time varying independent variables for a 
group of firms over time (t) that explain 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑖  are the time invariant factors 
that explain 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , and ∪𝑖𝑡 is the unobservable error term comprised of both the 
fixed heterogeneous unobservable component (μi) and (vit) the time varying 
error component. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ∪𝑖𝑡 
𝑤here ∪𝑖𝑡= μi + vit   
One of the major advantages of panel data is the ability to control time invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity, or the individual specific characteristics unique to a 
particular firm (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). These could be anything from the 
ability of individual SME managers or factors that are unobservable and cannot 
be captured among the variables in the model. The addition of panel data allows 
for the estimation through Random or Fixed Effects. While Random Effects 
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assume that the variation in the error term across cases is random, i.e. the 
covariance between 𝐶𝑖 and ∪𝑖𝑡 are zero, Fixed Effects, however, assumes that 
μi’s are correlated with individual X’s. Therefore Cov (𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝐶𝑖) ≠0, therefore 
time invariant individual effects are eliminated from the error, controlling for 
differences between cases that are constant over time. For estimation to be 
unbiased and consistent, requires strict exogeneity of individual regressors. 
Given that fixed effects has the ability to control for omitted variable bias that 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables, panel data analysis is effective 
in limiting endogeneity in the estimation procedure. In this thesis, a Hausman 
test was conducted to test if each of μi are correlated with individual regressors. 
Based on the rejection of null hypotheses that μi and xi’s are not related, Fixed 
Effects estimation shall be conducted. The benefits of panel, not only produce 
more consistent and unbiased estimates over cross-sectional least squares 
estimation, they also have the ability to control for past values of variables and 
lags can therefore lags can be used as instruments for endogenous regressors. 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in the form of three linked studies. Each study has its 
own constructed and detailed sample and methodology. The structured is as 
follows.  Chapter 2 examines the existing theories and empirical research on 
SME financing behaviour and capital structure. This chapter titled SME capital 
structure: The pecking order theory and the financial crisis use a panel sample 
of English, Scottish and Irish SMEs and test the Pecking Order Theory (POT) as 
a predictor of SME capital structure. The paper also draws upon a methodology 
commonly used in large firm corporate financing literature, but not previously 
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applied in the case of SMEs. By using this methodology, also known as the 
modified flow of funds regression, the paper shows the proportion of SMEs' 
financing deficit, accounted for by debt finance over the business cycle. While 
accounting for debt capacity, the research finds diminishing support for the POT 
for SMEs and predicts that alternative sources of financing have increased in 
importance for many SMEs. Nevertheless, the predictions of the theory 
regarding profits, size, age and tangibility are all upheld.  Finally, the paper 
highlights critical changes in SME financing since the onset of the financial 
crisis, including observed investment behaviour amongst the sample of SMEs. 
Drawing on the findings from Chapter 2, the second stage of the research 
examines the role of alternative sources of finance for SMEs. This is 
documented in Chapter 3 entitled Bank credit and Trade credit: Evidence from 
SMEs over the financial crisis. 
This chapter uses panel data to test the extent to which trade credit has acted as 
a substitute for bank finance in SMEs in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2008. It demonstrates that the reduction in the supply of funds to SMEs was 
compounded by the contraction of net trade credit within the sector. 
Nevertheless, trade credit played a vital role in the adjustment of the sector by 
easing the burden of financial crisis for some SMEs. Thus, the relative 
importance of trade credit increased for financially ‘vulnerable’ SMEs that were 
less liquid, highly dependent on short-term bank finance, and with a higher 
proportion of intangible assets, when entering the crisis. In terms of a 
redistribution effect; financially stronger firms extended relatively more trade 
credit to financially vulnerable SMEs in aftermath of the financial crisis.  In 
addition, the analysis demonstrates that the financial position of SMEs entering 
30 
 
the crisis was more important in determining the impact of the financial crisis 
on trade credit than company characteristics of age and size.  
In Chapter 4, the study is extended to consider the role of institutional and 
country specific characteristics in influencing SME finance. Unlike much of the 
existing research, this study includes a comprehensive analysis firms financing 
responses to the financial crisis. The study draws upon existing research on 
institutional and macro level factors and analyses their role in SME financing 
behaviour. This chapter titled Trade credit and Bank credit; A perspective on 
European SMEs. The research extends upon the work in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
examines changes in SME finance for a sample of European countries. While 
examining differences in the financing of SMEs across the Euro area, the 
research also examines how these differences are influenced by economic and 
institutional factors across regions. Using data from 15 European countries, 
including core European states and periphery states, this chapter also introduces 
a number of important methodological extensions to the examination of SME 
financing, and a country, economy and financial factors as well as measure of a 
composite risk for each country in the sample. 
Finally, given the important role of trade credit in SME finance highlighted in 
this research, I test its likely impact on firm survival over the crisis period.  
In line with the European Commission (2005) SME definition7, my final sample 
contains 2.1 million firm-year observations on European SMEs over the period 
2003-2012. In total, the sample contains approximately 283,360 firms across 15 
European countries. Firm industry sectors are categorised according to two digit 
                                                          
7 SMEs are defined according to the European Commission (2005) criteria, which includes firms 
that employ less than 249 workers in a given year and have either an annual turnover of less 
than €50m or a balance sheet total of less than €43m in a given year. 
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NACE 2007 codes and firms are assigned to 20 separate industry sectors. The 
analysis excludes all financial and insurance companies, in line with existing 
empirical studies, as well as public utilities such as public transport and postal 
services are also excluded from the sample. Summary statistics for all data used 
in this research are included in the Appendix of tables. The following is an 
outline of the conceptual framework of the thesis, summarising the research 
aims and objectives of each study and where they fit in each of the following 
chapters. 
  
32 
 
Table1.3 Conceptual map of thesis 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
 
 
                                
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research aim 
To empirically examine the changes and 
impact of the financial crisis on the working 
capital and financing behaviour of SMEs. 
Research 
Objective 1 
To test the Pecking 
Order theory as the 
primary descriptor of 
SME capital structure.
  
Research 
Objective 2 
To test of role of trade 
credit as a source of finance 
to SMEs over the financial 
crisis and assess the 
substitutability between 
trade and bank credit.  
Research 
Objective 3 
To examine the country 
differences in SME 
finance and the role of 
institutional and country 
level factors in SME 
Finance. 
Chapter 2 
Sub objectives 
To adopt a flow of funds 
methodology and panel 
data to test the P.O.T 
To capture the level and 
changes in the use of 
bank finance among 
SMEs as well as 
deleveraging within the 
sector over the crisis 
period. 
Chapter 3 
Sub objectives 
To empirically test the 
importance of trade credit 
finance to SMEs over the 
crisis. 
To test whether trade credit 
could be used as a 
substitute to bank finance 
for financially vulnerable 
SMEs. 
 
Chapter 4 
Sub objectives 
To test the relationship 
between country 
individual effects and 
SME financing behaviour 
over the financial crisis. 
To examine the impact of 
macroeconomic factors 
on financing conditions 
and assess the role of 
trade credit in SME 
survival. 
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 1.7 Key findings from the research 
 
a) Theoretical models explaining financing decision making of SMEs 
ought to pay greater attention to working capital and short-term 
financing behaviour as opposed to traditional capital structure theories 
based on debt versus equity finance. 
b)  Trade credit acted as an important source of finance for many 
financially vulnerable firms throughout the crisis period and influenced 
survival. Larger, older firms and firms with the greatest cash reserves 
were net financiers and extenders of credit to other SMEs over the past 
four years. 
c) Common law countries of Ireland, UK and French civil law countries 
of Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal all exhibited higher 
levels of net credit extension over German, Scandinavian and Socialist 
origin countries 
d) The results show a negative relation between the levels of net credit 
extended economy wide and Composite risk measure index. This result 
most likely indicates an overall negative impact of overall economic, 
political and financial risk on the level of inter-firm financing. 
e) Banking concentration, GDP growth and credit issued by banks are 
positively associated with the levels of inter-firm financing in the SME 
sector, while regulatory quality and political stability are inversely 
related to the levels of inter firm financing economy wide, holding all 
other economic, financial and firm level observable and unobservable 
factors constant. In particular, improved regulatory quality tends to 
reduce the reliance on trade credit finance among SMEs. 
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f) While country and institutional factors are an important determinant in 
SME finance, firm specific characteristics in particular the financial 
position of SMEs have the greatest impact on SME financing 
behaviour. 
g) Length of days SMEs await payment for goods varies significantly 
across country with Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy waiting twice or 
three times the average length of time compared to Finland, Germany, 
Sweden and the UK. 
h) Firms in the sectors of agriculture, accommodation, food and health 
care receive the lowest level of trade credit financing relative to 
wholesale, management companies and retail. 
i) Finally, the results also show that trade credit financing had a positive 
influence on firm survival.  Survival is determined and influenced over 
the crisis by both the level of debt overhang among SMEs and SMEs 
access to trade credit when bank finance is restricted. 
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1.7 Output from this research to date 
One study from this thesis has been accepted for publication in The 
International Small Business Journal, a leading internationally ranked academic 
journal. The International Small Business Journal publishes academic research 
in a range of issues relating to SMEs. In addition to this, the two other studies 
have been accepted for and peer-reviewed for a number of international finance 
and economics conferences. The peer review process including presentations 
has helped critique and advance the research in this thesis. The following details 
the published paper based on Chapter 3 and the conferences in which each of 
the studies were presented. 
 McGuinness, G. and Hogan, T. Bank credit and Trade credit: Evidence from 
SMEs over the financial crisis. International Small Business Journal, 
doi:10.1177/0266242614558314 
 The 10th ECB European Commission COMPNET Workshop, Banco De 
Portugal, Lisbon. Trade credit and Bank credit, Evidence from European 
SMEs over the financial crisis, September 18-19, 2014. 
 The 8th Portuguese Finance Network Conference (PFN), School of Economics, 
University of the Algarve, Vilamoura, Portugal. Paper title ‘Trade credit and 
Bank credit, theory and empirical evidence from European SMEs, June 18, 
2014. 
 The Irish Economic Association Conference (IEA), Paper title ‘Trade credit 
and Bank credit, Evidence from Irish SMEs over the financial crisis, May 8th, 
2014.  
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 The 11th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Aix en Provence, 
France. Paper title ‘Trade credit and Bank finance: Evidence from SMEs over 
the financial crisis’ June 12th, 2013 
 McGuinness, G. P and Hogan, T (2012) SME Capital Structure: A panel data 
analysis of SME financing behaviour in Ireland, England and Scotland, 2004-
2011. Paper presented at The 25th Anniversary Irish Accounting and Finance 
Association (IAFA) conference, NUIG, Galway. May 24-25. 
 McGuinness, G. P and Hogan, T (2012) SME Capital Structure: A panel data 
analysis of the Pecking Order in Ireland, England and Scotland, 2002-2009. 
Paper presented at the INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Trinity 
College Dublin, June, 2012. 
 The Irish Society of New Economists 8th Annual meeting, The Institute of 
Bankers, Dublin 1. Paper title 'SME Capital Structure and the Pecking Order 
Theory', August 18th, 2011. 
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Chapter 2:  SME capital structure: The Pecking Order theory and the 
financial crisis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The operation of many businesses and their survival are highly dependent on 
external finance and this is especially true for SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
Understanding the capital structure decisions and constraints of SMEs is crucial 
for informing policy makers and improving our understanding of the SME 
sector. This study seeks to examine how useful, one of the more prominent 
theories of capital structure, the Pecking Order theory, is in explaining SME 
financing decisions.  
Although the Pecking Order was originally applied to explain the capital 
structure of large firms, a growing number of studies have extended its use to 
explain the financing decisions of SMEs (Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson, 
1996; Berger and Udell, 1998; Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999; 
Hutson and Hogan, 2005; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010) and in particular 
small privately held SMEs (Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Berggren et al., 2000). 
This is not surprising, as the dominance of internal funding and the absence of 
equity are long established empirical features of SME financial structure 
(Bolton Report, 1971: BIS, 2012).  
Given that information asymmetries are at the heart of the pecking order theory, 
and more acute for SMEs (Berger and Udell, 1998), it is reasonable to expect 
that SMEs would follow the pecking order more closely than their large, 
publicly traded counterparts. Yet to date, there appears to be a conflict between 
theory and empirical evidence. Firstly, Barclay et al (2006) find that high 
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growth SMEs consistently use less debt finance than the Pecking Order theory 
(POT) would predict. Secondly, some studies point to the fact that more and 
more small firms are becoming publicly traded and that these firms do not issue 
equity under duress, as implied by Pecking Order (Fama and French, 2005). 
And thirdly, some researchers find that the theory performs better in the case of 
large firms as opposed to small firms (Leary and Roberts, 2010; Frank and 
Goyal, 2003), which also contradicts the predictions of the Pecking Order. 
Despite these differences and the assumption that the Pecking Order requires a 
separation of ownership and control, a characteristic of most large enterprises, 
but not generally applicable to SMEs, a considerable number of studies report 
the Pecking Order to be an excellent descriptor of SME capital structure 
(Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Berggren et al., 2000; Watson and 
Wilson., 2002; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010 and Vanacker and Manigart, 
2010).  
This study makes a number of empirical and methodological contributions to 
the study of SME finance. Firstly, the research applies a much more 
sophisticated test of the POT than hitherto employed in SME research. Few 
studies have tested the POT using the rigorous techniques typically applied in 
larger firm studies.  Most of the early researchers to test the POT in SMEs 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999) 
among others have relied heavily on correlations among variables as empirical 
evidence of the Pecking Order in practice; for example, an inverse relation 
between profitability and leverage signals support for the Pecking Order. Leary 
and Roberts (2010) and Streubulaev (2007) argue that the predications of 
various leverage regressions have no power to distinguish between alternative 
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theories. Another problem with this approach is its inability to explain the 
dynamic nature of SME capital structure (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 
2008). As a result of these issues, there still remains some debate about theory 
and empirical findings. These issues have lead Myers (2001) to conclude that 
empirically, it is possible to find support for any of the capital structure theories.  
To avoid these potential weaknesses, this research incorporates an approach to 
empirical measurement based on the original Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) 
and Lemmon and Zender (2010) methodology, which takes into account debt 
capacity constraints influencing financing behaviour and controls for firm 
specific individual unobservable effects which are found to significantly explain 
a large proportion of variation in leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In 
addition, while some studies do not explicitly take account of debt capacity, this 
study takes account of debt capacity for a sample of unquoted SMEs. Lemmon 
and Zender (2010) argue that financial distress costs and the issue of debt 
capacity (the extent to which firms can take on extra debt finance) are important 
in explaining capital structure decision making. This is critically important in 
SME financing research, as small firms are thought to have low debt capacities 
which influence their ability to take on debt financing. However, many studies 
do not account of this. Vanacker and Manigart (2010) find that for high growth 
companies, new equity issues are particularly important for SMEs to grow 
beyond their debt capacity levels. 
Secondly, despite the lack of available data on SMEs internationally, there is a 
growing interest and demand for empirical studies on the financing behaviour of 
SMEs particularly since the onset of the financial crisis. This is the first panel 
study to examine the financing of SMEs in England, Ireland and Scotland, over 
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the crisis, based on financial accounts rather than SMEs opinion surveys.  It 
examines whether the Pecking Order theory applies equally to SMEs throughout 
the crisis as in non-crisis periods. Since the onset of the financial crisis, SMEs 
have reduced their investments significantly and consequently, their demand for 
debt finance (BIS, 2012; Central Bank of Ireland, 2011).  
The key question is what would we expect to observe for SME leverage over the 
economic cycle and furthermore during a credit crisis? If the Pecking Order 
holds, would we expect to see leverage fall over the economic boom as firms 
rely on profits and internal financing to reinvest or would the larger investment 
opportunities in boom times exceeding internally generated finance to invoke a 
positive relation between economic growth and SME leverage? Ultimately 
leverage will depend on a number of factors, including the cyclicality of the 
industry in which SMEs are located in (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993) and whether 
the firm exhibits financial constraints or not (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) find that net debt issue for public and private large 
firms increase following a monetary contraction, while net debt and short-term 
debt issuances remain stable for small firms over the business cycle (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994). To date, there has been little in the way of research on this 
complex issue, particularly for unlisted SMEs. As the findings presented in this 
research are drawn from financial statement data of SMEs in 3 regions over an 8 
year period from 2004-2011, it is possible to identify the impact of the financial 
crisis. Panel data allows us to examine the dynamic behaviour of SME capital 
structure across regions and to identify both firm specific and regional effects, 
allowing us to ascertain changes in capital structure decisions of SMEs that a 
static empirical study cannot identify. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 contains a review of 
the Trade off and Pecking Order theory, from a theoretical perspective while 
also drawing upon existing empirical evidence for large and small firms. Section 
4 discusses methodological approaches in existing research as well as the data 
and empirical methodology used in this study. Section 5 presents the results and 
discusses the findings, while section 6 concludes and provides extensions for 
further research.  
2.2. Theories of capital structure 
2.2.1 The Trade-off theory 
The static trade-off theory was developed by Miller (1977) and Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984). It examines the role of leverage related costs in determining 
capital structures of firms. For example, the presence of debt tax shields reduce 
firms corporate taxes as debt financing increases all else equal. Debt tax shields 
increase the incentive for firms to issue debt, while the costs associated with 
financial distress or excessive leverage such as bankruptcy, penalties, agency 
costs and the loss of non-debt tax shields provide incentives for firms to use less 
debt financing (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973). Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) 
assume that costs of financial distress are a function of firm earnings in which 
firm leverage ratios are inversely related to volatility of earnings. Their paper 
also incorporates personal taxes on equity which influence corporate borrowing. 
Theoretically, the static trade off model is a one period model which assumes 
that firms target an optimal capital structure. This optimal or target capital 
structure is reached by comparing the benefits and costs of the firm adopting 
additional units of debt. Firms adjust their capital structures towards a target 
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each period due to market imperfections. Recent literature has focused on a 
dynamic model of the Static trade-off approach, which tests the speed of 
adjustment of firms towards their target or optimal capital structure (see 
Flannery and Rangan 2006 and Huang and Ritter 2009)  
The Static trade-off theory assumes that firms target an optimal capital structure. 
While it is a static/one period model, the empirical research assumes that firms 
revert back to their target capital structure. This target capital structure is 
difficult to define, since it is not observable, however, empirical studies measure 
the industry average capital structure over a number of years and this gives a 
prediction of the optimal target. In theory, if firms are past their debt capacity 
level they should reduce debt and revert back to their target ratio. Accordingly, 
capital structures are mean reverting. 
Firms balance debt tax shields against the costs of excessive borrowing, such as 
financial distress costs resulting from the firm being unable to meet repayments 
and various other costs in the form of legal, administrative fees and 
reorganisation costs. While interest tax shields are likely to be significant for 
large firms, they may not be as important for small firms, since small firms’ 
profits are not likely to be as great as large corporation profits and therefore face 
lower marginal taxes than large firms (Petit and Singer 1985; Michaelas et al. 
1999). For these reasons, the incentives for small firms to take on debt for tax 
shield purposes are not as great as they are for larger firms. In this case, non-
debt tax shields such as depreciation and investment tax credits may be 
important for observed capital structures of small firms. Scott (1977) argues that 
firms should issue secured debt, i.e. allowing the lender to secure designated 
assets in the case of default. He argues that even in the absence of corporate 
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taxes, issuance of secured debt can increase total firm value. For this reason, 
tangible assets are used in empirical studies to assess the relationship between 
tangible (collateral) and leverage. For small firms this is assumed to be an 
important determinant in accessing debt financing. 
 2.2.1 The Pecking Order theory 
The work of Myers and Majluf (1984) among others have continued the debate 
on capital structure of firms and revived the earlier Pecking Order predictions 
explained by Donaldson (1961). Unlike the Trade-off theory which predicts that 
firms have an optimal capital structure in which they trade off the benefits of 
debt financing against the increased likelihood of financial distress as firms’ 
leverage rises, the Pecking Order theory predicts a hierarchy of financing 
structure, and does not assume target debt ratios for firms. This theory suggests 
that financing decisions of firms are based on minimising financing costs and 
that observed debt ratios reflect the cumulative requirement for external finance 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), therefore the financing deficit of firm is expected to 
be occupied by debt finance. A key contribution of the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
paper is the inclusion of the role of asymmetric information in influencing firm 
financing decisions. 
Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric Information is often considered to be the most significant reason 
for the perceived cost difference between internal and external funds (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Information asymmetries refer to the difference between 
insider and outsider knowledge regarding the prospects of the firm and how they 
value the firm, the value of the firm’s assets in place and in the case of publicly 
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quoted firms, intrinsic versus the market price of the firm’s shares. The Pecking 
Order theory assumes that firms prefer to finance their investments through the 
least costly way, i.e. through sources of finance least subject to information 
asymmetries and transaction costs. Empirically, studies often use volatility of 
firm earnings (Frank and Goyal, 2003), credit rating scores and firm size as 
proxies for information asymmetry. In this study, we include the variables 
tangible assets and volatility of firm earnings to indicate the role of information 
asymmetry on SME financing behaviour throughout the crisis. Firm managers 
also have greater knowledge about the future prospects of the firm and the 
firm’s investment projects too.  
When a firm faces an investment opportunity which requires them to seek 
external financing, they face a financing deficit. There is the possibility that they 
may pass up on a positive net value investment opportunity. The advantage of 
debt over equity financing however means that existing shareholders do not 
relinquish their share of ownership of exiting assets. This can be particularly 
important in the case of unlisted SMEs8, whereby the SME is often motivated 
by the need to retain full ownership and full control of their business (Mac an 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2010; Watson and Wilson, 2002).  According to Myers and 
Majluf (1984) the implications of asymmetric costs are that firms prefer to 
finance according to a Pecking Order, through internal finance first, followed by 
debt, and finally externally equity. External equity is used only as a last resort. 
Information asymmetries are also central to the differences in cost structures 
between large and small firms and are the basis of financing preferences. 
                                                          
8 SMEs are characterised as employing between 10 and 249 employees( European Commission)  
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Some challenge the premise that the Pecking Order can only be derived by 
assuming asymmetric information (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Heaton (2002) 
derives the Pecking Order hypothesis using managerial optimism, in which 
managers believe that markets undervalue the firm’s assets in place and the 
present value of the firm’s investment opportunities. Managers may also have 
biased upward cash flow forecasts and expectations for the firm in which they 
are heavily personally involved. Myers (2001) and Leary and Roberts (2009) 
show, however, that agency conflicts arising from asymmetric information often 
account for the main source of Pecking Order behaviour among large firms.  
The focus of this research is on SMEs and the role of asymmetric information in 
limiting access to bank finance. Given that an overwhelming majority of SMEs 
do not use access finance on capital markets, we are implicitly differentiating 
between the problems encountered by large firms whose access to finance 
through capital markets may be limited by asymmetric information, and access 
to bank finance by SMEs. Using a survey of approximately 14,000 controlling 
financial officers, treasurers and controllers at over 8,000 US and Canadian 
companies, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that financial executives of 
companies are much less likely to follow academically prescribed theories such 
as the Pecking Order or Trade-Off theories when determining capital structure. 
Their results suggest that the assumptions and implications of such information 
asymmetries between investors and firm management that determine capital 
structures of large firms may have weaker explanatory power than existent 
academic literature would suggest. Specifically, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
find that few executives are concerned about the problems of asymmetric 
information.  
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Size 
2.2.3 The Pecking Order and large enterprises 
Size impacts on capital structure in a number of ways, therefore, it is necessary 
to distinguish between the size of enterprise and the form of financing structure. 
The association between firm size and leverage is of interest to many capital 
structure studies. As firm grows in size we would expect the firm to have 
greater levels of tangible assets, less risky and ultimately a positive relation 
between size and leverage. Empirically findings are mixed. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) find a negative relation between size and leverage, while Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007) find a non-monotonic relation between firm size and leverage, 
concluding that firm size may be acting a proxy for the inverse probability of 
default. There are number of plausible reasons why the Pecking Order is useful 
in explaining capital structure decisions of large enterprises. Firstly, in large 
enterprises, there is often a separation of ownership and control, not usually the 
case with SMEs. Secondly, large enterprises can accumulate significant retained 
earnings and often have greater scope to access external finance. Some time 
series analysis for large firms has shown results to be empirically consistent 
with the Pecking Order of financing (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama 
and French, 2002), however these studies have been primarily based on samples 
of large firms with conservative debt ratios, unlikely to be hindered with 
financing capacity constraints. Empirically, findings of the Pecking Order are 
mixed for large enterprises. Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999), Huang and 
Ritter (2009)  and Lemmon and Zender (2010) all find support for the Pecking 
Order of different magnitudes, while Huang and Ritter (2009) finds that the 
explanatory power of the theory has fallen over time. Frank and Goyal (2003) 
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and Fama and French (2002), who do not control for debt capacity indicate little 
support for the Pecking Order. In addition to this, while rejecting the Pecking 
Order as first order descriptor of financing behaviour, Frank and Goyal (2003) 
find that large firms are more likely to follow the Pecking Order behaviour than 
small firms, contrary to Pecking Order predictions. When debt matures it is not 
necessarily replaced by new debt and leverage declines. Their research also 
points to the fact that SMEs which are publicly traded seem to opt for new 
equity issues instead of debt to meet their financing needs and in the 1990s 
greater proportions of small firms became publicly traded in the US, while also 
reducing their debt levels relative to equity. These issues beg the question as to 
the ability of the Pecking Order to explain SME capital structure decisions.  
2.2.4 The Pecking Order and SMEs 
Over the past decade, the Pecking Order theory has emerged as the key 
theoretical lens for explaining SME capital structure. Despite differences in 
opinion regarding the role of information asymmetries in driving Pecking Order 
behaviour, it is generally asserted that SMEs suffer from informational 
asymmetries and transaction costs (costs involved in issuing securities) to a 
greater extent than large firms (Lopéz-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). In 
addition SMEs are generally unlisted. The costs associated with equity via IPO 
are greater for small enterprises (Schnabel, 1992; Chittenden et al., 1996). 
Uncertain cash flows and the lack of legal requirements to file financial 
statements as large, publicly traded firms are required to, means that in many 
cases the costs associated with improved financial accounting aren’t affordable 
for SMEs. This is particularly in the case of unquoted SMEs, where there is 
little publicly available and reliable information regarding their assets, 
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liabilities, credit history and organisational behaviour upon which lending 
decisions are made. These issues can give rise to a problem of adverse selection, 
where banks often cannot differentiate between good and bad investment 
opportunities and ultimately do not finance either (Stanworth and Gray, 1991; 
Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998). When available, the quality of 
financial statements varies due to their prohibitive costs. Furthermore, 
institutional accounting standards and requirements vary across regions (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008) and 
ultimately influence the availability and cost of finance for SMEs (Berger, 
2006).  
It is also believed that alternative sources of information provided by small 
firms are often inadequate and do little to minimise asymmetric information and 
agency costs (Petit and Singer, 1985) further increasing the costs of acquiring 
external finance. For many of the above reasons, SMEs are often considered to 
be more constrained financially than larger firms and often face higher interest 
rates too (Bass and Schrooten, 2006). In some regions they tend to use less 
external bank finance due to its relatively high cost (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2008). Accumulatively, there is an obvious preference to use the 
least costly source of finance, i.e. internal funds where possible.  
One way to reduce information asymmetries is by developing a relationship 
with the provider of external finance. According to Ennew and Binks (1997), 
the longer a small firm spends doing business with a bank, the greater is the 
flow of information about the firm and its credit worthiness. Constrained access 
to financial and credit markets result in greater reliance on short term debt 
financing, internal funds and trade credit. For these reasons, observed capital 
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structures of SMEs vary depending on the age, size, industry sector in which the 
firm is based and stage of the life cycle perspective (Mac and Bhaird and Lucey, 
2011; Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald and Gardiner, 2005; Berger and Udell, 
1998).  Research has shown that external equity is very important for high 
growth SMEs and particularly in the case of new high technology based firms 
(Hogan and Hutson, 2005).  Table 2.1 below shows a summary of some the 
main pieces of literature and their support for the Pecking Order theory. 
Table 2.14 Existing empirical studies testing the Pecking Order 
 
While costs are very important, other factors encourage Pecking Order 
behaviour, particularly by small firms.  The reason SMEs follow the Pecking 
Order of financing is primarily due to the reluctance of management to 
relinquish control to outsiders and contentment with steady organic growth of 
their firm. Aversion to external equity can be more pronounced in small firms, 
particularly small family firms. These differences in attitude regarding control 
often emanate from the founders of the enterprise that aspire to grow further and 
expand the scale of their enterprise (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997). SME 
managers value financial freedom and in some cases they are averse to 
Existing studies empirically testing the Pecking order theory
Sample and context Support for Pecking Order
Large firm studies
Lemmon and Zender (2010)* CRSP and Compustat. US data √
Huang and Ritter (2009)  CRSP and Compustat data X
Frank and Goyal (2003)* US Compustat data 1980-1998 X
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) Compustat Sample of US Firms √
SME studies
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010) Cross sectional sample of 299 Irish SMEs √
López- Gracia and Sogorb- Mira (2008) Spanish unquoted SMES 1996-2004 X
Watson and Wilson(2002) Cross sectional sample of UK SMEs √
Michaelas et al(1999) Panel 3500 UK SMEs 1986-1995 √
Jordan et al(1998) Sample of English SMEs < 100 employees √
Chittenden et al. (1996) UK private small firms √
* These studies also draw data from small firms
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substantial growth due to independence and lifestyle factors that motivate the 
manager and the small firm’s behaviour.  
SME size influences financing decisions by the ability of the SME to take on 
extra debt financing. In general, small, young firms are associated with small 
debt capacities and have smaller tangible asset bases than large firms. Larger 
firms generally have the ability to offer larger collateral guarantees on financing 
and have less chance of going bankrupt and tend to be more diversified (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988). It is also thought that debt capacity levels reflect the 
capacity of the firm to meet additional debt repayments (Vanacker and 
Manigart, 2010).  SMEs are frequently owned and managed by one or a few 
people. For this reason, the transaction costs of external financing especially 
equity financing tend to be significantly higher for SMEs, as they have less 
organisational and management power in credit markets, compared to older 
larger established firms (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb Mira, 2008). The next 
section presents the main predictions of the Pecking Order, 6 hypotheses have 
been derived that test the main predictions of the Pecking Order and Static trade 
off theories. 
2.3 SME Capital Structure Hypotheses 
Profitability  
The Pecking Order predicts that firms will prefer to use retained earnings to 
finance investments, therefore SMEs will rely on retained earnings to finance 
investment opportunities as this is the cheapest form of financing for them. 
While many small firms have no debt in their capital structure, it is often the 
case that internally generated profits are insufficient to meet the size of their 
investments (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Michaelas et al., 1999; Psillaki and 
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Daskalakis, 2008), therefore profits are negatively associated with debt 
financing up to a point. According to the static trade-off theory, a profitable firm 
would be expected to have higher levels of debt to offset corporate taxes; 
however we do not expect this to be likely in the case of SMEs, since many 
SME profits’ are less profitable than large corporation profits and therefore face 
lower marginal taxes than large firms (Petit and Singer, 1985; Michaelas et al., 
1999). For these reasons, we suspect the incentives for small firms to take on 
debt for tax shield purposes are not as great as they are for larger firms. 
However, it is noted that non debt tax shields such as depreciation and 
investment tax credits are important for observed capital structures of SMEs 
(Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb Mira, 2008).  
H1: A negative relation between profitability and leverage is observed. 
Industry sectors  
Given the diversity of industry sectors SMEs engage in, it is important to 
recognise the effects that heterogeneity of industry sectors have on observed 
capital structures (Vanacker and Manigart, 2009). An important factor 
influencing the demand and supply of finance to SMEs is the level of 
information asymmetry which is closely related to industry affiliation. Often 
characterised as relatively opaque in nature (Berger and Udell, 1998), SMEs 
ultimately are associated with higher levels of information asymmetries 
compared to large firms. According to the static trade off theory, firms adjust to 
target capital structures, often measured as the industry average. As pointed out 
by Myers (1984), debt ratios vary from industry to industry due to asset risk, 
asset type and the need for external funds. Thus industry sector does appear to 
matter. Johnson and McMahon (2005) find that even after controlling for firm 
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characteristics such as size, age, profitability, and risk and asset structure, cross 
industry differences in SME financing behaviour do exist. In addition, Leary 
and Roberts (2014) show that smaller less successful firms are more sensitive to 
the financing decisions of larger more successful industry peers. 
H2: Industry sectors with greater tangible assets to be positively related to the 
level of debt finance. 
Growth opportunities 
Small high growth firms are likely to have much larger growth opportunities 
relative to the assets of their firm in place (Hogan and Hutson, 2005). In 
addition, small high tech firms often issue equity due to their low debt capacity 
levels (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Conversely large firms are much less 
restricted by debt capacity constraints relative to small firms. As a result, when 
internal funds are exhausted, the use of external equity before debt financing 
does not contradict the Pecking Order theory for small firms (Lemmon and 
Zender, 2010). Carpenter and Peterson (2002) finds that growth of most small 
firms is constrained by the availability of internal finance and Hubbard (1998) 
finds that as debt financing increases, the probability of financial distress 
increases for firms affected most by information asymmetries, i.e. small firms in 
most cases.  
It is also important to note that firms also have preference for financial slack and 
often do not want to restrict themselves in future investments, therefore, many 
firms do not borrow up to their debt capacity levels. For this reason the 
existence of growth opportunities may have a significant impact on actual debt 
ratios. Myers (1977) shows that highly levered firms with significant growth 
opportunities often forgo positive net present value investment projects. SMEs 
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with significant future growth opportunities maybe considered risky, especially 
if the SME has little in the way of tangible assets to use as a guarantee, therefore 
we would expect debt to be negatively related to the level of future growth 
opportunities. However, for SMEs who rely mainly on debt financing and have 
little access to other formal sources of external financing, which constitutes the 
majority of SMEs’ external financing needs, future growth opportunities are 
also likely to be positively related to the level of debt financing depending on 
their debt capacity limits. This is observed empirically in a number of studies 
(Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; and Michaelas et al., 1999), while 
Lopez-Sogorb Mira (2008) find that firms with few growth opportunities and 
high cash flow should have a low level of debt. 
H3: A positive relation between the level of growth opportunities and the level 
of debt financing is expected to be observed. 
 
Age 
Central to the Pecking Order is information asymmetries. As stated already, 
information asymmetries are assumed to be greater for smaller and younger 
firms (Ennew and Binks, 1997). Younger firms have are less likely to have an 
established reputation or track record in meeting financial repayments to lenders 
upon which potential information asymmetries are reduced (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). Thus it is likely that as the firm ages, information asymmetries are 
reduced, and there it is expected that a positive relationship between firm age 
and leverage will be observed. Alternatively, as the firm ages, they accumulate 
more retained profits and rely less so on external debt financing and more so on 
accumulated internal funds. As in Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010) older firms 
54 
 
are expected to have accumulated greater levels of earnings, whereas young 
firms will rely more on debt financing, and especially short-term debt financing 
(Chittenden et al, 1996). Age is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios. 
H4: A negative relation between age and the level of debt financing. 
 
Risk 
From the perspective of the Pecking Order, a negative relation between SME 
risks (measured by volatility of earnings) and the level of debt is expected. 
However, this hypothesis is strongly rejected by Jordan et al(1998) More risky 
firms may try and lower the volatility of their profits by reducing their levels of 
debt, furthermore SMEs that are thought to be risky by banks may find it more 
difficult is accessing debt financing, in particular long term debt financing.  
H5: A negative relation between risk and leverage is expected to be observed. 
Non- debt tax shields (NDTS) 
Many firms may have substantial tax shields other than interest payments on 
debt. These may include depreciation (Bradley et al., 1984) and investment tax 
credits. Increases in NDTS reduce the optimal level of debt; however empirical 
results can often suggest the opposite. Scott (1977) suggests that tangible assets 
that generate NDTS could also be used for collateral for additional debt, hence 
the empirical ambiguity. In this study, NDTS are measured as the ratio of 
depreciation to assets. Michaelas et al (1999) find a statistically significant 
positive relation between NDTS and the leverage of long term debt, while 
Lopez Gracia and Sorgorb Mira (2008) find that NDTS are negatively related to 
the level of debt for their sample of Spanish SMEs and attribute their findings to 
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Spanish SMEs taking advantage of higher investment tax credits and accelerated 
depreciation of fixed assets to reduce their overall tax burden. 
H6: A positive relation between NDTS and leverage is expected. 
 
 
Economics conditions and the trade cycle 
The economic environment is likely to influence the level and availability of 
access to external finance for SMEs. According to Michaelas et al (1999), debt 
ratios will vary over the economic cycle. In times of better economic conditions, 
it is easier to raise debt financing, thus more opportunities for SMEs to raise 
long term debt finance, while as the economy grows, retained profits 
accumulate and high levels of short term debt from the recession are paid off. 
Thus SMEs rely less on short term debt as the economy grows and more so on 
long term debt financing. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that macroeconomic 
conditions account for 12-51% of the time series variation of firm leverage of a 
sample of listed firms, while Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) argue that small firms 
contract substantially more so relative to large firms during periods of tight 
money and ultimately face more liquidity constraints due to the fact that small 
firms tend to be more heavily concentrated in industries that are cyclical in 
nature. Therefore for these reasons, the following is expected. 
H7: A positive relation between the level of debt financing and economic 
growth. 
According to the information available, there are no clear theoretical predictions 
indicated by the Pecking Order or any other theory regarding the changes in the 
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level of long-term and short-term debt finance and the growth in the general 
economy. However one can speculate that over the observed time period. All 
three regions experienced an easing and expansion in the level of bank lending 
to SMEs (BIS, 2012; Central Bank of Ireland, 2012). Michaelas et al. (1999) 
examine this for a sample of UK SMEs aged 10 years or over from 1986 to 
1995 and for the reasons outlined above predicted a positive relation between 
long term debt finance and growth and an inverse relation between short-term 
debt and growth, however González and González (2014) find that changes in 
long-term and short-term financing depend on the level of banking liberalization 
and firm size. The following hypotheses are tested on a sample of unquoted 
SMEs over the period 2004-2011. Quoted SMEs have more financing options 
available to them and lower information asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
H8: Long term debt finance is expected to be positively related to economic 
growth. 
H9: Short-term debt finance is negatively related to economic growth9. 
2.3 Methodology 
Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) initially introduced the flow of funds identity 
to test the Pecking Order theory, in which a firms’ financing deficit is captured 
by the difference between cash inflows and outflows such as investments of the 
firm. The difference between the investment needs of the firm and internally 
generated funds should be accounted for by debt financing in the first instance 
according to the Pecking Order. The Pecking Order has also been empirically 
tested using leverage regressions (Michaelas et al, 1999; Lopéz-Gracia and 
                                                          
9 A list of the hypotheses findings from prior research are included in the Appendix in Table 
A.21 
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Sogorb-Mira, 2008), by regressing firm debt against the main factors 
influencing financing behaviour. These factors generally include age, size, 
profitability, net debtors, growth opportunities, asset structure, depreciation and 
industry sector. As noted in Myers and Majluf (1984) the problem with these 
types of leverage models is that debt dominates unless there are significant costs 
associated with debt financing and ultimately they are less effective in rejecting 
the Pecking Order over other theories of capital structure. Another problem with 
these approaches, in particular, is the inability to control for the level of debt 
capacity of different firms (Lemmon and Zender, 2010) and endogeneity among 
variables.  
Debt capacity 
Different types of firms, small and large have different debt capacities; therefore 
if small or high growth firms are more restricted by debt capacity, they will 
require external equity to finance their growth opportunities and investment 
needs at a much earlier stage. Due to differences in debt capacity between small 
and large firms, it is likely that small firms would use less debt and more equity 
and other sources of finance. Measuring debt capacity is difficult. Small firms 
often have less information on lending histories and bond ratings. Frank and 
Goyal (2003), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Leary and Roberts (2010) and 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) specify debt capacities as a function of firm 
characteristics such as assets, market to book value debt, profitability and 
tangibility, while Vanacker and Manigart (2010) use leverage measures such as 
total debt to total asset ratios and cash flow to assets ratios as proxies for debt 
capacity. Internally generated cash flow indicates a firm’s ability to make 
additional debt repayments. Other predictors include a measure of tangible 
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assets used by Cotei and Farhat (2009). The rationale here is that tangible assets 
are expected to be associated with higher debt capacity and lower costs of 
financial distress. 
The flow of funds regression10 used in this study explicitly shows the proportion 
of the financing deficit being filled by debt financing in each period. Using this 
methodology, we can analyse what proportion of SMEs’ financing deficit is 
occupied by debt financing for a sample of English, Scottish and Irish SMEs. 
The financing deficit is used to establish the difference between firms’ 
investment needs and internally generated funds. Firms constrained by the level 
of debt financing they can take on (their debt capacity) often have significantly 
low debt ratios, where an additional unit of debt financing is prohibitively 
expensive. Firms with high debt to value ratios and low cash flow ratios have 
limited debt capacity and therefore require external equity.  
Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) take real investment as exogenous, and test 
the hypothesis that if firms face a financing deficit they first of all resort to debt 
financing to test the Pecking Order hypothesis. In this regression debt is 
increased or decreased depending on whether investment requirements exceed 
internally generated finance. According to the Pecking Order hypothesis, when 
a firm’s internal cash flows are inadequate for real investment and dividend 
commitments, the firm issues debt.  
Equation 1 Flow of funds identity 
𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝𝑜𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡                                        (1) 
                                                          
10 The flow of funds regression is explained in the empirical model section of this study, 
specifically equation 1 and equation 1.1 in the section. 
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Where  𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the first difference of the ratio of total book debt to assets for 
firm i and 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the financing deficit and  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term for firm i in 
period t. The closer the coefficient 𝛽𝑝𝑜 is to one then the variation in debt over 
the year is mainly explained by the financing deficit, which is the prediction of 
the Pecking Order. 
The financing deficit used in equation (1) is generally defined by  
Equation 1.1 Capturing the financing deficit 
 
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 =
%∆Assetsit − %∆Retained earningsit
Assetsit=1 
where %∆ represents percentage change
 
                                    (1.1)                    
Huang and Ritter (2009) define net debt as the change in book debt as a 
percentage of the beginning of the year’s assets and the financing deficit as the 
change in assets minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of the 
beginning of the year assets.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) compare the results for a balanced and unbalanced 
sample of firms and attribute the support of the Pecking Order in the Shyam-
Sunders and Myers (1999) study to a balanced sample made up of mainly large 
firms. Accordingly, the inclusion of the smaller firms and firms with lower debt 
capacities significantly reduces the β coefficient on the financing deficit.  
Shyam Sunders and Myers’ regression illustrated in equation (1) ignores the 
degree of information asymmetry; firm’s debt capacity, equity market 
conditions and other firm characteristics that affect the amount of debt a firm 
can issue (Cotei and Farhat, 2009). Results show that the theory performs better 
among large firms with moderate leverage as in the case of Shyam-Sunders and 
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Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003). It is likely that high growth SMEs or 
young firms constrained by debt capacity and access to debt financing are more 
likely to seek external equity to finance investment projects. Despite the 
potential weaknesses outlined, this approach does show how changes in the 
level of debt respond to changes in firm financing deficit.  
Under the Shyam-Sunders and Myers financing flow identity above, irrespective 
of the size of the deficit, the financing deficit is covered with debt (Chirinko and 
Singha, 2000). The equation (1) specifies that the change in debt is a linear 
function of the financing deficit. Under this approach it assumes that debt 
changes dollar for dollar with the financing deficit. Lemmon and Zender (2010) 
incorporate a nonlinear function of the financing deficit into the above equation 
to illustrate the role of debt capacity in financing. They propose a modified 
empirical approach that controls for debt capacity. By doing this, the Pecking 
Order gives a good description of financing behaviour for firms.  
For smaller firms with low debt capacity levels, it is likely that the financing 
coefficient will be biased downwards and the greater the deficit, the more likely 
this will be covered by issuing debt and equity. Lemmon and Zender (2010) 
correct for this bias by adding a squared coefficient to the functional form of the 
regression. This allows the regression to capture the concave nature of the 
relation between the financing deficit and net debt issuance. For large firms or 
firms that are unconstrained by debt capacity issues, little difference is expected 
to be found between the two coefficients shown below. 
Equation 2 The modified flow of funds identity 
𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑝𝑜𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
2  +  𝜖𝑖𝑡                                        (2) 
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Under this modified flow of funds regression, for firms with low debt capacities, 
or small firms, the coefficient 𝛾 is expected to be negative, while βpo is positive 
and less than one which is the prediction of the standard Pecking Order.  
 The above methodology incorporates both current operating profits and costs 
and investment financing needs.  The regressions treats the issue of investment 
needs as exogenous and incorporate both firm requirements for investment 
needs and operating needs. In this case, firms will experience a financing deficit 
if internally generated funds cannot cover this deficit. In examining the 
financing decisions of firms after short-term changes in profits and investments, 
Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb–Mira (2008) test the Pecking Order by regressing 
firms’ debt against factors that summarize behaviour of the Pecking Order 
approach, similar to Jordan et al (1998) and Michaelas et al (1999).  
2.5 The data 
The data consists of SME11 financial data taken from the FAME database for 
the period 2004 to 2011. Data contains information on SMEs for 3 regions, 
England, Ireland and Scotland and a total of 5,514 unlisted SMEs, of which; 
4,170 are located in England, 691 are located in Scotland and the remaining 653 
firms in the sample are Irish. The sample includes a total of 46,650 
observations, 34,801 on English SMEs; 6,365 on Scottish SMEs and 5,484 on 
Irish SMEs. The data is the most comprehensive available on financing in these 
regions and the study represents the first panel study in these regions since 
Michaelas et al (1999). However, the claim is not made that the sample is 
representative of the regions in the ultimate sense. 
                                                          
11 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-
definition/index_en.htm 
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SMEs are defined according to the European Commission (2005) criteria and 
include firms which employ less than 249 workers in a given year and have 
either an annual turnover of less than €50m or a balance sheet total of less than 
€43m. In this study, we scale by the number of employees and the balance sheet 
totals of each SME in each year. The criteria for my sample are as follows: 
1) All firms employing between 2 and 249 employees in each of the sample 
years. 
2) All firms with balance sheet total of greater than 43,000,000 in any of the 
sample years are excluded. 
3) Firms that are reported to be listed or delisted are excluded. 
4) The analysis excludes all financial and insurance companies, in line with 
existing empirical studies. 
5) All financial variables are winzorised at the 1% and 99% level. This is to 
mitigate the effect of extreme outliers in the data. The data excludes subsidiary 
firms. 
Micro enterprises are included in the sample and represent over 1,100 in any 
year, while small represent over 1,500 firms and the remainder are medium in 
size12. It is important to note that this is a highly stratified sample and few 
researchers have applied such criteria to SMEs. The effect of this is to reduce 
the sample size of this study significantly13.  
                                                          
12 The proportion of the sample that is categorised as micro, small or medium varies slightly 
depending on the year. 
13 Original sample of SMEs, as defined by employees contained a total of 6147 firms, scaling by 
the additional criteria of assets reduced sample size to 5,519. The Irish sample is based on 
unlisted SMEs (average age of 17 years). More than half of the SMEs in the Scottish sample are 
of medium size with an average number of 86 employees. While the sample of English SMEs 
contains a median number of 44 employees and a mean number of 57 employees, with an 
average age of 21 years. 
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Using financial data, the financing deficit is calculated as the change in assets 
minus the change in retained earnings as a percentage of beginning of year’s 
assets, following Huang and Ritter (1999). Table 2.2 below contains a list of 
variables used in this study. Data on all firms are recorded according to their 
Nace Rev 2. 2007 codes. In all, a total of 13 different industry sectors are 
analysed14. It is important to note that the data for Irish firms is not as plentiful 
as for Scottish and English firms and this has restricted the analysis on the 
differences among industry sectors for the Irish sample as a whole). Also data 
on the number of employees each year in the Irish sample are weak. 
Unfortunately, given data restrictions, it was not possible to explicitly measure 
the relative cost of equity financing as in Huang and Ritter (2009), however a 
proxy for growth opportunities calculated as intangible to total assets 
(Caneghem and Campenhout, 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007 and 
Michaelas et al., 1999) and a dummy variable for SME ownership are included. 
However neither of these variables are statistically significant.  
  
                                                          
14 See Appendix A.1 for nace code descriptions 
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Table 2.25 Variable names and descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 below present the summary statistics for the sample as whole over the 
period 2004-2011, while table 4 presents the correlation coefficients of the main 
variables of interest included in the research. 
 
Variables 
Total assets: 
Total debt: 
 
 
Change in total debt: 
 
 
Tangibility: 
Financing deficit 
(Deficit): 
 
 
Financing deficit 
squared: 
 
NDTS: 
 
O’ship: 
 
Profitability 
 
Growth 
opportunities: 
Long- term debt 
Short-term debt 
 
Growth GDP/ PC 
 
Description 
Calculated as the sum of fixed and current assets 
Calculated as the sum of long and short term debt 
and overdrafts outstanding in a given period. 
 
This refers to the change in total debt outstanding 
as a percentage of the beginning of year firm 
assets. 
Calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets. 
 
This is calculated as the change in firm assets 
minus the change in retained earnings as a 
percentage of the beginning of year firm assets. 
This refers to the squared value of the financing 
deficit. 
 
A proxy for non-debt tax shields, calculated as 
the ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
A dummy variable indicating if the SME is 100% 
owned. 
The change in earnings before interest and tax 
scaled by assets 
A proxy for growth opportunities calculated as 
the ratio of intangible to total assets. 
Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
Ratio of short-term loans and overdrafts to assets 
 
GDP per capita growth in percentage terms     
Source FAME and World Bank 
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Table 2.3 6 Summary statistics for Irish and UK SMEs 2004-201115 
 
Table 2.4 7 Results of correlation coefficients of variables 
 
 
2.6. Empirical analysis 
The following contains two forms of regressions shown in equation 3 and 
equation 4 below. The first equation is based on the original Shyam-Sunders 
and Myers (1999) method to test the Pecking Order. This equation models the 
flow of funds deficit and tests how much of firms’ financing deficit is occupied 
                                                          
15  Please see Appendix from Chapter 2 ( Tables A.3.1, A.3.2 and A.3.3) for individual region 
summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Total assets 46,650 8,024,734 8,281,496 11823 5,700,000 43,000,000
Log total assets 46,650 15.3 1.85 9.38 15.7 19.3
Total debt 18,325 3,204,479 4856590 10047 1,600,000 77,600,000
Deficit 46,650 5.02 31.5 -89.5 2.6 244
Deficit squared 46,650 1250 4858 0.02 142 81327
Firm age 46,650 26 21 1 20 141
number of employees 43,093 60 54 1 45 249
Log age 46,650 3.0 0.76 0 3.0 4.9
Annual GDP per capita growth 46,650 0.2 2.6 -8 1 3
EBIT 46,572 0.03 0.42 -3.1 0.07 2.7
longtermdebt 19,598 1,660,231 3,414,977 1236 510,000 65,300,000
Tangibility 46,650 0.32 0.29 0 0.23 0.98
Growthopps 6,927 0.08 0.14 -0.03 0.02 1.6
Turnover 38,579 13,500,000 16,000,000 7916 8,800,000 100,000,000
Short-term debt 35,023 1,763,086 3,633,311 214 540,000 78,600,000
Change in total debt 16,536 0.79 14.8 -46.2 -0.8 96.0
Total debt ratio 18,325 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 2.0
longtermdebt ratio 19,598 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.0
Short term debt ratio 35,023 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.8
* All values are quoted in Euros
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Change in total debt 1
(2) Financing deficit 0.5662 1
(3) Financing deficit squared 0.3037 0.4206 1
(4) Log profit assets ratio -0.0894 0.0031 -0.0196 1
(5) Log age -0.0315 -0.091 -0.1297 -0.0093 1
(6) Log tangibility -0.0122 -0.0383 -0.0645 -0.0268 0.1138 1
(7) ndts -0.0323 -0.0295 0.0138 0.0098 -0.0154 0.1101 1
(8) Country 0.004 0.0114 0.0105 -0.0594 -0.0139 0.0914 0.0182 1
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by debt financing. According to the Pecking Order, debt financing is the 
preferred choice of financing after retained earnings, therefore the slope 
coefficient 𝛽𝑃𝑂 is expected to be close to one in equation 3. The second 
regression is based on the Lemmon and Zender (2009) modification which 
captures the role of debt capacity constraints influencing firm financing 
behaviour. It is expected that SMEs and particularly small firms to suffer from 
debt capacity constraints to a greater extent than large firms due to the expected 
information asymmetries associated with this cohort of firms. Equation 4 
includes the variable of the financing deficit squared as an additional regressor 
plus control variables. The following control variables of firm age, tangibility, 
profitability proxy and industry sector dummies and country specific controls 
e.g. GDP per capita growth.  These control variables have been indicated in the 
literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Frank and Goyal, 2003) to be 
influences on firm leverage. These include ltangibility (log ratio of fixed to total 
assets), lprofitability (log profit to assets ratio) and lage (measured as the log 
firm age), ownership dummy, growth opportunities and a proxy for non-debt tax 
shields (depreciation to total assets).  
According to the Pecking Order, a positive relation between tangibility and level 
of firm debt is expected and negative relation between profitability and debt. 
More profitable firms are expected to choose internal financing to fund their 
financing gap according to the Pecking Order, however the static trade off 
suggests the opposite. Previous studies have found an inverse relation between 
these two variables (Fama and French, 2002; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010) 
and a negative relationship between age and leverage (Mac an Bhaird and 
Lucey, 2010). It can also be argued that older firms due to the accumulation of 
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funds over time require less borrowing. Asset tangibility is included and this 
indicates that firms with greater tangible assets should suffer less information 
asymmetry constraints when accessing debt finance, so therefore a positive 
relationship between this variable and the change in net debt will be observed. 
To overcome any potential problems with skewness in the independent 
variables, the logs of tangibility, age and profitability are included in 
regressions16.As outlined above, all data in this study is restricted to SME 
criteria. A Hausman test was conducted and this showed in favour of the fixed 
effect regression over random effects. 
Equation 3 Modified flow of funds with control variables 
(3) ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2⅀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  + ℰ𝑖𝑡             
                                              
Equation 4 Modified flow of funds with debt capacity 
(4) ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2⅀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝜂𝑖 +  𝜂𝑡 + ℰ𝑖𝑡        
      
As a robustness check, the results obtained from the flow of funds identity 
equations are compared with an estimated model of trade off theory. While, for 
the reasons outlined thus far, the main source of interest is to estimate the 
performance of the Pecking Order, the Trade-off theory may give some insight 
into whether SMEs are likely to move towards a target level of leverage. The 
proposed model of the Trade-off is demonstrated in Equation 5. 
 
                                                          
16  Appendix Figure A.2 includes table of the mean and median values of dependent and 
independent variables on yearly basis. 
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Equation 5 Trade-off model 
 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑇𝐴
𝐷𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐷∗𝑖𝑡−1 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+∪𝑖+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Whereby 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
 is the first difference of total debt scaled by total assets. 𝐷𝑖𝑡
∗  
represents the target level of debt for firm i at time t. The trade-off theory 
predicts that as 𝛽𝑇𝐴 > 0 firms move towards their target, however there are 
adjustment costs. Variations of this model are regressed and results are provided 
in Table 2.6 
 
2.7 Findings  
The sample period 2004-2011 covers a time of significant change for SMEs. In 
this sample as a whole, it is observed that average sales and retained earnings of 
SMEs were rising steadily, as well as short and long term debt level until the 
crisis of 2008. Debt ratios fall in the last years of the sample. The results show 
significant change over the years of the sample period.  
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Table 2.5 8 Results of panel regressions 
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Table 2.5 shows the panel data regression analysis. In column one, the results 
for pooled OLS regressions are shown. These regressions in Table 2.5 are based 
Pooled Ols Fixed Effects( FE) FE plus time dummies
Constant -5.351
(.71)
Financing deficit 0.350*** 0.332*** .333***
.0101305 (.010) (.004)
Defict squared .0002* .0002 0.001***
 .0000887 (.00) (.001)
 log Profit assets ratio -1.54*** -1.636*** -1.645***
(.121)  (.18) (.157)
ndts  10.92***
 (2.76) 
log tangibility .511** 2.04*** 2.202***
(.12) (.42) (.332)
log age -.05 .254 .725
(.17) (.70) (.971)
Industry sectors No
1 .486
2 -2.41
3 .365
4 .205
6 .199
7 .736**
8 .243
10 1.036
11 -.974
13 Omitted
14 -1.58
15 .991
16 -2.11
Time Dummies
2004 Omitted Omitted
2005 1.06*** .760**
2006 -.125 -0.481*
2007 .456 0.142
2008 .905* 0.097
2009 -.117 -0.637
2010 .233 -0.378
2011 0.274 -0.259
Country effects Omitted
Ireland 0.942
Scot -.147
Observations 13940 16105 14248
number of groups 3015 3200 3057
obs per group ( average) 4.6  5.0 4.7
R-sq within 0.38 0.35 0.38
R-square between .31 0.25 0.27
R-square overall .37 0.29 0.35
   r ho* fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.151 0.3405 0.379
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, figures without stars are statistically
insignificant. Standard errors are signalled with parenthesis(  clustered)
Results of panel regressions1 
 
1Dependent variable: Net debt issued as a percentage of beginning of year assets. 
The regressions include year dummy variables and industry dummy variables. Relevant 
industry sector codes are shown in Appendix Table A.1. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Figures without stars are not statistically significant. 
Standard errors are indicated with parenthesis. 
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on equation 4 above. It is observed for the sample as a whole, the Pecking Order 
does a poor job of explaining the financing structure as a whole, with a 
coefficients estimate of just .350, while accounting for the nonlinear debt 
capacity relation. Interestingly, in Table 2.5, the coefficient estimate for asset 
structure (tangibility) is positive and the coefficient for profit to assets ratio is 
negative, both supporting the predictions of the Pecking Order. The industry 
sector of wholesale is the only sector to show statistically significant coefficient 
results. The results for age are mixed with negative coefficient sign in the 
pooled OLS regression and positive in the fixed effects regression, but neither is 
statistically significant. Results obtained from fixed effects and fixed effects 
with time dummies show positive relation with the dependent variable up to the 
crisis in 2008 and negative thereafter. By controlling for firm individual specific 
effects the results are broadly similar.  
The inclusion of the time dummies allows us to view these results from the 
perspective of a business cycle where positive growth was observed in each of 
the three regions up until the latter years of the sample. Surprising in the above 
panel regression, while the time dummies during the crisis period are negative 
in sign, they are not statistically significant. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below shows 
the estimated financing deficit coefficients 𝛽𝑃𝑂. The figure shows the results of 
the estimated coefficient (𝛽𝑃𝑂) for both regressions for the cross-sectional 
regressions in the English and Scottish samples. 
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Figure 2.1 4 Financing deficit coefficients for English SMEs 
 
Figure 2.2 5 Financing deficit coefficients for Scottish SMEs 
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Financing deficit coefficients taken from SMEs in  sample. The solid line represents the  yearly βpo 
coefficients from equation (3), while the broken line illustrates the yearly βpo coefficients from 
equation (4) for English SMEs.
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Financing deficit coefficients SMEs in Scottish sample1 1The solid line represents the yearly βpo 
coefficients from equation  (3), while the broken line illustrates the yearly βpo  coefficients from equation 
(4) for Scottish SMEs.
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The above figures illustrate the estimated 𝛽𝑃𝑂  values for the cross sectional 
regression with and without the additional deficit squared regressor. Figure 2.1 
shows that overall coefficients have remained static over the period for English 
SMEs and in some respects have declined up to the year 2010. This indicates 
that particularly over the crisis years, English SMEs have been relying more so 
on alternative sources of finance, other than debt finance obtained from banks to 
fill their financing deficits. As observed for the sample of Scottish SMEs, the 
coefficients peak at .45 in Scotland in 2006 and .4 for English SMEs in 2006 
and fall to .25 in year 2008. These coefficients support the findings of recent 
research that most SMEs do not use formal sources of external bank finance and 
instead rely on trade credit and retained earnings (BIS, 2012). 
As illustrated in Table 2.6, a Trade-off model is estimated. The estimated 
coefficient betata or 𝛽𝑇𝐴 captures if SMEs move towards or away from their 
target level of leverage (the industry average). Therefore, if  𝛽𝑇𝐴 > 0 firms 
move towards their target, however there are adjustment costs. The results show 
differences when fixed effects are applied, with a negative coefficient being 
observed for pooled OLS and a positive coefficient observed for fixed effects 
regressions. Overall for pooled OLS results appear to indicate that for the 
sample as a whole, firms move away from their target leverage. 
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Table 2.6 9 Trade off model 
 
The results in Table 2.6 appear that assuming a industry target level of leverage 
for SMEs, they appear to move more quickly towards this target level in pre-
crisis years, while this movement is much slower in the post crisis years of 2008 
onwards. The results in Table 2.6 also indicate that non debt tax shields (NDTS) 
and profitability are negatively related to firm leverage. These results regarding 
profitability do not support the predictions of the trade-off theory, yet the results 
of NDTS appear to support similar findings to Lopez-Gracia and Sorgorb Mira 
(2008), implying that investment tax credits may play a large part in SME 
financing decisions. 
The following Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the change in total debt of the 
sample of SMEs in each of the region and its relation with changes in their 
financing deficit/ surplus. For the Pecking Order to be successful, the graphs 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects (FE) Fixed Effects (FE) Fixed Effects (FE) Pre-crisis Post crisis
Constant 0.533** .321** -4.100** 11.95* 22.02 7.82
(.12) (.12) (.32) (4.77) (9.08) (7.34)
betata -.109***  .354*** .360*** .623*** 2.47*** .28***
(.03) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.24) (.13)
Profit assets ratio -6.35** -5.42** -9.88**
(.96) (1.64) (1.42)
ndts -73.28*** -1.66 -49.47*
(6.2) (12.9) 9.46
tangibility 5.13** 21.15** -.653
(1.87) (3.4) (2.7)
lage -2.46 -7.17* -.913
(1.6) (3.08) (2.41)
Industry dummys No No YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies No No YES YES YES YES
                          Country  Effects               Ire No No YES YES YES YES
Scot
Observations 14093 14094 14224 13884 7993 7887
number of groups 3025 3042 3004 2632 2751
R-square overall .01 .21 .23 .25 .38 .39
   rho* fraction of variance due to u_i)
Results of Panel regressions
Dependent variable  is the first difference of total debt scaled by Total assets and betata is the beta coefficient on the difference between the target 
level of debt for firm i at time t minus the level of debt for firm i in the period t-1 scaled by firm assets.
Column 1 shows the regression results for equation 5 using pooled ols and firm fixed effects based on the target level of debt of the as the median 
level of total debt for the sample as a whole of the period 2004-2011. 
Columns 3 and 4, the target level of debt are based on the median total debt of years 2003-2007( Pre-crisis) and years 2008-2011 (Post crisis).
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below should show that the change in debt financing tracking the financing 
deficit as predicted. Debt trends up in times of deficit and down in times of 
surplus, as explained by Myers (2001). 
Figure 2.3 6 Changes in debt ratios versus the financing deficit 
 
Figure 2.4  7Changes in debt ratios versus the financing deficit for Irish SMEs 
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Figure 2.5 8 Changes in debt ratios versus the financing deficit for Scottish SMEs 
 
 
The above illustrations indicate a period of time in which the majority of 
sampled SMEs are running financing deficits for the years of 2004-2007. These 
graphs indicates a significant change in SME financing behaviour during sample 
time period. It suggests that firms’ behaviour changed from running financing 
deficits to surpluses when the financial crisis began to occur. This suggests a 
dramatic cut in outgoings and investments over this period17. Noticeably, during 
the 2007/08 period, firms are deleveraging, allowing them to survive turbulent 
times. These firms may also be unable to borrow finance and have been forced 
to repay past borrowings. These events coincide with the changes in economic 
growth and investment in each region.  
                                                          
17 It important to note here that the observed sample is based on an unbalanced panel, 
therefore it is also likely that many firms who were running deficits may have fallen out of the 
sample due to business failure, therefore, there may be an element of bias in the final years of 
the sample graph towards surviving SMEs. 
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In figure 2.4, over the period 2004-2006, in general, a steady increase in the 
measure of the financing deficit for Irish SMEs is observed reflecting official 
data which show this to a period of sustained economic growth and increased 
investment (Central Statistics Office, 2011). For the Irish data, this reflects a 
period in which Ireland was characterised by a rapid expansion in both the level 
of investment and the level of credit availability (Central Bank of Ireland, 2001) 
until the financial crisis. Thereafter, total investment in the Irish domestic 
economy fell by over 52% during the period 2008-2011 (Central Statistics 
Office Ireland, 2011). 
Both the level of sales and the value of assets rose steadily for Irish SMEs. For 
the sample as whole, the level of retained earnings peaked in 2005 for Irish 
SMEs and in 2007 for English SMEs, and falls steadily thereafter. This fall off 
in retained earnings is more dramatic in the case of the sample of Irish SMEs. 
While levels of short-term and long-term debt financing are relatively stable 
over the sample period for English and Scottish SMEs, there is a steady and 
persistent increase in the levels of debt financing for Irish SMEs. This is 
consistent with a period in which the demand and supply of debt financing, as 
well as the level of investment among SMEs increased dramatically in the Irish 
economy until the recent crisis. Figure 2.6 illustrates the change in investment 
and real GDP growth over the sampled years. 
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Figure 2.6 9Total investment as a percentage of GDP: Ireland and UK 
 
 
Figure 2.7 below illustrates the changes in debt financing for the sample. Hall et 
al (2000) and Chittenden et al (1996) evaluate short and long term debt 
financing separately. They purport that total debt holds two separate effects for 
long and short term debt financing for some of the explanatory variables (asset 
structure, size and growth). Both long and short term debt financing have 
differing motivations, needs, costs and availability. In this study we examine the 
relationship between these variables across the explanatory variables of age, 
growth opportunities, profitability and macroeconomic conditions (captured by 
GDP per capita growth). Figure 2.7 illustrates the ratios for the sample of SMEs 
as a whole. The ratio of short-term debt to total financing is declining over the 
period of economic expansion (2004-2007), supporting the predictions of 
Michaelas et al. (1999). In addition, when splitting the sample by age, long term 
debt ratios appear to be rising significantly for SMEs of less than 10 years in 
age. 
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Figure 2.7 10  Debt ratios for sample of English, Irish and Scottish SMEs over period 
2004-2011 
 
Figure 2.8 11 Changes in aggregate levels of debt finance for small firms 
 
 
 
 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
G
ro
w
th
 i
n
 G
D
P
 p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 (
%
)
Debt ratios of sample of English, Irish and Scottish SMEs over the sample 
period 2004-2011
Longterm debt Short-term debt % Growth in GDP/PC U.K. N = 35023
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
%
 G
rw
o
th
 i
n
 G
D
P
?
 P
C
 U
.K
.
O
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
 (
m
e
d
ia
n
) 
le
v
e
ls
 o
f 
d
e
b
t 
(€
)
Changes in aggregate levels of debt finance of small firms
Longterm debt Short-term debt % Growth in GDP/PC U.K.
* All values are quoted in euros. This graph includes small firms from all 3 regions( Ire, Eng and Scotland) over 
2004-2011 period. the sample of small firms is in accordance with European Commission small firm definition as 
stated earlier .
79 
 
Figure 2.912 Long-term and short-term debt ratios by SME age 
 
The findings from regressions in Table 2.7 support the findings of Hall et al 
(2000) and the predictions of the Pecking Order regarding profitability, age, 
growth and asset structure, the sample of SMEs do exhibit falling short term 
debt ratios of the sample period as a whole. While this is similar over the years 
of economic growth (2004-2007) to the inverse relation observed in Michael et 
al (1999), it is unlikely to be for the same reasons as there were a number of 
years of sustained economic growth prior to 2004. It is interesting to note that 
long-term debt ratios are consistently rising for SMEs of less than 10 years in 
age over the sample period and falling for the rest of the sample of greater than 
10 years in age.       
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Table 2.7 10 Sources of debt panel regressions 
 
Finally, as regards changes in short-term financing over the sample period, I 
examine sources of informal finance by illustrating the increased importance of 
trade finance. In figure 2.10, I illustrate the increased importance of accounts 
payable in the short-term financing for SMEs over the sample period. 
 Variable Dependent variables
Total debt long-term debt Short-term debt
Constant .361*** .264*** .273***
lage -.049** -.061*** -.022
(.03) (.02) (.01)
Profitability -0.215*** -0.04*** -0.104***
(.07) (0.01) (.01)
Growth Oppertunities -.156**
(.08)
Risk -.790***
(.074)
Tangibility .268*** .252*** .017
(.06) (.03) (.02)
Growth GDP/ PC .012** .005 .003
(.00)  (.01) (.002)
Time Dummies
2004 Omitted Omitted
2005 0.02 .003
2006 0.01 -.010*
2007 0.01 -.019***
2008 -0.01 -.002
2009 -0.02 .007
2010 0.01 -.008
2011 0.01 -.006
Observations 4,050  18,880 33,851
number of groups 900 3571 5,343
obs per group ( average) 4.5 5.3 6.3
R-sq within .10 0.04 .03
R-square between .09 0.07 .03
R-square overall .10 0.1 .05
   rho* fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.8 0.810 .724
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, figures without stars are statistically
insignificant. Standard errors are signalled with parenthesis(  clustered)
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Figure 2.10 13 Trade payables as a proportion of total short-term debt financing 
                
2.8 Conclusions 
Although the research provides empirical evidence on capital structures of 
SMEs, the main aim of this study is to test the Pecking Order theory using the 
modified flow of funds regression technique over the business cycle. The study 
is the first of its kind to test the Pecking Order using this approach on Irish, 
English and Scottish SMEs. This and the time span of the panel are important as 
the cost structures and the availability of external finance, particularly debt 
financing changed significantly over this period. While the research finds that 
the Pecking Order may not give as good an explanation of SME financing 
behaviour as previously thought, it does indicate that the business cycle has a 
significant impact on the financing behaviour of SMEs. The results of the study 
show a falling level of support for the Pecking Order over the observed time 
period, however this rejection of the Pecking Order is not in favour of the 
Trade-off model. It shows that there is a downward sloping trend for the 
Pecking Order coefficients for English and Scottish SMEs in particular over the 
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sample period with inconclusive results on the coefficients for the Irish sample. 
This downward trend in the Pecking Order coefficients may be due to the 
availability of alternative financing sources to English and Scottish SMEs over 
the period. The research further highlights the increased investment across the 
regions and the subsequent decline over the sample period consistent with what 
you would expect from trade cycle and subsequent crisis. While recent official 
research points to a decline in bank lending to SMEs  (BIS, 2012; Central Bank 
of Ireland, 2012) for both demand and supply reasons, this research indicates 
that alternative sources of finance such as internal financing and various forms 
of trade credit have increased in importance over the crisis period. In addition, 
while the research finds support for many of the empirical predictions of the 
Pecking Order, it is my belief that the role of non-formal sources of bank 
finance raise questions about the role of the Pecking Order as the primary theory 
of SME capital structure. This is further reflected by the insignificant role of the 
role financing deficit squared variable in the analysis, which is there to capture 
debt capacity. 
This paper does not support the proposition that the Pecking Order is an 
excellent first order descriptor of SME financing decisions unlike prior studies 
(Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Berggren et al., 2000; Watson and 
Wilson, 2002; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010), in fact the empirical findings 
here suggest the opposite. The research does however, confirm the hypothesis 
that older, more established SMEs with greater level of assets, suffer less from 
debt capacity constraints further reflected by the squared financing deficit 
variable having little effect and often no effect on the observed Pecking Order 
coefficients in my sample.  
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As regards short and long-term debt finance, the analysis for the sample shows a 
downward trend in short term debt finance as a proportion of SME capital 
structure and an upward trend in the level of long-term debt financing over the 
positive economic growth years of the sample.  
Finally, it is clear from a finance perspective; that both demand and supply side 
effects are taking place in this study. The combination of credit tightening and 
reduced economic confidence are apparent in the reduction in the level of 
investment in SMEs over the crisis. From a demand side, SMEs wish to source 
finance at an affordable rate.  It may be the case that alternative sources of 
finance such as trade credit have become more important to SMEs, especially 
over the sample period of this study.   
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Chapter 3: Bank credit and Trade credit: Evidence from SMEs over the 
financial crisis18 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, bank lending to micro, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) has declined significantly in most developed 
economies. Recent figures for the EU show that new bank lending to SMEs 
(lending of <€1m) has declined by 47 percent since 2008, 21 percent in Italy, 66 
percent in Spain and 82 percent in Ireland19. This is a major policy concern as 
lack of access to finance inhibits investment and economic recovery.  The 
financial crisis not only effects the supply of money to firms for investment 
proposes, it also has knock on effects on the day to day operations of firms as 
they seek alternative sources of  funds to finance their activities when overdraft 
facilities are reduced or withdrawn.  The demand for alternative sources of 
funding, including business and personal credit cards rises (CBR, 2009) and the 
supply and demand for trade credit in the economy is also affected. The impact 
of the financial crisis depends on how financially exposed firms are at the time 
of the crisis. While some firms have cash at hand to cover shortages due to the 
reduction in bank facilities, others seek to manage their working capital more 
efficiently by delaying payments to suppliers and restricting credit provided to 
customers.  Some firms make arrangements with state agencies to delay taxation 
payments. In some cases extra credit is negotiated, in others it is taken without 
agreement, as both suppliers and buyers adjust to the new conditions. In an 
                                                          
18  This study was published in the International Small Business Journal. See: McGuinness, G. 
and Hogan, T. (2014). Bank credit and Trade credit: Evidence from SMEs over the financial 
crisis. International Small Business Journal, doi: 10.1177/0266242614558314. 
19 ECB Euro area bank lending survey. Available from http: 
www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html [Accessed on 1 Dec 2012] 
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adverse lending environment, it is likely that trade credit takes on an augmented 
role in financing economic activity, particularly in the SME sector. With the 
notable exception (see Carbó-Valverde, Rodriquez-Fernandez and Udell, 2012; 
Vermoesen, Deloof and Lavern, 2013) the majority of studies that examine 
trade credit and the financial crisis are based on listed firms from emerging 
market economies (Coulibaly, Sapriza and Zlate; Bastos and Pindado, 2013; 
Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007) and not on unlisted SMEs which is the 
focus of this study. This is an important research agenda, since SMEs are (a) 
more dependent on trade credit to cover their short-term financing needs 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), (b) have less potential to 
access external financing sources than larger firms (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012; Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2006), and (c) are more 
likely to be adversely affected by financing constraints (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2008; Bernanke, 1983; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and banking 
market concentration and the level of financial development (Agostino, 
Gagliardi and Trivieri, 2012; Ge and Qiu, 2007). 
This chapter addresses a number of important questions within the current 
debate in the trade credit literature and within the context of SMEs. First, what 
is the role of trade credit in periods of financial crisis? Is there a redistribution 
of credit from financially stronger firms through trade credit finance to firms 
that are financially constrained in accessing bank finance? Second, does trade 
credit act as a substitute for bank credit in a credit constrained economy and are 
there sectoral differences associated with any substitution effect? The study 
contributes to evidence on redistribution and substitution effects by testing the 
case for unlisted SMEs during this recent pre-crisis and crisis/post crisis periods 
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and uses data obtained from the Amadeus database which contains up to 10 
years of financial statement data on Irish companies. The data contains relevant 
profit and loss and balance sheet information on the same companies over a 
period of time conducive to doing panel data regressions with fixed effects. This 
study is the first to our knowledge that applies panel data analysis using the 
Amadeus data over the financial crisis.  
Ireland provides a useful setting for this analysis, as SMEs in Ireland account 
for approximately 98% of all enterprises and 68% of all private sector 
employment (CSO 2011). Following the financial crisis and subsequent 
recession, Irish SMEs experienced both a dramatic reduction in bank lending 
and change in aggregate demand, with GDP falling for three consecutive years 
from 2008 to 2010. Over the period 2008- 2012, the Irish banking market 
became significantly more concentrated as measured by the share of assets held 
by the 5 largest banks. Similar banking sector concentration was evident in 
other European countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland where banking sector 
restructuring took place (ECB, 2013).  During the period 2003-2007, bank loans 
to property related businesses grew by unprecedented levels from €45 billion in 
2003 to a peak of  €125 billion in Q1 2008 (Whelan, 2013). Ireland’s banking 
sector model also changed dramatically from one based on traditional deposit 
based lending to one that was highly dependent upon raising funds from short-
term borrowing on international inter-bank and money markets. During the 
same period, international borrowings of the six main banks in the country rose 
from €15 billion in 2003 to over €100 billion in 2007, representing over half of 
the country’s GDP (Whelan, 2013). This type of funding ultimately proved to 
be less stable than traditional deposit based lending. While Ireland was very 
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much exposed to a potential crisis, it was not the only European country where 
banking deposits were insufficient to satisfy the growth in domestic credit 
expansion. In the European 30 countries, the average ratio of bank deposits to 
GDP grew from 57 percent in 1999 to 89 percent in 2007, whereas the average 
ratio of private credit to GDP grew much more quickly from 67 percent  in 1999 
to 107 percent  in 2007 (Lane and McQuade, 2013). In the immediate aftermath 
of the recession in 2008, the Irish government began a period of severe austerity 
measures coinciding with the troika bailout and the introduction of a banking 
guarantee. However, despite these measures and the guarantee to bank deposits, 
international investors continued to withdraw their funding. Research has found 
that, in particular, deposits of non-residents at the Irish banks covered by the 
guarantee declined from €162 billion in August 2010 to €116 billion by 
November 2010. Not surprisingly, coinciding with the reduction in official bank 
funding itself, there was an overall reduction in financial institutional lines of 
credit to SMEs too was also quite substantial. Figures shows that the 
outstanding stock of credit to non-financial, non-property related private sector 
fell by over 30 per cent from its peak in Q4 2008 to mid 2011 (Central Bank of 
Ireland 2012).  
While the findings of this study show that net trade credit has declined over the 
crisis period indicating an overall reduction in inter firm financing in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The results provide evidence of a substitution 
of bank finance for trade credit when firms are constrained in accessing bank 
credit consistent with Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012), Fishman and Love (2003) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1997). The findings demonstrate a financial 
‘adjustment process’ whereby financially vulnerable SMEs adapt to the 
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restriction in lending in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, by substituting 
bank finance for trade credit which is most likely extended by financially 
stronger SMEs. The panel analysis also indicates that the financial position of 
SMEs is a more important determinant of who redistributes credit within the 
sector than firm age or size. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature 
on trade credit financing during times of credit restriction, focusing on the 
theories and evidence relevant to the hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology applied in this research, while Section 4 
discusses the findings of the paper.  Section 5 outlines the limitations of the 
research and avenues for further research, while Section 6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Trade credit use in SME finance and in periods of credit restriction 
The importance of trade credit in financing economic activity has been noted in 
numerous studies. Ng et al. (1999) find that the amount of trade credit exceeds 
the primary money stock M1 by a factor of 1.5 in the U.S. In general, the terms 
of trade credit contracts differ for firms depending on a number of factors 
including the industry setting and the length of time in which they have been 
doing business together (Fishman and Love, 2003). This is important, 
particularly for SMEs that rely so heavily on internal funds and on bank lending, 
especially bank overdrafts as a means of short-term financing. While trade 
credit is generally thought of as a short term method of financing (Nilsen, 
2002), it plays a very important role in the everyday organisation and decision 
making of firms too (Rodriquez-Rodriquez, 2006).  
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Theory on trade credit is not new. Its role has been examined from a number of 
different perspectives including, transactions costs, redistribution, substitution, 
market power and relationship lending. One of the key benefits to suppliers in 
extending trade credit is the knowledge they have regarding the credit 
worthiness of the firms they do business with. This is a result of the ongoing 
monitoring of orders, repayment schedules and the ability to enforce repayment 
or cut off future supplies (Love and Zaidi, 2010). Obtaining favourable trade 
credit terms also allows firms to reduce their overall borrowing costs, especially 
by obtaining discounts for early payment (Aktas, Bodt and Lobez, 2012; Fabbri 
and Klapper, 2009; Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen, 2011). Trade credit has 
also been shown to sustain the sales and profitability of SMEs prior to the 
financial crisis (Banos-Caballero, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2012). 
Trade credit can be a very expensive form of finance too, especially when firms 
do not avail of the early discount facility (Nilsen, 2002; Petersen and Rajan 
1997), therefore, it may be beneficial for firms to hold cash as a precaution to 
avoid postponing and incurring the costs of late payment for goods (Wu et al., 
2011).   
This study examines the role of trade credit in the European context of Irish 
SMEs and extends the analysis to the post crisis period of 2008. The theoretical 
bases for this study are the redistribution view of trade credit financing and the 
substitution effect. The financing of firms during times of credit shortages has 
received increased attention in recent times (Drakos, 2013; Love and Zaida, 
2010; Vermoesen et al., 2013) in particular, the role of trade credit and whether 
it can act as a substitute for official lines of credit in times in financial 
tightening has returned to the forefront of finance research (Huang, Shi and 
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Zhang, 2010; Love et al., 2007; Love and Zaida, 2010 among others). 
Redistribution theory developed by Meltzer (1960) suggests that large liquid 
firms are net suppliers of credit to smaller firms because they have better access 
to bank finance. Empirical evidence of this theory has been shown in periods of 
tight money (Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel, 1995; Nilsen, 2002). 
Calomiris et al. (1995) showed that large firms use commercial paper to fund 
trade credit during periods of monetary tightening. It is therefore predicted that 
the redistribution of credit from liquid firms can provide a cushion during a 
credit crunch for less financially liquid firms (Bias and Gollier 1997; Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006; Kohler et al., 2000; Nilsen, 2002; 
among others), whilst also reinforcing supplier customer relations (Cunat, 
2007). Evidence on redistribution during periods of financial crises is mixed, as 
banking systems are not properly functioning as in ‘normal’ times (Boissay and 
Gropp, 2007; Love et al., 2007). Love et al. (2007) find empirical evidence of 
the redistribution effect for a sample of large listed firms in emerging markets; 
however they find that this effect shuts down during a financial crisis. 
Consequently, firms become unable to redistribute credit to less privileged firms 
after a period of time. Choi and Kim (2005) and Marotta (1997) both find 
empirical evidence against the redistribution view. Choi and Kim (2005) state 
that when banks refrain from lending to smaller firms during a monetary 
contraction, large US firms often refrain from extending financial help to small 
firms too. They find that trade credit increases at the time of a crisis and then 
declines significantly in the period straight after. They find little evidence that 
the increase is proportionately more for small than for large firms. Marotta 
(1997) finds that small financially constrained firms are not shielded from 
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monetary tightening through the redistribution mechanism as proposed by 
Meltzer (1960). 
Similarly, there is mixed evidence as to whether trade credit financing can be 
used as a substitute for bank finance. Theoretical support for the substitution 
effect can be found in some studies (Bias and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and 
Ellingson, 2004; Cunat, 2007; Meltzer, 1960 and Wilner, 2000) and empirically 
using cross sectional US data (Danielson and Scott, 2004; Fishman and Love, 
2003 and Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Other studies find support contrary to the 
substitution effect during banking crises. These studies show evidence that 
small illiquid firms pass on liquidity shocks to their suppliers along the supply 
chain, thus propagating reduced trade credit and ultimately default in many 
cases (Boissay and Gropp, 2007; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Love and 
Zaida, 2010). Furthermore, the possible substitution between trade credit and 
bank credit is likely to be determined by the country setting firms operate in 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Hernández-Cánovas and Koeter-Kant, 
2011). Huang et al. (2010) provide evidence of a substitution effect between 
trade credit and bank credit and a counter cyclical relationship between trade 
credit and GDP using a panel dataset of 284 large publicly listed Chinese 
companies over the period 1998-2006. Love et al. (2007) and Love and Zaida 
(2010) examine the role of trade credit during the financial crises in emerging 
economies of Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Korea in the late 1990’s and 
find evidence against the premise that trade credit can act as a substitute to bank 
credit during financial crises. Instead, they argue that liquidity shocks are passed 
along the supply chain exacerbating the financial shocks from the reductions in 
credit from financial lines. 
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The majority of trade credit studies are based on large US listed firms 
(Calomiris et al., 1995; Choi and Kim, 2005; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garrig, 2013 among others) or publicly listed firms from emerging market 
economies (Coulibaly et al., 2013; Love et al., 2007 and Love and Zaida, 2010). 
This may reflect the lack of comprehensive data on SMEs and their financing. 
In a recent study, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garrig (2013) find that large 
US firms extended credit to financially weaker large firms throughout the crisis. 
Despite these findings, there is little evidence regarding the role of trade credit 
financing for small and medium sized firms and whether it has acted as 
substitute to bank financing over the recent crisis, particularly in the case of 
unlisted SMEs which are the focus of this study. The nearest study to examine 
the role of trade credit to SMEs is Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012). They examine 
the role of trade credit for a sample of Spanish SMEs over the period of 2004 to 
the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. They find that financially constrained 
SMEs depend on trade credit to finance capital expenditures at the onset of the 
crisis. The findings of their study implies a significant role for credit and 
investment amongst SMEs by modelling those of which are constrained in their 
access to bank finance. My studies differs from Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012) by 
examining the effective role of trade credit in financing SMEs over the period of 
the financial crisis and beyond, focusing on  the role of trade credit as a 
substitute for bank finance for financially constrained SMEs.  
Given that my sample is made up of unlisted SMEs, we expect the dramatic 
reduction of bank credit extended in Ireland, as a result of the financial crisis, to 
have a significant impact on the level of trade credit extended within the SME 
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sector. Therefore, the first hypothesis we test is for the overall reduction in trade 
credit after the crisis. 
3.2.1Trade credit hypotheses 
H1: Overall trade credit reduces over the financial crisis. 
Overall, the expectation is that net credit redistributed by financially stronger 
firms rises immediately after the crisis and falls thereafter, such that the impact 
of the crisis would be seen in year one of the crisis and fall in subsequent years. 
Bernanke (1983) argued that the disruptions in the banking sector following the 
Great Depression reduced the efficiency of credit allocation and consequently 
aggregate demand and output. Thus the secondary effects of increased lending 
restrictions and credit availability to firms in the years after the onset of the 
crisis is likely to reduce the overall supply of credit and allocation of credit in 
the economy reducing the level of trade credit extended and received.  
H2.A: Financially liquid firms extend more trade credit following the financial 
crisis. 
H2.B: Financially illiquid firms receive more trade credit following the 
financial crisis. 
 According to the redistribution view of trade credit, financially stronger firms 
have the ability to pass on credit to financially constrained and vulnerable firms 
via their accounts receivable. Trade credit in this way acts as important source 
of financing when credit from financial institutions is not available. This leads 
to the third hypothesis. 
H3: Trade credit acts as a substitute for bank finance for SMEs in a financial 
crisis. 
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Do firms that would normally access bank credit switch to trade credit in a 
financial crisis?  If trade credit acts as a substitute for bank finance for credit 
constrained or financially illiquid firms that would have received bank financing 
prior to the crisis, then trade credit received use increase for this group of firms 
in the period after the financial crisis of 2008. This leads to hypothesis number 
4. 
H4: Trade credit received will be strongest for the period straight after financial 
crisis, particularly in terms of quantity and length of credit time. 
Next to assess the role of collateral and use of trade credit finance. Specifically, 
we assess if there is a relation between the level of intangible assets in firms’ 
balance sheets and the likelihood of receiving trade credit financing. This is 
particularly important for innovative firms or firms that invest more in research 
and development. It is likely that this group of firms are most likely to be 
adversely affected by the banking crisis, where capital requirements by banks 
restrict the allocation of official credit to innovative SMEs in particular.  
H5: Innovative firms will depend more on trade credit finance in the crisis 
period as opposed to pre-crisis years. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that firm age has a non-linear effect in terms of 
financing. Reputation and credit worthiness are much more important in the 
early years of a firm’s life and these factors take time for firms to acquire. To 
account for this non-linear effect of age, the square of the age variable is 
included alongside the age variable itself. Alternative variables such as retained 
profits and the size of firm assets are likely to capture the effect of SME age on 
the level of trade credit granted. Firm assets are also a good indicator for 
collateral, which has previously been found to be a good in alleviating the 
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problems of information asymmetries and securing debt finance for SMEs (Mac 
an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010).  
H6: Older SMEs are more likely to extend trade credit than young SMEs. 
3.3 Data, variables and methodology 
 
The data consists of Irish SME financial statement data obtained from the 
Amadeus database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. The Amadeus data is derived 
from accounts filed at the official Irish government’s Companies Registration 
Office (CRO).  In total there were 158,666 private limited companies registered 
in Ireland in 2012 (CRO, 2013) representing 79.3 percent of the estimated 
200,000 total number enterprises in the economy (Eurostat, 2013, The Structural 
Business Statistics Database). The sample obtained in this paper includes over 
7,600 SMEs with balance sheet and profit and loss account information over the 
period 2003-201120. While the sample only represents a small proportion of the 
total number of limited companies registered in Ireland, it is important to note 
that it is much more representative of surviving companies as the sample size is 
quite significant for two reasons: (1) The figure of 158,666 companies masks 
the fact that each year an average of 9.1 percent of the total are new entrants and 
8.9 percent are exits. The sample population is also significantly impacted by 
the provisions of the Companies (Amendment) Act 198621, whereby many 
                                                          
20 Regression analysis is applied up to year 2011 as the level of responses reduces dramatically 
in year 2012 due to data not fully available when we began our data analysis. Therefore we 
focus on years 2003-2011 in our analysis. The data is strongly balanced for years 2003-2011. 
 
21 Small sized companies are exempted from the full extent of the requirements relating to 
annual accounts in respect of the company satisfies two of the three following conditions: 
Balance sheet total not exceeding €4.4m, Turnover not exceeding €8.8m, Employees not 
exceeding 50. Companies under Section 8 (Amendment) Act 1986, as amended by Regulation 4 
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SMEs in Ireland are exempt from filing complete financial accounts. Thus of 
the 15,964 companies in the sample with employee data of at least 2 employees 
and less than 250 employees,  only 7600 have financial data  for at least two/ 
three of the years of sample period (2003-2011). 
SMEs are defined according to the standard European Commission (2005) 
criteria22, which includes firms that employ less than 249 workers in a given 
year and have either an annual turnover of less than €50m or a balance sheet 
total of less than €43m. Micro enterprises are also included in the sample. In this 
study, we scale by the number of employees and the balance sheet totals of each 
SME in each year. The criteria for the sample are as follows:  
 All active firms employing less than 249 employees in each of the sample 
years.  
 All firms with balance sheet total of greater than €43,000,000 or annual 
turnover greater than €50,000,000 in any of three consecutive years of the 
sample years are excluded.  
 Firms that are reported to be listed or delisted are excluded.  
 The analysis excludes all financial and insurance companies, in line with 
existing empirical studies. 
 Public utilities such as public transport and postal services are also excluded 
from the sample. 
 All financial variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level23.  
                                                                                                                                                           
European Communities (Accounts) Regulations 1993 and European Union (Accounts) 
Regulations 2012).    
22 The European Commission provide a comparable reference group for defining SMEs across 
the European Union. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-
definition/  
23 This is to mitigate the effect of extreme outliers in the data. The data excludes subsidiary 
firms.  
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 All responses for creditor/debtor days, accounts receivables and accounts 
payables are greater than zero in any given year. 
These restrictions reduce the initial sample by a further 325. In total, the final 
sample contains approximately 7618 Irish SMEs and 68,562 firm year 
observations over the period 2003-2011, all of which remain active over the 
sample period. Based on sales turnover of the last three years of the sample and 
scaling turnover according to European Commission (2005), the panel contains 
approximately 6002 micro enterprises (78 percent of total sample24), 864 small 
enterprises (11.5 percent of total sample), and 723 medium sized enterprises or 
(9.5 percent of the total sample). Firms employing 10 persons or fewer in a 
given year are classified as micro enterprises, while those that employ between 
10 and 49 workers are labelled small, and finally, enterprises employing 
between 50 and 249 employees are classified as medium sized enterprises. 
Figure 3.1 shows the changes in the number of debtor and creditor collection 
days and the efficiency in working capital in micro and small enterprises over 
the sample period. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, average micro debtor 
collection days have slightly increased from 82 pre-crisis to 91 during the crisis, 
while payment days have reduced from an average of 60 days to 59 for micro 
enterprises meaning an increase in the Working Capital Requirement (WCR) 
from 22 days pre-crisis to 32 in the crisis. Small enterprise debtor collection 
days have reduced from an average of 59 days prior to the crisis to 47 days 
during the crisis, while small firm payments days have remained the same25. In 
addition the median numbers of days over the two periods are also presented. As 
                                                          
24 Of our sample of micro enterprises, approximately 1700 employ less than 5 employees 
annually. 
25 All figures are winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile range to mitigate the effects of extreme 
outliers which influence sample means. 
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we can see from the figures presented above, the change in micro debtor 
collection days appears quite significant; however the median figures show 
micro debtor days to have risen only from 43 to 45 days over the two periods, 
suggesting the figures are skewed to the right as we would expect. This is a 
strong indication that the “bad” debtor days or the very long length of days have 
gotten worse over the two periods for some firms, hence pushing the average 
figure up. Even basing this change in WCR on the median figures, this 
represents an increase in WCR days from 16 to 20 days for micro enterprise 
where WCR has reduced for both small and median enterprises based on either 
mean or median figure. The change of 9 days in the mean debtor days for micro 
enterprises also represents an approximate move of 6 standard deviations of the 
mean of the micro sample, therefore indicating that the average has over the two 
periods has moved. 
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Figure 3.1 14 The average (mean) number of debtor and creditor days and the working 
capital requirement (WCR) of SMEs measured in days 
 
From Figure 1, a steep reduction in small firm debtor collection days over the 
two periods from 59 to 47 is observed. In this case the median change is actually 
from 51 to 33. This too represents an interesting change over the two periods. 
This reduction of 12 average debtor collection days also represents an 
approximate movement of 6 standard deviations of the mean of the small firm 
sample. These changes are a strong indication that the differences we observe 
over the two periods are not by chance. Average Medium sized enterprise 
collection days (while still high) have reduced from an average of 59 pre-crisis 
to 53 in the crisis/ post crisis period. In terms of working capital requirement, 
micro enterprises have been placed under the most pressure in terms of 
receiving their payments from suppliers over the two periods. These figures 
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would suggest greater changes in terms of efficiency in working capital appears 
to be taking place in small firms over the crisis period, where micro firms 
appear to be experiencing a deterioration in WCR days in comparison to small 
and medium sized firms. 
When examining debtor and creditor days across industries, it can be seen that 
the average level of trade credit received has increased for food processing, 
wholesale and business services sectors. Trade credit levels decrease for real 
estate and community services/ residential care services. There are changes 
within the two periods; debtor days generally reducing in all sectors with the 
exception of construction and retail (see Table 3.1)26. The largest proportion of 
SMEs in the sample are in the sectors of real estate services, hospitality and 
tourism and community services, with the lowest proportion in construction, 
retail and publishing (see Table 3.3). The figures suggest that cash in some 
sectors is being collected more quickly since the onset of the crisis; however 
some sectors have seen an increase in the levels of trade credit financing 
received over the crisis period. These include food processing, wholesale and 
business services (Table 3.2). As pointed out by Love et al. (2007) the 
redistribution of credit from financially stronger to financially weaker firms 
during a banking crisis is based on the assumption that firms with better access 
to external finance will redistribute credit via trade credit to financially weaker 
firms. In the event of a credit crunch as experienced in the Irish context where 
bank lending effectively stopped, redistribution requires a transfer of credit from 
cash rich firms to those firms that are constrained in access bank finance. 
                                                          
26 See Tables 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 Appendix for overall levels of net credit calculated as calculated as 
trade receivables minus payables divided by the total sales of the firm in each year. 
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Table 3.111: Average debtor and creditor collection days across industry sectors for SMEs 
in Ireland 2003-2011 
 
 
Table 3.212:  Average (mean) levels of trade credit by sector 
 
 
Table 3.313 Summary statistics for the final year of the sample 2011 
Average Debtor days across sectorsAll
Food/              
manufacturin
g
Constructio
n Wholesale Retail Hosp and Rec
Broadcasting
/  publishing
Business 
services
Community 
work
Pre-Crisis 45 58 47 75 16 25 60 61 21
Std. Dev (78) (64) (84) (55) (54) (76) (46) (82) (65)
Skewness 2.28 2.37 2.2 2.23 2.81 3.18 0.94 2.36 3.93
Crisis 45 51 49 65 17 23 51 55 17
Std. Dev (110) (62) (75) (75) (56) (51) (68) (83) (68)
Skewness 2.19 3.21 2.62 2.89 4.56 3.24 3.23 2.44 4.44
Average Creditor days across sectors
Pre-Crisis 26 27 33 25 37 24 28 19 15
Std. Dev (80) (51) (60) (42) (50) (65) (88) (76) (71)
Skewness 2.90 4.49 2.47 3.33 2.79 3.36 2.86 2.97 3.67
Crisis 25 32 39 29 34 23 29 24 12
Std. Dev (84) (74) (93) (66) (52) (75) (71) (99) (72)
Skewness 2.99 3.84 2.75 3.89 4.09 3.2 3.26 2.71 3.89
 *The Pre-crisis represents the average values over the period 2003-2007 and Crisis represents the average values from 2008-2012.
   ST.Dev are shown in parenthesis
    The figures represented illustrate the average number of days calculated using the median.
Industry sectors No. of SMEs  Sample (%) Emp Firm age Sales Cashta
Food processing/ manufacturing 261 3.3 51 (51) 24 (13) 9200000 (1000,000) 0.32 (.03)
Construction, real estate and related activities 204 2.6 14 (22) 16 (8) 2,100,000 (5200,000) 0.37 (.34)
Wholesale 346 4.4 25 (31) 22 (12) 7,800,000 (9,400,000) .27 (.26)
Retail trade 224 2.8 42 (51) 21 (10) 7,500,000 (9,500,000) 0.3 (0.3)
Hospitality, tourism and recreation 1230 15.5 12 (21) 20 (10) 780,000 (2,900,000) 0.7 (.33)
Broadcasting, publishing 70 0.1 27 (45) 15 (7) 4,300,000 (7,800,000) 0.38 (.33)
Business services 603 7.6 14 (24) 17 (7) 2,000,000 (5,200,000) 0.49 (.34)
Community work activities, residential care 2281 28.7 16 (24) 17 (8) 500,000 (1,700,000) .80 (.27)
Figures represent mean levels of employment, firm age, sales and cash at bank and in hand of company scaled by firm assets( Cashta) 
Note: Figures in paranthesis denote Standard Deviation 
Industry sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average β
Food processing/manufacturing 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.13 .0163***
Construction 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.19 .021***
Real estate 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.27 -.007**
Wholesale 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 .008***
Retail trade 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 -.002
Hospitality and Tourism 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 .001
Business services 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.2 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.25 0.20 .006*
Community services 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.1 0.13 -.006***
 Average across years 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17
* Trade credit recieved is calculated as trade payables divided by the total sales of the firm in each year
* β is the estimated coefficient  the regresssion TC = α + β1(year) +ε1 , indicating  how much trade credit increases for each sector for each year of the sample from a simple pooled 
regression with no control varaibles.  Positive values of β indicate an increase in average levels of trade credit recieved in a given sector over the sample period. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% 
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3.4 Multivariate analysis 
Debtor and creditor days are one measure of the use of trade credit amongst 
SMEs; they indicate the length of time for payment of goods to take place. To 
avoid potential biases or misleading inferences from the results, it is necessary 
to use several methods of estimating trade credit use. Most noticeably, it is 
important to take account of differences amongst SMEs in terms of their 
financial vulnerability to the crisis. Similar to Love et al. (2007), we examine 
the use of trade credit prior to the period of financial crisis and during the 
financial crisis using panel data. As outlined in Chapter 1, the advantages of 
panel data are significant including the study of changes in trade credit 
financing over a period of time and ultimately, by giving the researcher more 
information, more variability, more degrees of freedom and efficient estimates 
(Baltagi, 2008). Most importantly, in terms of the estimates, panel data allows 
for the control of unobservable and individual heterogeneity. Variables are 
scaled for trade credit by firm sales for account receivables and payables in 
Tables (3.5), (3.6), (3.10) and by firm assets in Table 3.8 and Table 3.927. In 
Tables (3.7) and (3.10), the length of credit days are estimated using the natural 
logarithm of creditor and debtor days and by the difference between debtor and 
creditor days for each firm, in total, the analysis includes nine different 
measures of trade credit including the three measures of creditor and debtor 
days. 
                                                          
27 In Tables (3.8) and (3.9), Trade credit values are scaled by firm assets due to fewer data 
availability for asset intangibility and cash flow. 
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Table 3.414 Descriptive statistics for the major variables of the study 
 
The variables for credit received are: accounts payable scaled by firm sales 
(tradecreditorst), accounts payable scaled by firm assets (Tradecreditorassets) 
and the number of creditor collection days. The variables for credit extended 
are:  accounts receivable scaled by firm sales (tradedebtors) accounts receivable 
scaled by firm assets (Tradedebtorassets), and the number of debtor collection 
day. Table 3.4 illustrates differences in mean levels of the variables for the two 
periods of the crisis and pre-crisis. Given that the sample period (2003-2011) 
covers a period of economic boom and recession, descriptive statistics are split 
into two separate periods (2003-2007) and (2008-2011). All the economic 
indicators such as firm sales growth, profits, GDP per capita growth and 
retained profits and credit extended by the banking sector to private enterprises 
(PcreditGDP) are different from pre-crisis to crisis periods. It is also worth 
noting that the sample as a whole is made up of mainly mature SMEs with an 
average age of 17 years. Therefore, this research is based on what might be 
termed “resilient firms” which survived over the seven year period in question.  
                                                                                                                                         2003-2007                                                                                   2008-2011
Variables Obs Mean ST.Dev 0.25 Median 0.75 Obs Mean ST.Dev 0.25 Median 0.75
Firm age  AGE 38090 13.2 51 5 9 15 38090 17 51 4 14 20
Total assets 38090 710000 2200000 13036.00 43636 200000 31432 920000 2400000 18014 60023 260000
Number of employees    EMP 5096 19 32 3 7 20 15203 17 29 3 6 18
Creditor payment days  Creditordays 8194 53 76 10 26 62 14224 53 79 9 26 61
Debtor collection days  Debtordays 8982 78 95 17 45 97 15965 85 110 16 45 104
Debtor days minus creditor days Numdays 5724 21 85 -12 11 52 10630 30 97 -10 13 56
Accounts recievable/ firm assets Tradedebtorsassets 11518 0.39 .31 0.11 0.33 0.63 18632 .37 .31 0.09 0.29 0.6
Accounts payable/firm assets Tradecreditorassets 12447 0.45 .76 0.06 0.2 0.51 17553 .44 .81 0.05 0.16 0.46
Accounts recievable minus payables/  firm assets Netcredita 11518 -0.01 .68 -0.13 0.03 0.31 17553 -.02 .70 -0.09 0.04 0.29
Total firms short term debt/ firm assets    Loansta 36520 0.52 2.61 0 0 0.08 30608 0.66 2.94 0 0 .16
Accounts payable/ sales  Tradecreditorst 8536 0.19 0.37 0.02 0.07 0.17 15209 0.19 0.37 0.02 0.08 0.17
Accounts recievable/ sales  Tradedebtors 8375 0.26 0.43 0.04 0.12 0.28 16499 0.28 0.44 0.04 0.12 0.31
Accounts recievable minus payables/ sales  Netcredit 8375 0.05 0.36 0 0 0.06 15209 0.09 0.44 -0.03 0.02 0.15
Credit extended by banks as % of GDP  PcreditGDP 38090 156 29.0 133 159 179 30472 222.00 9.55 215 225 229
Gross domestic product per capita growth GDPpcg 38090 2.9 0.54 38090 -2.20 2.69
inter money market lending rate irmoneymkt 38090 2.99 1.03 2.13 2.4 3.64 30472 1.35 0.97 0.64 0.97 2.06
Cash and Cash equivalent/ firm assets   Cashta 33809 0.61 0.35 0.27 0.69 0.96 28823 0.62 0.35 0.3 0.73 0.96
Cash of firm and deposits at bank/ firm assets Cashflowta 9187 0.39 1.51 0.02 0.17 0.45 15779 0.04 14.36 -0.02 0.1 0.35
Intangible to total assets  Intang 23971 0.01 0.07 0 0 0.01 19990 0.01 0.07 0 0 0.01
Firm assets(year1) - Firm assets( year 0)/ Firm assets( year 0) Invest 18337 0.32 1.73 -0.13 0.01 0.13 18931 0.04 0.87 -0.2 -0.03 0
Net sales plus opperating revenues/ firm assets Opprev 21204 5.07 12.07 1.01 2.06 4.23 28440 4.73 11.26 0.84 1.82 4
Firms sales( year1) - firm sales (year 0)/ Firm sales(year 0)  Salesgrowth 13370 1.83 29.000 -0.05 0.07 0.25 26865 0.05 0.55 -0.13 -0.01 0.09
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To test the set of hypotheses outlined in this study, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the characteristics of the SMEs in my sample. I employ panel data 
fixed effects and control for the financial position or strength of SMEs entering 
the financial crisis period based on their financial vulnerability to the crisis, as 
measured by (A) the level of short-term debt financing, (B) the level of ‘Cash’ 
held by the SME prior to and during the crisis, (C) the level of intangible assets 
to total assets and (D) the level of cash flow of the firm.  The Cash variable is a 
measure of cash stocks held by the company and deposited in banks. As a first 
measure, we examine the ratio of short-term debt to assets prior to the crisis. 
Reliance on short-term debt is used as a proxy for vulnerability to the crisis in 
several studies (Love et al. 2007; Guariglia and Mateut 2006). As per 
hypotheses 2A and 2B, firms with higher short term debt are expected to reduce 
their provision of credit as a result of the financial crisis and increase their use 
of trade credit financing, relatively more so than those with lower short-term 
debt ratios (Love et al. 2007) given the difficulty in obtaining financing from 
banks. 
Basic regressions for trade credit take the form of the equation below, where t 
and i indicate the time period and individual SMEs, α is the firm fixed effect. X 
is a vector of firm specific control variables. To examine the responses of SMEs 
to crisis, I use the interactions of the financial position of the firm in the pre-
crisis year (2007) with the crisis year (2008) and the post-crisis years 
(Postcrisis) where FSTi(−1) represents the financial strength of SME (i) 
measured in the pre-crisis year and this value is fixed. Financial strength or 
position of the firms is measured using the four factors above in separate 
regressions.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the error term which is comprised of unobserved time 
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invariant (∩𝑖) and time variant (𝑉𝑖𝑡) factors. Variants of this approach are 
applied.  
Equation 6 Trade credit over the crisis 
 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2
∗Postcrisis + 𝛽3
∗FST𝑖(−1) ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽4
∗FST𝑖(−1)
∗ Postcrisis + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =∩𝑖+ 𝑉𝑖𝑡. 
Causal factors that are time invariant, including industry effects which influence 
trade credit are captured by the fixed effects. All other explanatory variables 
change over time are predicted to be factors that influence the level of trade 
credit. These factors include age, growth in sales (salesgrowth), cash reserves 
(Cashta), size (log of total assets) the level of economic activity indicated by 
GDP per capita (Gdppcg). The first table shows the significance of an SME 
financial position and use/provision of trade credit. A Hausman test was also 
conducted and this showed in favour of the fixed effect regression over random 
effects. 
3.5  Findings 
In Table 3.528, trade credit use since the crisis is examined taking SMEs’ 
financial stance into account by using both year dummies and interactive 
dummy variables to capture the relationship between financial position of SMEs 
entering the crisis and the their use of trade credit during and after the crisis.  
The analyses captures both the levels of credit received and extended by SMEs 
as well as a variable to capture the overall change in trade credit (Netcredit). To 
                                                          
28 In Table 3.5, we scale trade credit by sales instead of total assets. Love et al. (1997) find a 
significant change over time in assets and sales. It is possible that firms in financial distress 
undergo assets sales, and often in times of financial distress drops in assets are far steeper than 
the drop in sales. Therefore to main consistency, trade credit is scaled by sales. 
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avoid any potential endogeneity/ simultaneity, all explanatory variables are 
lagged. Age is included as well as the values of age squared.  Overall, the results 
indicate that firms with greater short-term debt to assts ratios entering crisis 
receive more credit (as measured by the interactive dummies in columns 1 and 
1A), and extended less credit compared to pre-crisis levels (Columns 2 and 2A). 
While overall net credit extended by firms with greater short-term debt to assets 
ratios entering the crisis extended significantly less trade credit in the years 
2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011,  as indicated in column 3B. These findings support 
H2 B. The results are also statistically significant in both columns 1and 1A 
when we include additional firm specific control variables of age, size and sales 
growth. Consistently, we can also see that while the firms more ‘vulnerable’ to 
the crisis in terms of their reliance on short-term bank finance extend less trade 
credit to their customers over the same period. Older firms and higher growth 
firms appear to be net providers of credit and it is consistently shown within 
each regression format that older firms receive less trade credit financing from 
their suppliers supporting H6. 
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Table 3.5 15 Trade credit and short-term debt 
 
 
In Table 3.6, I examine if firms with a better cash position prior to the crisis 
provide more trade finance to their customers during the crisis period. As 
expected, when we control for firm size, sales growth and firm age, firms with 
the greatest levels of cash and cash equivalent reserves, on entering the crisis, 
extended more trade credit finance and this result is shown to be statistically 
significant particularly for the variable capturing net credit extended and also 
supporting H2A. Overall, the results suggest an increase in reliance on trade 
credit financing amongst firms most financially vulnerable at the time of the 
(1) (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Tradecreditorst Tradecreditorst Tradedebtors Tradedebtors Netcredit Netcredit
Crisis -.024*** -.009* -.007 -.018*** .003 -.007
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Post1 -.011** .003 .012** -.010 .008 -.012
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Post2 -.012** .010 .032*** .0001 .014** -.015*
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Post3 -.102*** .011 .046*** .005 .035*** -.002
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01)
Crisis*loansta-1 .005*** .006*** -.001 -.001 -.006*** -.007**
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 1*loansta-1 .007*** .009*** .007** .009** -.007*** -.004
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 2*loansta-1 .009*** .010*** .004 .007** -.005* -.005*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 3*loansta-1 .009*** .008*** .006** .002 -.010*** -.009***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag Size -.0002 -.001** -.0001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
lag salesgrowth -.0001** .001 .0001**
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.004** .011*** .009***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 -.0001 -.0001 -.003
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant .195*** .269*** .257*** .110** .078*** -.057
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.04) (.00) (.04)
Observations 23502 16194 24651 17835 28067 22850
number of groups 5247 4336 5488 4642 6281 5824
obs per group(average) 4.5 3.7 4.5 3.8 4.4 3.9
Adjusted R-squared .65 .72 .71 .75 .56 .60
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditorst' calculated as accounts payable scaled by turnover, 'Tradedebtors calculated as accounts 
receivable scaled by turnover and 'Netcredit' as accounts receiveable minus payables scaled by turnover. Independent variables include 
'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' and 'Post3' are 
time dummy variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Crisis*loansta-1 represents the SME level of short-term bank loans to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions with 
'loansta-1' show the effects of 'loansta-1' during the crisis and the three years following the onset of the crisis. The models are estimated 
with fixed effects and include the independent variables of  'Size'  represented by the natural logarithm of firm assets, a measure of  
sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm (Age) and the squared age of the firm 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in 
parentheses, while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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banking crisis, i.e. firms with the highest levels of short-term debt financing and 
lowest levels of cash reserves. These firms are more likely to receive trade 
credit financing after the onset of the financial crisis, due to the difficulty of 
rolling over short-term bank debt and overdrafts. The results suggest evidence 
of a substitution effect for firms most financially vulnerable at the time of the 
crisis supporting H3. 
Table 3.6 16 Trade credit and cash 
 
For the other firm characteristics of size, sales growth and age, the results show 
that larger firms (as measured by the log of assets) extend more and receive less 
in the form of trade credit, supporting the proposition of Berger and Udell 
(1) (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Tradecreditorst Tradecreditorst Tradedebtors Tradedebtors Netcredit Netcredit
Crisis -.011 -.001 -.001 -.019** -.019* -.038***
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Post1 .004 .008 .015* -.014 -.022** -.044***
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post2 -.002 .015 .033*** -.007 -.025** -.059***
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00)
Post3 -.013 .004 .037** -.017 .001 -.043**
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Crisis*Cashta-1 -.013 -.008 .0003 .007 .043** .054***
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 1*Cashta-1 -.026** -.009 .006 .012 .063*** .061***
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Post 2*Cashta-1 -.014 -.009 .009 .010 .078*** .076***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Post 3*Cashta-1 .006 .011 .033** .035** .062*** .060***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
lag Size -.001 -.0001 -.001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
lag salesgrowth -.002*** -.0001 .0001***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.004** .013*** .012***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 -.001 -.0001 -.0001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant .189*** .259*** .245*** .054 .069*** -.123**
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.04) (.00) (.00)
Observations 21953 15195 22637 16452 25939 21143
number of groups 4851 4051 5034 4283 5797 5383
obs per group(average) 4.5 3.8 4.5 3.8 4.6 3.9
Adjusted R-squared .64 .71 .71 .75 .56 .60
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditorst' calculated as accounts payable scaled by turnover, 'Tradedebtors calculated as accounts 
receivable scaled by turnover and 'Netcredit' as accounts receiveable minus payables scaled by turnover . Independent variables 
include 'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' and 
'Post3' are time dummy variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Cashta-1*Crisis represents the SME level of cash to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions with 'Cashta-1' show 
the effects of 'Cashta-1' during the crisis and the two years following the onset of the crisis. The models are estimated with f ixed 
effects and include the independent variables of  'Size'  represented by the natural logarithm of firm assets, a measure of  sales growth 
'salesgrowth', firm age and the age of the firm squared 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while the ***, **, *, 
represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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(1998) that trade credit financing is more important in the financing of small 
firms. This result also supports the premise that larger older firms can access 
funds from institutions due to their larger supply of collateral, longer banking 
relationships and larger cash reserves too. The implementation of fixed effects 
isolates the specific individual effects of the crisis on the level of trade credit 
extended within the SME sector. There are a number of benefits of fixed effects 
in this scenario. It allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneous factors as 
well as time-invariant factors that influence the level of trade credit extended. 
With the inclusion of fixed effects, we can say with more reliability that firms 
with greater levels of cash extended more credit in the times of crisis, holding 
other unobservable and industry factors constant. As in Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) we use both the firm’s age and size as a proxy for credit worthiness. Age 
of the firm shows how long it has survived and older firms are thought to be 
more credit worthy. 
 
While Tables (3.5) and (3.6) estimate the relation between financially state of 
the firms and the level credit extended and received in terms of quantity. In 
Table 3.7, I estimate do the results hold for the length of time in which credit is 
extended and received.  
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Table 3.7 17  Financial strength and length of credit days 
 
I examine the relationship between financial strength of the firm (measured by 
cash reserves) and the length of credit extended measured by the number of 
days in which they receive payment from their customers and the number of 
days in which they repay their creditors. Results are consistent with expectations 
that financially stronger firms receive less credit in terms of time and extend 
more over the crisis period. On average, firms with greater cash reserves extend 
between 12 and 46 percent longer time period to their customers to repay over 
(1) (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
logcreditordays Logcreditordays Logdebtordays Logdebtordays Lognumdays Lognumdays
Crisis -.088*** .024 -.087*** -.162*** -.107*** -.155***
(.03) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Post1 -.079** .054 -.066** -.159*** .002 -.078
(.03) (.00) (.00) (.03) (.04) (.06)
Post2 -.085*** .056 -.089*** -.218*** .027 -.080
(.00) (.00) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.06)
Post3 -.156*** .003 -.088*** -.263*** -.031 -.166***
(.00) (.00) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.07)
Crisis*Cashta-1 -.046 -.119* .100*** .126** .213** .191
(.05) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.09) (.11)
Post 1*Cashta-1 -.107** -.154** .171*** .198*** .198** .178
(.05) (.00) (.00) (.05) (.09) (.07)
Post 2*Cashta-1 -.067 -.097 .340*** .364*** .275*** .204*
(.05) (.06) (.04) (.05) (.09) (.11)
Post 3*Cashta-1 .059 .037 .434*** .465*** .556*** .484***
(.01) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.09) (.11)
lag Size -.0001** -.0001 -.0001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
lag salesgrowth .0001 .0001 -.0001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.032*** .034*** .025***
(.00) (.00) (.01)
Age2 .00001 -.0001 -.001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 3.19*** 3.61*** 3.56*** 3.04*** 3.47*** 2.91***
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.35)
Observations 21072 14583 22727 15956 9334 6679
number of groups 4759 3956 4973 3.8 2809 2299
obs per group(average) 4.4 3.7 4.6 3.8 3.3 3.0
Adjusted R-squared .64 .67 .72 .75 .65 .75
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'logcreditordays' calculated as the natural logarithm of creditor days, 'logdebtordays' calculated 
as the natural logarithm of debtor days and 'lognumdays' calculated as the natural logarithm of the difference between 
debtor and creditor days. Independent variables include 'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial 
crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' and 'Post3' are time dummy variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011
respectively.
Cashta-1*Crisis represents the SME level of cash to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions with 
'Cashta-1' show the effects of 'Cashta-1' during the crisis and the two years following the onset of the crisis. The models are 
estimated with fixed effects and include the independent variables of  'Size'  represented by the naturaal logarithm of firm 
assets, a measure of  sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in parentheses, 
while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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the crisis period (Column 2B), holding all other firm characteristics constant 
supporting H2A and H4. This could be derived from unwillingness from their 
customers to repay on time, or it could also be from a willingness on the part of 
financially stronger firms to allow flexibility in repayments to their financially 
constrained business partners. 
The results for credit received show that financially stronger firms are receiving 
less time for their repayments (1A) in comparison to pre-crisis periods, however 
these results are not as statistically strong as for credit extension.  Columns 3(A) 
and 3(B) also include a variable that captures net extension of credit measured 
in terms of time (lognumdays). This variable confirms the finding that 
financially stronger firms allowed a net extension of time for repayments greater 
than pre crisis periods. This variable is also statistically significant when we 
include additional control variables. 
My final two measures of the financial position of SMEs are derived from the 
firms’ ratio of intangible to total assets and the levels of cash flow.  One of the 
benefits of asset tangibility, other than reducing asymmetric information, is that 
tangible assets can be used as collateral in times of bankruptcy and protecting 
creditor rights (Berger and Udell, 1998; Michael et al., 1999).  We would expect 
firms with a higher ratio of intangible to total assets in their balance sheet are 
more likely to be financially constrained over the crisis due to their expected 
difficulty in accessing debt finance. I, therefore expect this group of firms to 
access trade credit over the crisis period, and where they do so to be in an 
involuntary basis given the reluctance of other firm (managers) to provide credit 
given the lack of collateral (stock) redeemable in the event of non-repayment. 
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Similarly, as in Love et al. (2007) I expect firms with greater liquidity measured 
by their cash flow to generate more trade credit to their customers. 
 Table 3.8 18 Trade credit and asset intangibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Tradecreditassets Tradecreditorassets Tradedebtorassets Tradedebtorassets Netcredita Netcredita
Crisis -.028*** .011 -.027*** -.010** .002 -.006
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Post1 -.039*** .018 -.041** -.012** -.006 .019
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Post2 -.038*** .014 -.034*** .002 .0001 -.003
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Post3 -.026** .011 -.030** .011 -.007 .005
(.00) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Crisis*Constrained-1 -.149 -.189 .041 .055 .087 .131
(.14) (.16) (.04) (.06) (.11) (.13)
Post 1*Constrained-1 .151 -.113 .013 -.019 -.168 -.020
(.14) (.16) (.04) (.06) (.12) (.13)
Post 2*Constrained-1 .247* .216 .033 .020 -.217* -.224*
(.10) (.15) (.05) (.05) (.11) (.13)
Post 3*Constrained-1 .260** .223 .005 .001 -.274** -.267**
(.00) (.16) (.05) (.00) (.11) (.13)
lag salesgrowth -.0002 -.0001 -.0003
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.012* -.010*** -.001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 -.001 -.0001 -.0001
(.00) (.05) (.00)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant .484*** .579*** .353*** .518*** -.093*** .018
(.00) (.15) (.00) (.05) (.00) (.10)
Observations 20730 11232 18469 10739 23716 13812
number of groups 3749 3089 3632 3025 4265 3669
obs per group(average) 5.5 3.6 5.1 3.6 5.6 3.8
Adjusted R-squared .63 .70 .69 .73 .60 .67
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditassets' calculated as accounts payable scaled by total assets, 'Tradedebtorsasets calculated as 
accounts receivable scaled by total assets and 'Netcredita' as accounts receiveable minus payables scaled by totalassets. Ind ependent 
variables include 'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1',  'Post2' 
and 'Post3' are time dummy variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Crisis*Constrained-1 represents the SME level  intangible assets to total assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions 
with 'Constrained-1' show the effects of 'loansta-1' during the crisis and the three years following the onset of the crisis. The models are 
estimated with fixed effects and include the independent variables of  measure of  sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm and 
the squared age of the firm 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 3.919  Trade credit and cash flow 
 
These tables provide another robustness check to the hypothesis that financially 
vulnerable/ constrained firms were net receivers of credit from informal sources 
over the crisis period and that financially stronger firms played a significant role 
as financial intermediaries when bank lending was absent. 
The results from Table 3.8 show that firms with less assets tangibility at the 
time of the crisis received significantly more trade credit (Column 1) and 
extending significantly less over the subsequent years (Columns 3A and 3B),  
supporting H5. It is likely to suspect given the reasons outlined above that this 
could be evidence of the involuntary granting of credit. Similarly the results are 
(1) (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Tradecreditorassets Tradecreditorassets Tradedebtorassets Tradedebtorassets Netcredita Netcredita
Crisis -.024** .015 -.025*** -.009** -.010 -.014
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Post1 -.035*** .011 -.040*** -.017*** -.018** -.012
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Post2 -.033*** .025 -.032*** -.004 -.013 -.006
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Post3 -.039*** .035 -.028*** .002 -.014 -.009
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Crisis*Cashflow-1 -.007*** -.015*** -.0001 .001 .012*** .026***
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 1*Cashflow-1 -.004 -.011*** .003*** .005*** .008*** .015***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 2*Cashflow-1 .001 -.007*** -.0001 .001 .010*** .017***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 3*Cashflow-1 .007** -.009*** .001 .004** .001 .012***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag Size -.002*** -.001*** -.001*
(.00) (.00) (.00)
l.cashta -.081*** -.099** -.015
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.015*** -.006*** .003
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant .377*** .646*** .326*** .457*** -.027*** -.002
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Observations 15117 13393 13546 12730 17332 16321
number of groups 2629 2571 2590 2554 3055 3020
obs per group(average) 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.7 5.4
Adjusted R-squared .58 .60 .69 .69 .57 .58
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditassets' calculated as accounts payable scaled by total assets, 'Tradedebtorassets calculated as accounts 
receivable scaled by total assets and 'Netcredita' as accounts receiveable minus payables scaled by total assets. Independent variables include 
'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' and 'Post 3' are time 
dummy variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Crisis*Cashflow-1 represents the SME level of cashflow to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions with 'Cashflow-1' 
show the effects of 'Cashflow-1' during the crisis and the three years following the onset of the crisis. The models are estimated with fixed 
effects and include the independent variables of  'Size'  represented by the natural logarithm of firm assets, a measure  firm cash and bank 
deposits lagged ' l.cashta' and the age of the firm and the squared age of the firm 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while 
the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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consistent for cash flow, i.e. firms with greater cash flow entering crisis 
extended more trade credit and received less over the post crisis period (2008-
2011). Again, my regressions find that older firms tend to receive less credit and 
extend less. 
3.5.1 Impact of macroeconomic factors  
Finally in Table 3.10, I test the relationship between trade credit and some 
macroeconomic factors, including the percentage of credit extended by the 
banking sector within Ireland and a proxy for the interest rate that is charged to 
SMEs on bank loans. I use fixed effects estimation and use two different 
specifications for trade credit finance received (Tradecreditorst) which is a 
proxy for the quantity of credit received and logcreditordays which captures the 
length of time in which creditors are repaid. The final variable (Netcredit) 
captures the net credit extended by firms. Overall, the results show that firms 
with higher levels of cash to assets ratio receive less credit, both in terms of 
quantity and length of time, controlling for firm specific characteristics and 
time.  In column 1, we observe an inverse relation between dependence on 
short-term bank finance and trade credit. We would assume this to be the case 
given that trade credit is generally viewed as a short-term means of finance. 
This is further support of substitution between trade credit and bank credit and 
indeed, the counter cyclical nature of trade credit as found in Huang et al. 
(2010). Furthermore, it highlights the financial vulnerability of firms entering 
the financial crisis with high dependence on short-term bank finance. As shown 
in Table 3.5, the firms with the greatest dependence and vulnerability to the 
crisis required increased trade credit financing from their suppliers. 
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Recent research shows that net interest margins (ratio of net interest income to 
average interest earning assets) of Irish Banks declined steadily over the period 
1997-2012 and in particular over the period of the financial crisis.  The majority 
of Irish banks’ operating income is sourced from the net interest income. As a 
proxy for the cost of lending to SMEs over the time period, we use the lag value 
of inter-money market bank rate29 as an indicator of the cost of credit and other 
loans to Irish SMEs over the sample time period. 
While the inter money market lending rates is a blunt estimation of the rates at 
which bank credit is extended to SMEs within the Irish economy. The variable 
‘l.moneymkt’ can be considered as a proxy for the cost of bank financing. The 
higher the cost of money on the international markets, the more banks charge on 
the money they lend to SMEs. Therefore, we would expect that the higher the 
cost for external financing, the more we would expect firms to seek trade credit 
financing. We examine the effect of the lag of the money market rate (the rate at 
which banks borrow for funding purposes) and the effect of the money market 
rate on trade credit use. The negative coefficient of interbank lending rates and 
the amount of trade credit extended and received by SMEs is interesting. In all 
three columns with the exception of ‘credit days’, the results show that the 
higher the money market rate the less credit extended and received in the 
economy. However, we are unable to detect a significant association between 
the percentage of credit extended by the banking sector as a proportion of GDP 
(PcreditGDP) and the level of trade credit due to this being a one country study. 
 
 
                                                          
29 Source: Thomas Reuters DataStream 
116 
 
 Table 3.1020  Trade credit and bank credit 
 
While my findings show some support for redistribution and evidence of 
substitution (H3), the reduction in overall credit extended by the banking sector 
in Ireland over the period 2007-2011 coincides with a reduction in the level of 
trade credit extended and received within the SME sector (H1), however as we 
have seen in the analysis, this is not the case for all sectors and for all firms. 
Therefore, we cannot find conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that 
liquidity shocks are propagated along the supply chain (Boissay and Gropp, 
2007; Love and Zaida, 2010) during a systematic shock leading to a reduction in 
credit to all firms. Nevertheless,  given the severity of the crisis, and the fact that 
firms that would not have difficulty receiving credit from banks in ‘normal 
times’ experienced significant difficulties in obtaining funds since the crisis, we 
Tradecreditorst Credit days Netcredit Net credit
l.Turasset -.001 -.005*** -.001 -.001
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
l.loansta -.003* .005 .0001 .001
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
l.irmoneymkt -.002** .001 -.004*** -.003**
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00)
l.Cashta -.030*** -.183*** -.058*** -.058***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
PcreditGDP .000**
(.00)
Time dummies YES YES YES NO
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Constant .197*** 3.179*** .126*** .042***
(.00) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Observations 18368 17643 25753 25753
number of groups 4970 4695 6103 6103
Adjusted R-squared .69 .70 .57 .58
R-squared overall .77 .75 .67 .68
* No time dummies are included in column 4 due to correlation with PcreditGDP
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditorst' calculated as accounts payable scaled by turnover, 'Credit days'  calculated as
the natural logarithm of the number of creditor days. 'Netcredit' as accounts receiveable minus payables scaled by turnover.
'l.loansta' is the lag of the ratio of short-term loans from financial institutions to firm current liabilities, 'l. Turasset' is the 
one year lag of the ratio of firm profits to assets. l. Cashta is the one year lag of firm cash and deposits scaled by firm 
assets. 'l. lmoneymkt' is a proxy for the cost of bank funds, calculated as the one year lag of the money market rate.
Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
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find strong evidence supporting a substitution effect. Firms that can obtain trade 
credit do so; however the instance of the substitutability may be limited to a 
period of time. Interestingly, my results do show that larger firms- with greater 
cash reserves and liquidity at the time of the crisis- extended significantly more 
trade finance to the less financially liquid firms for a period of time post the 
onset of the financial crisis. This shows that there is evidence of an adjustment 
process in financing for some SMEs. On this basis, when I model trade credit 
using the panel regressions, I show that profitable firms are more likely to 
voluntarily extend credit, though the period of extension may be limited.  
3.6 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The analysis ends in 2011 and it would be important to assess the extent to 
which profitable firms continued to extend trade credit in subsequent years, 
when bank financing to SMEs was still very much restricted and aggregate 
demand remained weak, both in Ireland and the EU.  How will the financial 
crisis impact on trade credit use, survivorship, economic growth and recovery in 
the long term? My analysis has focused on the substitution and redistribution of 
financing in surviving SMEs, as at present the data does not provide adequate 
coverage of failed firms in this study. Extending the analysis to failed firms is 
an important avenue for future research. While, I used an unbalanced panel in 
this study, I do not believe the results are influenced by an attrition bias. Subject 
to data availability, it would be interesting to study the effects on supplier and 
customer relations. How did trade credit use influence future lines of business 
relations and growth? Furthermore, quarterly data as opposed to annual data 
would also improve our understanding in terms of firms’ immediate behaviour 
in the aftermath of shocks to the financial system. Finally, in the case of SMEs, 
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further research on role of market power and trade contracts is required. This 
would be an important extension to the research.  
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that unlisted financially ‘vulnerable’ SMEs entering the 
financial crisis  received more trade credit from suppliers and  extended less 
trade credit to their customers in the year of the crisis and thereafter.  The 
chapter is the first to show empirical evidence of a substitution effect in the 
context of a panel data sample of unlisted European SMEs post the onset of the 
2008 financial crisis. The contextual setting for this research makes an 
interesting case. During this period, there was both a boom in bank lending and 
a sudden and very dramatic shock to the economy and the SME sector. The 
timeframe covers the period of economic boom and financial expansion with the 
effects of the financial crisis and finds evidence of an adjustment process and 
substitution effect in the financing of SMEs. While there is some evidence that 
aggregate levels of trade credit declined over the crisis, the data unequivocally 
shows that trade credit financing has played an important role in the financing 
of SMEs throughout the banking crisis. I find strong support of a substitution 
effect between trade credit and bank credit over the recent financial crisis period 
for financially vulnerable SMEs. I suggest that both redistribution and 
substitution effects are best specified in terms of the financial position and 
financial strength of firms at the time of the crisis rather than the age or size of 
the firm. The policy implications of this paper are important in light of the 
recent financial crisis. If during a financial crisis, larger, more financially 
stronger and liquid firms have the ability to redistribute credit to financially 
constrained SMEs, this provides a source of finance to firms that otherwise 
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would not be available to them. Therefore any policy that restricts the 
profitability, cash reserves and access to finance for larger /more financially 
liquid firms has adverse effects for SMEs by restricting their ability to receive 
trade credit in place of bank finance when bank lending is restricted. Given the 
importance of SMEs in terms of national output and employment, this issue has 
potential significance for economic recovery and avoidance of compounding the 
growth crisis. The late payment for goods is particularly important for the 
working capital financing of micro and financially weaker SMEs. The Small 
Business Act (2008) makes specific reference to trade credit in its 10 point plan 
and highlights that on average SMEs wait between 20 and 100 days for the 
payment of goods, with one in four insolvencies due to late payment. Therefore, 
this is clearly an issue for further consideration and importance for other 
countries within the EU. The results show that while trade credit is used for 
transaction purposes within the economy in non-crisis periods, there appears to 
be some degree of substitutability between the cost of bank credit and the use of 
trade credit as measured by the proxy for the cost of inter-bank lending. Finally, 
while the results of this study also suggest that some involuntary use of trade 
credit is evident in my data, the findings robustly show that financially strong 
firms are more likely to extend finance, even though the period of extension 
maybe limited.  
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Chapter 4: Bank credit and trade credit use amongst European SMEs over 
the financial crisis. 30 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the financing behaviour and decisions of Small and 
Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) often differs from large firms for a number of 
reasons. A growing number of studies, however, also highlight the importance 
of institutional and country specific factors influencing the financing behaviour 
of SMEs (Beck et al., 2003; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009), and some studies 
further point to the observed differences between listed and unlisted small firms 
(Brav, 2009; Joeveer, 2013). Due to information asymmetries pertaining to 
private firms, Brav (2009) shows that for a sample of private and public UK 
firms, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt finance due to the relative 
high cost of private equity compared to public equity and their aversion to 
ownership dilution. Due to the high dependence on debt finance, capital 
structures of small firms are particularly sensitive to changes in firm 
performance. Joeveer (2013) finds that for a sample for listed and unlisted firms, 
firm size and tangibility are positively associated with leverage for listed firms, 
while for unlisted firms, this relationship is not robust, but instead, findings 
indicate that country specific variables are a greater indicator of leverage for 
unlisted firms. For these reasons, it is assumed that higher shareholder and 
creditor protection rights are associated with higher levels of leverage for 
unlisted firms. 
                                                          
30 This study was presented at the 10th ECB European Commission COMPNET workshop 
September 2014, and at the 8th Portuguese Finance Network Conference, 2014. 
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As highlighted in earlier chapters, research has shown that external finance 
availability is limited for SMEs by the presence of information asymmetries 
(Petit and Singer, 1985; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Poutziouris (2002) concludes that often there is an aversion to external equity 
among family owned businesses due to succession considerations and 
managerial independence, and these reasons are commonly cited for Pecking 
Order behaviour among SMEs (Bolton, 1971; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; 
Chittenden et al, 1996; Jordan et al, 1998). Some studies have also examined the 
relationship between the size of the SME sector and the overall business 
environment, such as entry and exit costs and the degree of credit information 
sharing (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2007). 
This chapter extends to this literature and examines the financing of SMEs and 
in particular, the use of trade credit among a sample of European SMEs over the 
financial crisis period. While this research is novel in terms of the size and 
coverage of data for SMEs, it is also the first study that examines a large sample 
of SMEs using actual firm level accounting data. As highlighted by the OECD 
European Scorecard (2013), one of the biggest challenges facing research on the 
changing conditions and access to finance for SMEs are limits in actual 
accounting data to make cross country comparisons, and this difficulty is also 
compounded by the lack of conformity on defining SMEs across countries. In 
this study, the data is comparable and SME definition criteria are applied 
equally. The research conducted in this chapter draws upon existing findings in 
Chapter 3 on the role of trade credit use among SMEs and examines if 
institutional and accounting standards specific to individual countries within the 
European area influence SME financing behaviour. This is the first study that 
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assesses the impact of these institutional and country level factors on the 
working capital of SMEs in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
chapter also applies a robust panel data methodology using firm and country 
level data.  
The findings of this chapter illustrate that not only do firm specific 
characteristics influence finance for SMEs, but country level influences at the 
macro level have significant effects on SMEs financing and often survival too. 
In particular, the results demonstrate significant differences in the levels of trade 
credit use across countries with both financial, political and economic risks 
influencing, both bank credit and trade credit. The results show that net credit 
extended is highest in common law regions, such as Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, however, despite the traditional perception that trade credit use is 
associated with regions with lower levels of financial development, this chapter 
argues that trade credit played a significant role in supporting financially 
vulnerable SMEs throughout the crisis as indicated by the increased levels of 
credit extended by firms with larger cash stocks and reserves. The results of this 
chapter also illustrate that trade credit availability is likely to reduce the 
propensity of firm failure in some cases. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 is the literature review, which 
discusses the European SME performance over the crisis and the working 
capital of SMEs. Section 3 examines the impact of institutional factors on 
financing. Section 4 outlines the methodology and data used, while Section 5 
discuses results and Section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 European SME performance over the crisis 
SMEs in Europe are an important source of employment and output. It is 
estimated they provide two out of every three jobs and account for more than 
58% of gross value added (IIF Bain and Company, 2013). SME size and how 
they are managed vary significantly across countries. In Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain, SMEs account for almost 20% more employment than the European 
average, while German SMEs are typically larger and characterised by a 
separation of ownership and management, in comparison to closely held and 
family managed SMEs in Italy and Spain. Throughout the financial crisis, 
however, it is fair to say that SMEs across Europe have been adversely affected 
by both dramatic reductions in demand and in bank lending, upon which most 
are heavily reliant for working capital and short-term finance. According to 
European Commission data, since 2008, loans of less than €1 million to SMEs 
have declined by an average of 47 percent since the pre-crisis peaks, with falls 
in the region of 66 percent in Spain and 82 percent in Ireland. GDP per capita 
growth has fallen in the entire countries sampled, the most severe reductions in 
GDP per capita can been seen in Greece, Ireland, Latvia Lithuania and Finland. 
Average growth and recovery since 2011 in GDP per capita, however, has been 
strongest in Lithuania, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and Germany, with Sweden and 
Germany appearing to be performing the best along with Ireland, with Portugal 
and Italian SMEs faring worst. From the sample of European countries 
presented in this study, Spanish SMEs report the greatest losses in employment, 
turnover and profitability compared to SMEs in other European countries. These 
findings also corroborates with recent ECB SAFE reports. It has also been 
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found that German and Swedish SMEs had greater financial reserves and less 
financial indebtedness at the onset of the crisis, while these countries also fared 
better in terms of their global competitiveness measures. 
Financial indebtedness and working capital management has been a major issue 
for policy makers. Ratios of private sector credit to GDP have exceeded 200 
percent in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, while remaining around the 100 percent 
mark for Germany, Sweden and France.31 The proportion of non-performing 
loans is found to be highest in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
The comparison in non-performing loans is quite stark at 20 percent in Ireland 
in comparison to 2 percent for Sweden in 2012. Research has also found 
significant differences in the types of bank finance that SMEs are reliant on. In 
Ireland, for example, SMEs are found to be more reliant on bank overdrafts with 
over 60 percent of Irish SMEs using this source of finance compared to 7 
percent of Swedish SMEs (Mazars, 2010).  International SMEs create more 
employment, while German SMEs are larger, more innovative and more 
involved in exporting in comparison to other European countries.  
4.2.2 The role of working capital and trade credit among European SMEs 
The nearest study to my knowledge which examines the role of trade credit 
among European SMEs is Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012). They examine the role 
of trade credit for a sample of Spanish SMEs over the period of 2004 to the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2008. They find that financially constrained 
SMEs depend on trade credit to finance capital expenditures at the onset of the 
crisis. The findings of their study indicate a significant role for credit and 
                                                          
31 European Commission Working Paper “Exploring the steady-state relationship between credit 
and GDP for a small open economy” (EC, 2013), 
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investment amongst SMEs by modelling those that are constrained in their 
access to bank finance. Similarly, using SAFE32 data, Casey and O’Toole 
(2014) find that in the case of SMEs denied access to bank credit for working 
capital purposes during the crisis, they were more likely to turn to and apply for 
trade credit off other firms. This paper extends on these pieces of research, by 
using actual firm level accounting data over the recent crisis period and 
examining the role of which country and institutional specific factors influence 
access to finance for SMEs for working capital purposes.  
 
4.3 The role of institutional differences on financing 
 
While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on firm level characteristics and access to 
finance for SMEs, this chapter focuses more on the institutional and country 
specific factors and can be analysed from the following perspectives. 
4.3.1 Bank concentration and ownership across Europe 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a renewed interest 
in the relationship between banking market competition and the level of private 
sector credit extended by banks. Drakos (2013) found that bank loan terms and 
conditions for European SMEs, particularly in the sovereign debt crisis 
countries (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) experienced considerable 
tightening in credit conditions above the Euro zone average. Similarly, Cull, 
Soledad and Pería (2013) examine bank lending in Eastern European countries 
                                                          
32 As discussed in Chapter 1, SAFE (Survey on Access to Finance) is a European Commission 
survey on approximately 5,000 SMEs across Europe that are surveyed on a 6 monthly basis. 
While the data is quantitative in nature, the majority of variable are categorical and binary in 
nature and reflect the opinions of SME owner/managers at a point in time.  
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over the financial crisis period and find noticeable differences between 
domestic, foreign and government-owned banks in terms of credit growth. For a 
sample of Finish banks, Fredriksson and Moro (2014) found that SME 
performance is a major factor in explaining the risk-adjusted profitability of 
banks. This result is consistent with the belief that greater market power 
increases banks incentives to produce more information on potential borrowers, 
consistent with the information-based hypothesis. 
Ryan, O‘Toole and McCann (2014) extended this research to examine the 
relationship between bank market concentration and SME financing constraints 
using a sample of SMEs across 20 European countries between the years 2005-
2008. Their paper finds that increased bank market power is associated with 
lower levels of investment among SMEs due to restricted loan supply and 
higher lending rates. Conversely, using a sample of 14,000 European publicly 
traded firms, Ratti, Lee and Seol (2008) show that firms are less financially 
constrained in countries with highly concentrated banking sectors.   
As well as changes in the level of concentration and competition within the 
European banking sector, the question is ‘how does this impact on access to 
finance?’ Hanedar, Broccardo and Bazzana (2013) who investigate the collateral 
requirements for SMEs in less developed countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia find that while information-sharing mechanisms are associated 
with improved credit availability, the collateral requirements in SME loan 
contracts are not less restrictive in countries that feature more intensive 
information-sharing mechanisms than in countries that do not. These differences 
in lending mechanisms are further highlighted by Bartoli, Ferri, Murro and 
Rotondi (2013) who examine SME lending technologies in Italy and find that 
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banks tend to use both transactional and relationship lending technologies. 
Banks that use relationship lending technologies produce more soft information 
which ultimately decreases the probability of credit rationing. According to 
Revest and Sapio (2012), financial systems across Europe can be differentiated 
into ones that are more banking based, such as German and Scandinavian 
countries, and others, such as the UK and US which are more market-based. 
Companies domiciled in countries which are defined by bank-based financial 
systems, such as Germany and France, tend to display a greater reliance on 
networks and long-term relationships with creditors. These differences, they 
find, are particularly important for the financing of technology-based small 
firms. 
Another aspect in the poor performance of European banking system over the 
past 6 years has been the contagion of financial debts and the dramatic 
restrictions in inter-bank lending. De Bruychere, Gerhardt, Schepens and 
Vennet (2013) find that banks with weak capital buffers and weaker funding 
structures, and those which are based on less traditional banking activities were 
particularly vulnerable to risk spill-overs. While at the country level, the debt 
ratio is the most important driver of contagion (Lane and McQuade, 2013).  
 
4.3.2 Collateral requirements for European SMEs 
Given the fact the SMEs are particularly sensitive to information asymmetries 
due to their often opaque nature, it is important to assess the role to which 
changes in collateral requirement are also likely to have influenced access to 
finance. It is expected that countries with less developed financial sectors are 
associated with more stringent in terms of the collateral requirements (Menkeff 
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et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2006). However, Hanedar et al. (2014) finds that the 
presence of collateral in loan contracts is determined mostly by the borrower’s 
characteristics for a sample of Eastern European SMEs. They find that collateral 
requirements are not less restrictive in countries that feature more intensive 
information-sharing mechanisms.  
 Research has also shown that institutional accounting standards and 
requirements vary across regions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008) and ultimately influence the availability and cost 
of finance for SMEs (Berger, 2006).  
4.3.3 Legal origin and finance availability 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney (1997, 1998) illustrated a 
relation between legal origin, investor protection and the availability of finance. 
In addition to legal origin, firm size and the degree of information asymmetry 
also significantly influences the availability of finance. Smaller firms tend to 
face higher monitoring costs for lending (Boocock and Woods, 1997), the most 
significant reason for the perceived cost difference between internal and 
external funds (Berger and Udell, 1998).  For these reasons, trade credit is likely 
more important in countries where creditor protection is weaker (Burkart 
Ellingson, 2004). Notwithstanding this, trade credit relationships between firms 
and suppliers could mitigate the country level institutional factors through the 
acquisition of information from on- going business and through the enforcement 
and renegotiation/liquidation process (Fishman and Love, 2003).  Marotta 
(2005) finds that trade credit is mostly used in Italy compared with other 
European countries. 
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4.3.5 Bankruptcy law 
Finally, several studies have examined the relationship between a country’s 
bankruptcy laws and the entrepreneurial environment (Armour and Cumming, 
2008; Lee, Yamakawa, Peng and Barney, 2007). The severity of bankruptcy 
laws on debtors may limit the ease of doing business, but also limit the 
availability of finance to SMEs. A bankrupt debtor may obtain a discharge from 
outstanding credit obligations after a period of time and obtain a fresh start from 
bankruptcy. While this has implications for the level of business start-ups and 
investment, it undoubtedly has implications for the propagation of liquidity 
shocks in the SME sector. Both personal discharge and corporate discharge 
periods are found to vary significantly both across regions and over time. In the 
UK for example, discharge periods in recent years have been reduced from 3 
years to 1-year and in Ireland from 12 years to 3 years. Research has found that 
contrary to popular belief creditor rights have remained stable for most 
countries over time (Djankov, Mcliesh and Shleifer 2007). For many years in 
European countries, no discharge was available for personal indebtedness 
(Armour and Cumming, 2008), however over the financial crisis, bankruptcy 
laws have been relaxed across countries including the UK, Ireland, Belgium and 
Italy.  
Vanacker, Heughebaert and Manigart (2014) examined the relationship between 
personal bankruptcy laws across six European countries and their influence on 
the financing behaviour of new technology-based firms (NTBFs). They show 
that venture capital investors strengthen the relationship between national laws 
and the financing of private firms. Better shareholder protection rights are 
positively associated with increased levels of external equity finance and larger 
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levels of equity finance being raised. Research has also found that international 
investors rely on financial and accounting information to assess investment 
opportunities and risk, particularly for international venture capital investments 
(Cumming and Dai, 2010). These findings support existing research that has 
shown that external equity is very important for high growth SMEs and 
particularly in the case of new high technology-based firms (Hogan and Hutson, 
2005).  
To take account of institutional differences in creditor rights and differences in 
legal requirements and obligations of SMEs across regions, in this study, the 
analyses includes variables that capture regulatory quality, the rule of law and 
enforcement and governance measures. The measures also capture the ease of 
access to finance for firms both large and small in size. World Bank Governance 
Indicators 2013 are used (WBGI).  
To summarise, some the main hypotheses of this chapter are 
H1 Net credit remains unchanged in response to a financial crisis  
H2 The change in trade credit following financial crisis is related to the financial   
liquidity of the firm 
H3 Trade credit acts as a substitute for bank finance for unlisted SMEs during the     
financial crisis 
H4 SMEs access to finance for working capital purposes and the level of trade credit 
used are unrelated to country level factors 
H5 SMEs reliance on trade credit finance is unrelated to the level of institutional and 
creditor rights protection will have. 
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4.5 Methodology and data analysis 
4.5.1 Methodology 
The first stage of the research is to examine the relationship between the 
financial position of SMEs entering the crisis and their subsequent financial 
position and use of trade credit financing. However, the difference with this 
stage of the research as opposed to Chapter 3 is that I now include and control 
for differences in economic and institutional factors that vary across country and 
time as well as estimating the likely impact that these factors have on overall 
SME performance. The first stage of the methodology is to analyse the levels of 
trade credit extending and received within the European SME sector and the 
differences among the financial position of SMEs at the time of the financial 
crisis, and hence their subsequent extension or net receipt of trade credit 
throughout the subsequent crisis and post crisis years.  
Model (1) and (2) for trade credit take the form of the equation below, where t 
and i indicate the time period and individual SMEs, α is the firm fixed effect. X 
is a vector of firm specific control variables and ε denotes the error term. To 
examine the responses of SMEs to the crisis, I use the interactions of the 
financial position of the firm in the pre-crisis year (2007) with the crisis year 
(2008) and the post-crisis years (Postcrisis). FSTi(−1) represents the financial 
strength of SME (i) measured in the pre-crisis year and this value is fixed. 
Financial strength or position of the firms is measured using the four factors 
above in separate regressions.  𝜀𝑖𝑡  which represents the error term is comprised 
of unobserved time invariant (∩𝑖) and time variant (𝑉𝑖𝑡) factors. Variants of this 
approach are applied. 
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(Model 1)  Firm fixed effects and financial position entering the crisis. 
Equation 7 Firm fixed effects and financial position entering the crisis 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  ∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where εit = ( ηi +  Vit). 
Where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡  denotes trade credit for firm i at time t. 
Causal factors that are time invariant, including industry effects which influence 
trade credit are captured by the fixed effects. All other explanatory variables 
change over time and are predicted to influence the level of trade credit. These 
include age, growth in sales (salesgrowth), cash reserves (Cashta), level of short 
term bank debt scaled by firm assets (loansta), size (log of total assets) the level 
of economic activity indicated by GDP per capita (Gdppcg). Table 4.1 shows 
the significance of an SME financial position and use/provision of trade credit. 
A Hausman test was also conducted and this showed in favour of the fixed 
effect regression over random effects. In model (2), the same estimation is 
conducted, however the estimate the net level of trade credit extended captured 
by (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡). This estimates the net levels of credit extended (i.e. levels of 
trade credit extended minus trade credit received) based on the firms’ financial 
position entering the financial crisis. The results from model (1) and (2) and 
variants of their approach using the dependent variables of Tradecreditors 
(which indicates levels of credit received), Trade debtors (which shows levels 
of trade credit extended) and Net TC (which indicates net levels of credit 
extended) are outlined in Table 4.7. 
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 (Model 2)  Net levels of trade credit extended and the financial position 
entering the crisis. 
Equation 8  Net levels of trade credit extended and the financial position 
entering the crisis 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2
∗Postcrisis + 𝛽3
∗FST𝑖(−1) ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽4
∗FST𝑖(−1)
∗ Postcrisis 
+∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , , where εit = ( ηi + Vit) 
In model (3), I examine the change in trade credit use relative to bank credit 
over the crisis. This estimation contains the same structure with interactive 
dummy variables as in model (1) and (2), however here the dependent variable 
is captured by the ratio of net credit extended scaled by the level of bank credit 
received and outstanding. This way, it is possible to capture changes in net 
credit relative to bank credit for SMEs dependent on their financial position. 
There are illustrated in Table 4.8. 
 (Model 3) An estimation of the substitution between trade and bank credit 
Equation 9 An estimation of the substitution between trade and bank credit 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑇𝐶
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2
∗Postcrisis + 𝛽3
∗FST𝑖(−1) ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 
 𝛽4
∗FST𝑖(−1) ∗ Postcrisis + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , , where εit = ( ηi +  Vit) 
Finally in model (4) the relationship between macroeconomic, financial and 
institutional differences on the level and use of trade credit finance for European 
SMEs is analysed. Model (4) examines the relationship between the net levels 
of credit extended and institutional and regulatory factors, based on the 
International Country Rules Guide (ICRG) factors and levels of regulation 
across regions, as well as country dummy variables. It is important to note that 
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the inclusion of the Composite Risk rating is an individual country ranking 
based on economic, political and financial risk factors. These factors include a 
combination of variables including GDP per capita growth, Inflation, 
Government budget balance as a percentage of GDP, political stability, 
legislative strength, and exchange rate stability, foreign debt as a percentage of 
GDP and debt service payments. The results from model (4) are outlined in 
Table 4.9 
(Model4) Trade credit use and macroeconomic and institutional factors 
over the crisis.  
Equation 10 Trade credit use and macroeconomic and institutional factors 
over the crisis 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
∗∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
∗∑𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑖𝑡  𝜀𝑖𝑡 , , where εit = ( ηi + Vit), 
  and ∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  is the sum of individual firm characteristics described  
above lagged, and  ∑𝑍𝑖𝑡  are the firm 
specific industry fixed effects and ∑Cit are the country effects.   
4.5.2 The data 
The data consists of SME financial statement data obtained from the Amadeus 
Bureau Van Dijk database. It covers SME balance sheet and profit and loss 
accounts over the period 2003-2012. SMEs are defined according to the 
European Commission (2005) criteria, which includes firms that employ less 
than 249 workers in a given year and have either an annual turnover of less than 
€50m or a balance sheet total assets of less than €43m. In this study, the number 
of employees and the balance sheet totals of each SME are used as scales in 
each year.  The data is also combined with data obtained from the World Bank 
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Financial Development index and the IMF to capture country level and 
macroeconomic differences and financial development indicators across Europe.  
The final sample contains almost 2.1 million firm-year observations on 
European SMEs over the period 2003-2012. In total, the sample contains 
approximately 283,360 firms across 15 European countries. Firm industry 
sectors are categorised according to three digit NACE 2007 codes and firms are 
assigned to 20 separate industry sectors. The analysis excludes all financial and 
insurance based companies, in line with existing empirical studies, as well as 
public utilities such as public transport and postal services. 
The criteria for the sample are as follows: 
 All active firms employing between 2 and 249 employees in each of the 
sample years.  
 All firms with balance sheet total assets of greater than €43,000,000 or annual 
turnover greater than €50,000,000 in any of three consecutive years of the 
sample years are excluded.  
  All financial variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. This is to 
mitigate the effect of extreme outliers in the data. The data excludes subsidiary 
firms. Furthermore we eliminate values that imply trade credit of longer than 
one year. 
Firms employing 10 persons or fewer in a given year are classified as Micro 
enterprises, while those that employ between 10 and 49 workers are labelled 
small, and finally, enterprises employing between 50 and 249 employees are 
classified as medium sized enterprises33.  
                                                          
33 Link to the international country risk guide 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_TableDef.aspx 
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The Anti-directors rights (ADRI) index (La Porta et al., 1997) capture 
shareholder protection, however these are time invariant and do not capture 
changes in financial liberalisation, but World Bank variables are available for 
most years. The data we also use are the International Country Rules Guide 
(ICRG) data. The ICRG data uses estimates for country-level risk rankings to 
capture factors such as protection of creditors, governance and financial 
reporting quality, which may vary overtime, especially for developing countries. 
4.5.3 Country effects 
Since data size and quality vary significantly with country and this is an 
unbalanced panel, it is important to check that the results are not being driven 
by any one country. As pointed out by previous studies which have used 
Amadeus, the data collection is homogeneous and representative across regions, 
and sectors are narrowly defined. In addition, data on manufacturing and 
services across countries is quite good, and industry coverage is stable and 
representative across countries and over time (Gomez- Salvador et al., 2004). 
Despite the benefits of Amadeus and its noted representativeness across 
countries, its data availability for Germany is noticeably less given the fact that 
German SMEs are not legally forced to disclose financial data (Desai et al., 
2003). While the regressions include country level dummy variables as a 
robustness measure, we also employ a weighted least squares specification as a 
robustness check to the regressions to control for any biases that may arise from 
countries whose SMEs are over represented in the total sample. The weighting 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/Scoreboard_2013_extract_chapter2.pdf  
 
 
137 
 
scheme uses the inverse of the proportion of country observations, therefore 
increasing the importance of the countries with the lesser number of firms as a 
proportion of the total sample. 
The weighting least squares procedure is as follows: The weighted measure is 
simply the number of observations for country i scaled by the total number of 
observations for the total sample. To get the inverse of the weight, the measure 
of 1 over the individual country weight is used as illustrated below. 
Equation 11 European sample weighting 
Weighting Wi =  
1
𝐶𝑖
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
 
Where 𝐶𝑖 = The number of observations for country i and n= number of 
observations for the total sample.   
4.5.4 The variables 
Firm level variables used include measures of short-term debt finance; firm 
loans; firm age; cash stocks; operating revenue, sales growth, trade credit 
received, trade credit extended and total debt finance34. Total debt is calculated 
as long-term debt plus short term debt (loans) or (current liabilities). Total bank 
financing is calculated as total amount of long term debt financing outstanding 
by the firm plus short-term bank finance. Debt overhang is calculated in similar 
fashion to Ryan et al. (2008) (Calculate as total debt/ capital stock), while 
Investment = the Accumulation of fixed assets (accounting for depreciation, 
amortisation and/ or revaluations) in a given year, normalised by the stock of 
fixed assets at the beginning of the year). Other variables used in the study 
capture the level of collateral accounted in firm balance sheets, a measure of net 
                                                          
34 Please see Table 4.12 for descriptive statistics of firm variables used in the study. 
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trade credit received (Net received) calculated as accounts payable minus 
receivables scaled by sales, and also a measure for whether or not the SME has 
survived or not. For this, a variable for firm ‘Fails’ is also included. Fails 
represent a small proportion of the total sample of firms; however, given the 
importance of SMEs across the Euro area in terms of output and employment, I 
decided to model the influence of some of the factors outlined above on SME 
survival. 
 
 
Country level Control variables 
The study includes a number of country level control variables. These include 
controls for economic growth, inflation, as well as financial sector development, 
the degree of banking concentration and a measure for competition in the 
banking sector. The analysis uses other institutional factors, such as creditor 
rights and a dummy variable representing legal origin of each country, similar to 
La Porta et al. (1998). In terms of macroeconomic indicators, a measure of 
interest rates35 and measures for GDP per capita are included. Interest rates are 
an important factor to measure the influence of the cost of bank finance for 
SMEs. For many years now, there has been a long established relation between 
financial sector development, institutional factors and economic growth. 
Raghuram and Zingales (1998) examine whether financial development 
facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship, 
which predict that financial development reduces the costs of external finance to 
                                                          
35  Interest rate data sourced at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/data/enterprise-finance-index/access-to-
finance-indicators/loans/index_en.htm [ Accessed: 25th July 2014] 
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firms. Firms using little debt financing will be capital constrained and grow 
slower (King and Levine, 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). As stated earlier, a 
composite index for country level risk, political and regulatory risk obtained 
from the ICRG database are included.  
As a robustness check and to avoid the presence of multi-collinearity among 
variables, a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) tests are reported for all 
regressions as well as a correlation matrix of variables included in regressions36.  
Descriptive statistics  
Initial examination of the data shows that average debtors over the sample 
period are longest in the countries of Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain and 
shortest in the countries of Finland, Germany, the UK and Lithuania. Table 4.1 
shows the distribution of SMEs and relative proportions of observations on 
SMEs from each country region. The countries of France, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK account for the majority of observations in 
the sample, while the countries of Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany and 
Ireland each contribute the smallest number of observations on SMEs to the 
total sample. While these figures are representative and in proportion to country 
size, as stated, the noticeable outlier in this sample is Germany. Germany 
representing the largest European economy contributes one of the least in terms 
of the quantity of SME observations in the sample (only information on 4,000 
SMEs of an estimated population of over two million SMEs37). In addition, 
official figures show that German SMEs are among the best performing SMEs 
                                                          
36 None of the variables in the correlation matrix have an association above .7 indicating that 
the presence of collinearity amongst the explanatory variables is low and unlikely to bias our 
results. 
37 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-
review/files/countries-sheets/2012/germany_en.pdf [Accessed 11th November 2014] 
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and environment for SMEs to do business within Europe and in general are 
larger in size than the European average. 
 
Table 4.1 21European sample size per country per year 
 
Table 4.2 shows a breakdown of industries in the sample. In total, using NACE 
2007 index codes, a total of 20 separate industry sectors are included. The 
sectors of construction, manufacturing and wholesale trade represent the largest 
proportion of SME observations within the sample and represent over 51 
percent of the total sample. The two grouped sectors of public utilities and 
finance and insurance based firms are excluded. Each of the remaining 15 
sectors approximately account for between 1 and 7 percent of the total sample. 
Overall, the sample contains a broad and representative mixture of sectors. 
Sample size per country
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
1 Belgium 6,507 6,538 6,533 6,497 6,505 6,475 6,492 6,414 6,349 618 58,928
2 Finland 9,196 10,451 10,581 10,890 10,242 8,231 9,113 8,807 9,709 2,335 89,555
3 France 34,871 37,255 37,267 37,262 36,915 36,898 36,933 36,907 36,823 4,046 335,177
4 Germany 391 656 1,178 2,133 2,414 2,630 2,983 2,806 2,342 43 17,576
5 Greece 503 505 508 509 508 507 533 684 587 592 5,436
6 Hungary 50 187 627 1,358 8,462 3,984 9,236 8,944 8,880 7 41,735
7 Ireland 1 10 190 1,764 3,328 3,820 3,966 4,092 3,903 412 21,486
8 Italy 8,833 8,490 8,806 10,124 10,300 10,008 10,006 9,786 10,960 236 87,549
9 Latvia 740 932 932 928 927 932 946 959 961 191 8,448
10 Lithuania 1,188 1,418 1,437 1,415 1,402 1,407 1,414 1,395 1,387 69 12,532
11 Poland 7,512 7,622 9,017 15,631 16,587 20,657 38,255 11,305 6,582 0 133,168
12 Portugal 363 407 383 25,530 25,607 25,777 25,466 25,825 25,806 5 155,169
13 Spain 41,788 44,460 45,741 46,514 47,138 48,377 49,030 48,807 48,863 234 420,952
14 Sweden 44,062 47,678 47,747 47,769 47,745 47,745 47,743 47,774 47,578 35,056 460,897
15 United Kingdom 19,097 19,928 20,369 21,319 22,374 23,833 24,599 24,197 23,657 3,941 203,314
Total 175,102 186,537 191,316 229,643 240,454 241,281 266,715 238,702 234,387 47,785 2,051,922
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Table 4.2 22 Industry sectors across European Sample 
 
In Table 4.3, the study concentrates to the financing of SMEs across the entire 
sample. Table 4.3 shows the average number or period of debtor collection days 
for SMEs across regions represented by their median values. As the table shows, 
SMEs in general in the countries of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have the 
longest levels of debtors’ collection days across the sample. The shortest lengths 
of debtor days are observed in the countries of Finland, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Latvia and Sweden.  
Firm year observations Year
Industry sector NACE 2007 Nace 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total %
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 11  (1110-1159) 1 4,195 4,452 4,567 5,456 5,904 5,733 6,617 5,701 5,660 1,812 50,097 2.44
Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction
21 (2111-2139)
2 692 736 738 935 983 997 1,097 996 970 115 8,259 0.40
Utilities 22 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Construction 23 (- 2389) 4 25,095 26,773 27,261 32,833 33,871 33,915 37,009 33,712 33,087 7,623 291,179 14.17
Manufacturing 31-33 5 35,581 37,219 38,468 48,363 50,727 50,531 56,018 50,225 49,224 7,196 423,552 20.61
Wholesale trade 41, 42 6 31,248 32,639 39,082 33,786 40,710 41,543 45,705 40,387 39,515 5,736 350,351 17.04
Retail trade 44-45 7 14,769 15,790 16,088 19,551 20,325 20,057 22,724 19,876 19,664 5,021 173,865 8.46
Transportation and warehousing 48-49 8 10,659 11,252 11,481 13,026 13,499 13,557 14,542 13,384 13,247 3,580 118,227 5.75
Information and Cultural industries 51 9 2,784 2,997 3,092 3,518 3,729 3,794 4,294 3,605 3,516 614 31,943 1.55
Finance and Insurance 52 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Real estate and rental and leasing 53 11 4,870 5,129 5,217 6,199 6,771 6,943 8,593 6,714 6,441 1,484 58,361 2.84
Professional, Scientific and Technical services 54 12 13,594 14,924 15,205 17,503 18,360 18,444 20,498 17,703 17,404 5,241 158,876 7.73
Management of company and enterprises 55 13 1,135 1,243 1,310 1,259 1,261 1,274 1,323 1,297 1,285 222 11,609 0.56
Administrative and support, Waste management 56 14 6,506 7,063 7,239 8,479 8,935 9,025 10,020 8,970 8,856 1,764 76,857 3.74
Educational services 61 15 2,643 2,889 2,963 3,550 3,676 3,712 3,942 3,750 3,720 1,126 31,971 1.56
Health care and social assistance 62 16 4,871 5,408 5,559 7,371 8,099 8,347 9,179 8,514 8,382 1,254 66,984 3.26
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 71 17 2,387 2,616 2,702 3,035 3,252 3,268 3,527 3,369 3,351 729 28,236 1.37
Accommodation and Food services 72 18 7,528 8,347 8,463 11,074 11,560 11,308 12,125 11,466 11,398 2,033 95,302 4.64
Other services except public administration 
(beauty salons, repair shops etc) 81 19 6,238 6,709 6,865 7,942 8,320 8,317 9,004 8,511 8,325 2,196 72,427 3.52
Public Administration 91-92 + other 20 303 346 358 412 467 511 493 421 344 171 3,826 0.19
Total 175,098 186,532 196,658 224,292 240,449 241,276 266,710 238,601 234,389 47,917 2,051,922 100.00
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Table 4.3 23  Mean debtor days for SMEs across country 
 
Table 4.4 illustrates the observed relationship between SME financial 
characteristics and the level of trade credit finance they receive both before and 
after the financial crisis. The distribution of firms by their characteristics and the 
level of trade credit they receive are split into 4 quartiles. In this case trade 
credit received is measured by the individual SME’s level of accounts payable 
outstanding scaled by their level of assets. Pre-crisis represents the years of 
2003-2007, while the post-crisis period is measured as the years 2008 to 2012. 
The figures illustrate a number of interesting findings. For the sample, the 
figures show that in general both older, larger and firms with greater revenue 
turnover in general receive more trade credit, and firms with the largest cash 
reserves and sales growth receive less trade credit up to the final quartile. The 
difference between the pre-crisis and post-crisis years are that firms with the 
greatest cash reserves receive less trade credit during the crisis period and the 
older firms are more likely to receive trade credit over the crisis period. Firms 
with the largest sales growth appear to receive less trade credit finance over the 
crisis years in comparison to pre-crisis years. While these figures are purely 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2003-2012
Belgium 76 73 74 75 74 69 70 71 70 69 72
Finland 28 28 29 30 30 28 29 32 31 31 30
France 60 59 59 60 59 57 56 56 55 56 58
Germany 33 32 31 31 28 25 27 28 27 33 30
Greece 124 127 132 133 134 134 135 143 143 127 133
Hungary 49 44 48 47 47 45 50 52 54 48
Ireland 26 25 24 36 42 42 44 47 48 60 39
Italy 83 79 97 98 96 92 102 101 99 101 95
Latvia 35 36 34 34 35 36 43 42 38 38 37
Lithuania 56 57 55 51 51 52 65 62 59 61 57
Poland 56 53 58 59 57 58 62 64 64 59
Portugal 106 105 104 107 107 110 120 125 131 135 115
Spain 90 91 94 96 96 90 99 101 100 86 94
Sweden 34 33 34 34 34 32 31 33 33 31 33
United Kingdom 47 46 45 46 46 44 37 36 35 39 42
Average per year 60 59 61 62 62 61 65 66 66 67 63
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correlations and do not control for a number of important contributing factors, 
such as contextual setting, they do provide some interesting initial insights. 
Table 4.4 24 Firm characteristics by levels of trade credit received 
 
In Table 4.5, the levels of trade credit received according to industry sector are 
reported. Industry sectors of management, wholesale and information and 
cultural industries receive the highest levels of trade credit finance as measured 
by the ratio of accounts payable to firm assets, while the industry sectors of 
agriculture, accommodation and food and healthcare receive the lowest levels of 
trade credit finance as a proportion of their total assets. From the statistics, 
however, it is difficult to ascertain if the overall levels of trade credit increased 
in the crisis period. 
Pre-crisis' represents the years preceeding the financial crisis ( 2003-2007)  and crisis represents the onset of the financial crisis
 and beyond (2008-2012) * All figures are represented by mean values*
Pre crisis Crisis Pre crisis Crisis Pre crisis Crisis Pre crisis Crisis 
Size ( log total assets) 13.6 13.9 13.6 13.8 13.8 13.9 14 14
AGE 13.7 18 16 21 20 23 16.5 22
Opprev 3.18 1.8 2.54 1.67 2.15 2.15 15.9 3.8
Loansta 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.121 0.11 0.122
Cashta 0.19 0.153 0.2 0.196 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.134
Employees 18 18 20 22 29 30.6 30 30.1
Sales growth 0.2 0.01 0.18 0.027 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.07
Total debt/ Assets 3.45 1.54 1.37 0.68 0.61 0.6 2.1 1.05
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
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Table 4.5 25 Trade credit received across industry sector 
 
Tables 4.1 – 4.5 reports the firm level data used in this study. Table 4.5 shows 
that trade credit as measured by accounts payable/assets has increased up to 
2008 and 2009 and falls thereafter, but on average is still higher than the years 
2003-2005. In Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1, the analyses concentrate on macro level 
data over the time period 2003 -2012. While this is a 15 country study most 
countries are common members of the Euro currency and monetary union with 
the exception of Sweden and the United Kingdom, who retain individual control 
over monetary policy and setting of interest rates. While monetary and fiscal 
policy has a significant impact on the performance of the SME sector, 
institutional factors also have a significant influence on the level and availability 
of finance to SMEs. Table 4.6 illustrates some of the main country level 
differentials across the sample of European SMEs. 
Industry sector NACE 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 11  (1110-1159) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction 21 (2111-2139) 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.12
Construction 23 (- 2389) 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17
Manufacturing 31-33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
Wholesale trade 41, 42 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
Retail trade 44-45 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Transportation and warehousing 48-49 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14
Information and Cultural industries 51 0.21 0.19 0.56 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.21
Real estate and rental and leasing 53 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.36
Professional, Scientific and Technical services 54 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
Management of company and enterprises 55 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.28 0.75 2.81 0.09 0.11 0.10
Administrative and support, Waste management and remediation services 56 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.30
Educational services 61 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Health care and social assistance 62 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.09
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 71 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.25
Accommodation and Food services 72 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11
Other services except public administration (beauty salons, repair shops etc) 81 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Average 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.31 0.15 0.16 0.16
* Wholesale, information and cultural industries, management and Arts and recreation  have the largest TC to assets ratios
* Trade credit is measured by the ratio of accounts payable over total assets
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Table 4.6 26 Average macroeconomic and institutional indicators across sample of 
European countries 
 
Figure 4.1 15 GDP per capita growth across sample of European countries: 2002-2013 
 
Over the period 2003-2012, average GDP per capita growth was highest in the 
less developed regions of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, while averages were 
lowest in Portugal, Italy and Greece. These average growth figures are highly 
influenced by the severe recession experienced from the period 2008 onwards. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the two countries of Latvia and Lithuania 
experienced some of the highest levels of growth in GDP per capita, while also 
Table: Average macroeconomic indicators across European Countries 2003-2012
Country Legal origin 
Average 
GDPpcG
Average 
PcreditGDP
Average 
SME 
interest
Banking 
Concentration
Av. Est. 
Regulation 
quality
Av. 
Political 
stability
Composite 
Risk 
Rating 
Belgium French origin 0.59 (-1.09) 83.3 (-0.03) 3.83 (0.31) 84.66 (0.74) 1.33 (0.10) 72.7 (-0.94) 76
Finland Scandinavian origin 1.18 (-1.72) 79.1 (-0.09) 3.78 (0.75) 97.41 (-0.330 1.75 (-0.52) 98.7 (-1.00) 80.75
France French origin 0.44 (-1.48) 100.0 (-0.01) 3.75 (0.83) 62.14 (-0.68) 1.22 (-0.48) 61.9 (-1.09) 72.5
Germany German origin 1.32 (-1.14) 109.7 (-0.11) 4.50 (0.56) 73.77 (0.72) 1.53 (-0.47) 73 (0.13) 84
Greece French origin -0.28 (-0.18) 86.4 (-0.02) 5.90 (-0.09) 0.23 (-0.37) 0.79 (-0.72) 53.1 (-0.28) 64.75
Hungary Socialist 1.41 (-1.20) 50.5 (-0.12) 10.67 (1.17) 69.87 (1.80) 1.11 (-0.33) 73.4 (0.69) 68
Ireland English 0.32 (-0.85) 179.0 (-0.28) 4.86 (0.93) 75.19 (1.12) 1.68 (0.67) 87.2 (-0.54) 72
Italy French origin -0.68 (-1.25) 98.0 (-0.3) 4.36 (0.42) 55.53 (0.27) 0.92 (-0.61) 60.9 (-0.69) 70.75
Latvia Socialist 5.19 (-1.37) 61.0 (-0.14) 8.63 (0.98) 54.11 (-0.48) 0.99 (-0.34) 66 (0.24) 65.75
Lithuania Socialist 5.84 (-1.68) 38.0 (0.11) 6.43 (0.79) 74.31 (-0.22) 0.95 (-2.31) 71.6 (1.72) 73.25
Poland Socialist 4.21 (-0.08) 94.9 (0.18) 6.84 (1.06) 55.63 (0.59) 0.85 (0.08) 70.3 (-0.34) 75
Portugal French origin -0.18 (-0.41) 163.6 (-0.08) 6.52 (-0.10) 86.27 (0.02) 1.01 (-0.50) 77.2 (1.22) 68
Spain French origin 0.14 (-1.02) 151.7 (0.23) 4.52 (0.61) 75.60 (1.05) 1.19 (-0.78) 39.9 (0.24) 67
Sweden Scandinavian origin 1.56 (-1.17) 137.5 (.0.69) 3.94 (-0.01) 94.50 (0.07) 1.66 (0.43) 92.4 (-0.18) 85.5
United Kingdom English 0.71 (-1.28) 173.8 (0.02) 5.21 (-0.11) 54.04 (-1.48) 1.71 (0.24) 57 (-0.01) 73.75
**Figures in parenthesis represent skewness of the variables over the sample period 2003-2012
** Composite Risk Rating is a rating for each country for the year 2012. The rating is a combination of Economic, Political and Financial Risks obtained from ICRG Data availabe 
    from https://epub.prsgroup.com/icrg-tables
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experiencing the most severe falls in GDP per capita growth over the recession. 
Similarly, countries of Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK experienced significant 
and dramatic reductions in GDP per capita at the onset of the financial crisis. 
While policies in terms of dealing with the crisis and levels of austerity differed 
across regions, the onset of the financial crisis dealt a significant blow to the 
prosperity and fortunes of the SME sectors across the European community. 
Most significantly, this can be seen in terms of demand and investment across 
Europe, but also in terms of the levels of bank credit extended economy wide. 
Column 2 of Table 4.6 shows the average levels of private sector credit 
extended by the banking sector across European countries over the period. 
Interestingly, these figures are negatively skewed reflecting the dramatic fall 
over the period 2008 onwards. The countries of Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK are noticeable outliers with average percentages of credit extended 
exceeding 150 percent of GDP. This compares to levels of 100 percent and 
below in countries of France, Belgium, Lithuania among others. These figures 
correlate with countries that experienced significant expansions in banking 
credit extended to the private sector up to the 2008, followed by dramatic falls 
in economic output and banking crises and public finance crises.  
The average levels of interest rates charged to SMEs differ across regions over 
the period, while so too does the level of banking concentration. Some recent 
studies including Ryan et al. (2012) have found a direct correlation between the 
levels of banking concentration, interest rates charged to SMEs and access to 
finance. Since the crisis began, many European economies have experienced a 
severe reduction in the levels of banking concentration and competition. The 
countries of Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and UK rank high in 
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terms of regulation quality relative to the other sampled countries, only Sweden, 
UK, Ireland and Belgium have positively skewed figures for the whole sample 
period. Similarly, while many countries rank highly in terms of political 
stability for the period as a whole, the negative skewed figures (represented by 
those in parentheses) indicates the deterioration in political stability in many 
countries over the economic crisis. Finally, the variable Composite Risk Rating 
is a composite measure of the combined ranking of a country based on 
economic, political and financial risk factors obtained from the ICRG data38. All 
these figures are captured in the regression analysis and discussed in the results 
section of this chapter.  
 
4.6 The results 
Table 4.7 illustrates the relationship between firms’ financial position at the 
time of the crisis and their subsequent use of trade credit finance in during the 
crisis/post-crisis years. The results reported are consistent with the findings in 
Chapter 3. The results show that firms in a stronger financial position when 
entering the crisis, in particular, those with the largest cash reserves, were net 
providers of credit in the subsequent years. They consistently extended more 
credit and received less than were the case prior to the onset of the financial 
crisis supporting H2a. This result holds when controlling for firm 
characteristics, country variables and firm fixed effects, and country fixed 
effects. The results hold for the levels of credit received measured by the 
variable “Tradecreditors”, the levels of credit extended measured by the variable 
“Tradedebtors” and the net level of credit extended measured by the variable 
                                                          
38 Note the variable is ‘Composite Risk Rating’ is a time invariant measure, calculated based on 
each country’s ranking in the year 2012. 
148 
 
“Net TC”. The variable “Net TC” is also important here as for the first time in 
this study, controlling for both firm individual effects, country level factors and 
time invariant unobservable factors, one can observe that firms with the largest 
levels of cash reserves entering the period of financial crisis were net providers 
of credit throughout the crisis period.  
Table 4.7 27 Trade credit and firm cash levels across European financial crisis 
 
The adjusted R-squared for each of the regressions is in excess of 70 percent, 
indicating that the choice of variables included in the regression specification 
explain the majority of variation in each of the three dependent variables. In the 
final columns of the table, a measure of short-term bank debt is included to 
control for possible debt overhang among SMEs and their use of trade credit. 
Table  Trade Credit and Cash
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) (3C) (3D) (3E)
Tradecreditors Tradecreditors Tradedebtors Tradedebtors Net TC Net TC Net TC Net TC Net TC
Crisis -.004 -.024*** -.0101*** 0.011*** -.003*** -.004*** -0.001 -0.003* -.003*
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post1 .010 -.006 .0055*** .005*** .011*** .010*** .004*** .003** .003*
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post2 .011* -.005 .0126*** .103*** .015*** .015*** .009*** .007*** .007***
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 3 .028*** .017** .0145*** .0155*** .016*** .017*** .011** .008*** .008***
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Crisis*Cashta-1 .612*** .091*** .021*** .025*** .015*** .016*** .026** .043*** .043***
(.03) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 1*Cashta-1 .133*** .051* .004** .006*** .001 .001 .023*** .039*** .039***
(.00) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 2*Cashta-1 .079** .010 .006*** .008*** .004** .004** .031*** .050*** .050***
(.03) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Post 3*Cashta-1 -.001 -.080* .009*** .011*** .006*** .006*** .034*** .051*** .051***
(.03) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag Size -.0001*** -.001**** -.001** .0001* .0001*** .0001
(.13) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag salesgrowth -.0001 -.001 -.001 -.007*** -.009*** -.009***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag of Loansta -.011** -.033*** -.033***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 -0.0001** -.0001** -.003** -.0001 -.001** -.001*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Country Fixed effects No No No No No No No YES No
Country dummy No No No No No No No No YES
Constant .791*** .876*** .196*** .213*** .106*** .113*** .048*** .047** .023***
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Observations 1579260 1183937 1676093 1353985 1671548 1351580 134521 134521 134521
number of groups 198358 194219 216961 214851 216785 214609 32965 8 32965
obs per group(average) 8.0 6.1 7.7 6.3 7.7 6.3 4.2 4.2
Adjusted R-squared .70 .75 .69 .73 .69 .72 .65 .03 .04
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with firm fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Tradecreditors' calculated as accounts payable scaled by firm input material costs and 'Tradedebtors' calculated as acounts recievable scaled 
by sales. 'Net TC' represents the net credit extended by firms calculated as the difference between trade recieveables minus payables scaled by firm sales. Independent 
variables include 'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' , and 'Post3' are time dummy 
variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Cashta-1*Crisis represents the SME level of cash to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The interactions with 'Cashta-1' show the effects of 'Cashta-1' during the 
crisis and the three years following the onset of the crisis. The models are estimated with fixed effects and include the ind ependent variables of  'Size'  represented by the 
naturaal logarithm of firm assets, and lag measure of  sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm 'Age2' and a measure for the level of shorterm bank debt and 
overdrafts outstanding scaled by firm assets.Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.
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The inclusion of this variable reduces the sample size, nevertheless the negative 
sign coefficient is interesting in so far as indicating that SMEs with greater 
dependence on short-term bank debt extend less net credit in comparison to 
firms with lower ratios of short-term bank debt outstanding to total assets. 
Table 4.8 reports results that examine the relation between trade credit and bank 
credit. The results show  that the level of trade credit extended relative to bank 
finance received rises for the firms with the highest levels of cash reserves over 
the years of the crisis 2008 to 2011, controlling for country and firm level 
individual effects and time invariant unobservable factors, indicating support for 
H2 and H3. This result reinforces the finding that irrespective of changes in the 
banking sector, firm’s role as financial intermediaries increased over the crisis 
period, and this role is particularly noticeable for firms with the strongest 
financial position when entering the crisis. 
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Table 4.8 28 Trade credit and bank credit 
  
(1) (1A)
Net TC/ Bank finance Net TC/ Bank finance
Crisis .029*** -.002
(.00) (.00)
Post1 .050*** .007***
(.00) (.00)
Post2 .065*** .010***
(.00) (.00)
Post 3 .073*** .003
(.00) (.00)
Crisis*Cashta-1 .028***
(.00)
Post 1*Cashta-1 .043***
(.00)
Post 2*Cashta-1 .073***
(.00)
Post 3*Cashta-1 .091***
(.00)
lag Size .000***
(.00)
lag salesgrowth .001
(.00)
Age .009***
(.00)
Country dummies YES
Fixed Effects YES YES
Constant .207*** .031***
(.00) (.00)
Observations 1,440,166 945,250
number of groups 204,822 156,305
Adjusted R-squared .66 .71
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically 
    with fixed effects
The dependent variables are 'Net TC/ Bank Finance' calculated as the difference trade receivables 
minus payables scaled by the total outstand bank debt of the firm . 'Net TC' represents the net credit 
extended by firms calculated as the difference between trade recieveables minus payables scaled by 
firm sales. Independent variables include 'Crisis' represents a year dummy variable for the year of 
financial crisis impact in Ireland(2008), while 'Post1', 'Post2' , and 'Post3' are time dummy variables 
for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Cashta-1*Crisis represents the SME level of cash to assets ratio one year prior to the crisis year. The 
interactions with 'Cashta-1' show the effects of 'Cashta-1' during the crisis and the three years 
following the onset of the crisis. The models are estimated with fixed effects and include the 
independent variables of  'Size'  represented by the naturaal logarithm of firm assets, and lag measure 
of  sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm 'Age2'.Standard errors are represented in 
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Country effects 
To analyse the influence of country specific factors on the levels of trade credit 
extended and received within the SME sector, see Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 29 Trade credit and institutional country level factors 
 
 
Table  Trade Credit and Country level factors
Net TC (1) Net TC (2) Net TC(3) Net TC (4) Net TC (5) Net TC (6)
 Size 0.0001 .004*** .003*** -0.0001 .00001*** -.0001**
(.00) (.00) (.00 (.00) (.00) (.00)
lag salesgrowth -0.0001 -0.011** -.008*** -.0128*** -.010*** -.011***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Lag Cashsa .001*** .102*** .105*** .0001 .001*** .001*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Age -.001*** .00001* .001** .002** -.0001** .001**
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Age2 .0001*** -.0001* -.001* -.0001** -.0001* -.0001**
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Cashsa*Firm size 0.0001* -.0001* -.0001 .00001* .0001** .0001**
(.00) (.00) (.00 (.00) (.00) (.00)
Lag of Loansta -.007 .009*
(.00) (.00)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO
Banking concentration .003*** .001**
(.00 (.00)
GDPpc Growth .001*** -.0001
(.00) (.00)
ICRG Political stability -.004** .0001**
(.00) (.00)
ICRG Regulatory quality -.083*** -.034***
(.00) (.00)
ICRG Current Composite Risk* -.003***
(.00)
lag of PcreditGDP .0002*** .0001***
(.00) (.00)
lag of SME interest rate .005*** .006***
(.00) (.00)
English origin Base Base Base Base Base Base 
French origin .122** .121***
(.00) (.00)
Scandinavian origin -.009** -
(.00)
German origin -.010*** -.027***
(.00) (.00)
Socialist -.012*** -.006***
(.00) (.00)
Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO YES
Year dummies YES YES YEAR YES No YES
Constant .012*** .014** .267*** .088*** .244*** .067***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.03) (.00)
Observations 1345439 143888 143888 1345439 1179183 1179183
number of groups 226757  40065 40065 226757 221001 221002
Adjusted R-squared .15 .08 .08 .73 .21 .74
* Industry sector dummies makes no difference to results as they are excluded automatically with fixed effects
* Regressions include robust standard errors and include country observations weights
* This varaible, unlike ICRG Political stability and ICRG Regulatory Quality is time invariant and represents the country ranking for one year
The dependent variables are 'Net TC' represents the net credit extended by firms calculated as the difference between trade recieveables minus payables 
scaled by firm sales. Independent variables include  variables of  'Size'  represented by the natural logarithm of firm asset s, a measure of cash stocks of the 
firm scaled by sales ( Cashsa) and lag measure of  sales growth 'salesgrowth' and the age of the firm 'Age2' and interaction variable of cash reserves by firm 
size (Cashsa*totalwinsor) and a measure for the level of shorterm bank debt and overdrafts outstanding scaled by firm assets ( loansta).
Variables capturing country level factors include Banking concentration, GDP per capita growth, Political stability, Regulatory quality, and 'PcreditGDP' 
which capitures the level of credit extended by a country's banking sector as a proportion of GDP. The final variable is interest rate which captures the 
interest rate charged on loans of less than €1m across the set of European countries. 
Our final set of variables are dummy variables according to the LLVS of country level origin.
Standard errors are represented in parentheses, while the ***, **, *, represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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 In Table 4.9, the relationship between the use of trade credit financing over the 
financial crisis and role of country level institutional factors is analysed. In 
column one, grouped country level dummies are included, similar to those used 
in La Porta et al.(1998) to examine the relationship between country 
institutional factors and SME finance. Given the statistically significant 
coefficients, country and institutional factors are clearly important rejecting the 
null hypothesis H4. More debateable are whether H4 and H5 is supported by 
these results. From the first two columns, the results show that levels of net 
credit extended are greater in French origin countries (i.e., Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain) over common law countries, while 
Scandinavian, German and Socialist origin countries show lower levels of net 
credit in comparison to common law countries. The results in columns 1 and 2 
indicate that the relation between net trade credit and country legal origin are 
lower in all three legal origins of  Scandinavian, German and Socialist when 
compared to the common law countries of Ireland and the UK, with French 
origin being the only region to have a positive coefficient. 
In column 3, composite country risk rating are included. While this variable is 
time invariant, its negative coefficient surprisingly indicates that an inverse 
relation between the levels of trade credit extended net economy wide and the 
level of composite risk. This result could indicate a negative impact of overall 
country level risk and level of credit and transmission mechanism of bank credit 
discussed in chapter 3. In columns 5 and 6, one can see that factors of banking 
concentration, GDP growth, the level of private sector credit issued by the 
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banking sector are all positively associated with the level of net credit extended 
economy wide, while an inverse relationship between regulatory quality, 
political stability and net trade credit is observed. Interestingly, controlling for 
firm level fixed effects; increased levels of banking concentration are associated 
with higher levels of trade credit use, perhaps indicating a movement towards 
informal sources of firm level finance, when of level of competition in the 
banking sector are reduced. Additionally regulatory quality, political stability 
are all associated with lower levels of trade credit use. 
Firm Survival throughout the crisis 
Finally, while the results above do reaffirm some of the predictions about 
institutional and regulatory requirements influence on SME finance, they say 
little about the likely impact of trade credit finance on SME survival. This is a 
topic that has been neglected within the literature. While many studies have 
examined the relationship between SME access to finance and credit constraints 
which influence SME performance and ultimately survival, there has been little 
in the way of research into the role of trade credit on SMEs survival. 
In this chapter, the factors influencing SME survival throughout the crisis period 
in this European sample are also analysed. Some studies have found evidence 
that the survival of firms is contingent on the firms’ ability to develop its own 
individual competencies to adapt to the highly competitive and changing 
business environment (Esteve-Pérez and Manez-Castillejo 2008). Some studies 
focus on firm survival from entry stage (Geroski, 1995) with firm age, human 
capital and managerial experience as important determinants of SME survival 
(Cressy 2006).  It is also noted that 50% of start-ups disappear within the first 
five years (Berger and Udell 1998). Financial development also reduces the 
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costs of external finance to firms. In terms of trade credit, the majority of studies 
have tended to focus on the role of trade credit and its influence in easing 
financial distress for SMEs, as is the case in this study. Suppliers can support 
their customers through trade credit financing when they experience a 
temporary liquidity shocks (Cunat, 2007). The issue of debt overhang is also 
particularly important in the case of SMEs and their probability of default 
(Lawless and McCann 2013). This leads my next two hypotheses 
H6 SMEs with a larger level of debt overhang are more likely to default 
H7 Access to trade credit finance is unrelated to the probability survival among 
SMEs over the crisis 
Out of the 15 countries in my sample, some countries (but not all) have 
information on failed firms. Therefore to estimate the influence of trade credit 
on survivorship, I limit the sample to the countries in which data on surviving 
firms is available. These include the countries of Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The countries of Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland do not have 
information on insolvency. 
While it can be argued that this study of SME finance primarily focuses on 
surviving SMEs throughout the crisis, I do have information on almost three and 
half thousand failed firms over the sample period. The largest majority of these 
are in the countries of France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, with 
information on over 1,000 failed SMEs in Spain, 841 in France, 681 in Portugal 
and 336 in the United Kingdom. While there are likely to be a greater number 
more SMEs that have become insolvent, dormant over the intervening period, 
the data reliably shows us that these numbers at a minimum have experienced 
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severe financial pressures that have forced them to exit the industry. Table 4.10 
shows a breakdown of the numbers of failed firms in the sample. 
Table 4.1030 Firm survival across sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 4.11, a simple Probit model was estimated to assess the likely influence 
of the factors the institutional factors and trade credit on SME survival39.  Probit 
model estimation is a non-linear transformation of the linear probability model 
also known as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The transformation of 
combination Xβ is constrained to an outcome of a [0,1] interval. Under the 
normal distribution of a continuous dependent variable, however for a binary 
dependent variable the outcome is bounded between a [0,1] interval. Therefore 
for a binary dependent variable y and a (k x 1) vector of explanatory variables, 
the conditional probability is specified by the following  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝑥, 𝛽) =  𝑋′𝛽 
                                                          
39 Unfortunately, given the data available to me, it is not possible to accurate date when 
the firm failed, however, all firm failures occurred within the sample time period, and 
majority occurred during the crisis years of 2008-2012. 
Table: Proportion of insolvent/failed firms in sample
# Firms
# insolvent/failed 
firms
% of sample 
failed/insolvent
Belgium 7765 17 0.22
Finland 12232 44 0.36
Frannce 37673 841 2.23
Germany 4712 43 0.91
Hungary 9390 9 0.10
Ireland 8277 7 0.08
Italy 12342 98 0.79
Potugal 26157 681 2.60
Spain 51951 1044 2.01
Sweden 47975 232 0.48
United Kingdom 29728 336 1.13
248202 3352 1.35
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In the case of a binary dependent variable, traditional OLS estimation contains 
the assumption of homoscedastic and constant variance of the error term, this 
assumption is automatically violated in the case of a binary dependent variable. 
The distribution of the error term in the case of a binary dependent variable is 
non-normal and only contains two possible outcomes. An individual error (εi) is 
conditional on xi, therefore, only two possible outcomes. Either 𝜀𝑖 = 1 − 𝑥
′𝛽 
with probability 𝑥′𝛽 (the probability of observed value 1) and 𝜀𝑖 = −𝑥
′𝛽 with 
probability 1 − 𝑥′𝛽 (the probability of the observed value = 0). 
Additionally, with only two possible outcomes, the variances of the error terms 
depend on x and are heteroscedastic. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖|𝑋𝑖) = (𝑥
′𝛽)(1 − 𝑥′𝛽 ) 
Using standard linear probability estimation in the case of a binary dependent 
variable will lead to inefficient estimates, biased errors and ultimately mis-
leading inferences. With Probit estimation the model is transformed to constrain 
the outcome to the [0,1], therefore in the case of the regression conducted here, 
where the dependent variable is whether the SME fails or not, the specification 
is as follows 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝑥, 𝛽) =  𝐺(𝑋′𝛽) 
Here G is the standard normal cumulative distribution where 𝐺(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) =
 ф(𝑥𝑖′𝛽) where ф represents the conditional expectation. Since Probit 
transforms the functions of (𝑥′𝛽) are non-linear, Probit estimation requires 
Maximum likelihood estimation which gives the parameters most likely to 
generate the data. 
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  In addition, with Probit estimation, we must be careful with the interpretation 
of the coefficients.  
Probit : 
𝜕 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖=1|𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑗
=  ф(𝑥𝑖′𝛽)𝛽𝑗 
Therefore the marginal effect, i.e. what happens to the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 
when we increase the explanatory variable. The marginal effects are the 
conditional probability of a unit increase in the jth explanatory variable. The 
regression for determining survival is there as follows. 
Equation 12 SME survival 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =×𝑖𝑡 β + εit where εit~ (0, σ
2) 
The dependent variable is whether or not the firm became insolvent/bankrupt. 
The dependent variable is modelled as binary choice where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 if the event 
occurs and 0 if not to firm i at time t and X is a vector of explanatory variables 
influencing survival including firm age, size, growth and access to trade credit 
finance. As regards survivorship, the results indicate the following, intuitively; 
SMEs in regions and in periods of higher economic growth are less likely to 
fail. Firms that are older and larger in size are statistically less like to become 
insolvent, however those with higher debt levels and variability in sales are 
particularly at risk. 
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Table 4.1131 Trade credit use and firm survival 
 
 
Interestingly for the sample, the results do show that firms that receive more 
trade credit are significantly more likely to survive the crisis period than those 
with the same indebtedness that did not trade credit. This is further reflected by 
the statically significant negative coefficient for the variable banking 
concentration. The higher the degree of banking concentration, the greater the 
chance SMEs will experience obtaining bank finance, particularly in periods of 
financial distress, ultimately influencing SME survival.  
It is also worth noting in measuring the goodness of fit of the Probit model, I 
note the Pseudo R-square which differs from the regular R-square used 
Probit model of Firm failure
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg3
Varable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Employees -0.002 0 0.0001 0 -.001* (.00)
lag.Loansta 0.312 (.27) -.001** (.00) -.034* (.00)
lag Cashta -1.276*** (.33) -.012** (.00) -1.088* (.03)
lag Firm sales growth -.087 (.09) -.076** (.00) -.079** (.01)
Age .000** (.01) -0.001 (.00) -.001** (.00)
Tradebankcredit -.0171*** (.03)
Net days -.001** (.00)
Net receieved -.207*** (.02)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Country dummy NO YES YES YES
Banking concentration .068*** (.00)
GDP per capita -.071** (.03)
Observations 731971 826834 603785
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.06 0.05
Averge Marginal effects of Trade credit received
dy/dx SE
Net received -0.006*** (.00)
Dependent variable = (1= firm failed, 0 if the firm survived).
Independent variables capture individual firm characteristics, such as firm size, growth, age, industry sector, 
the level of trade credt received relative to bank credit( Tradebankcredit), country  and industry controls.
' Net days represents the ldifference of credit days minus debtor days to capture level s of credit received in 
terms of days as measure of net credit received. 'Net receieved' captured the level of trade credit received 
calculated as ( accounts payable- receievable scaled by sales).
Lag represnts the one year lag of the varaible. 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%,5% 
and 10% level.
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throughout this research. The Pseudo R-square captures the goodness of fit is 
measured as  
1 −
𝐿𝑢𝑟
𝐿0
 
Where Lur refers to the log likelihood for function for the full model and L0 
represents th log likelihood function for the model with only an intercept. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Using a large sample of 300,000 European SMEs, this study highlights the role 
of trade credit as an important source of finance for financially vulnerable SMEs 
over the financial crisis. While this chapter draws upon a large heterogeneous 
sample of SMEs across the Euro area, the chapter represents a significant 
advancement in the knowledge regarding the financing of SMEs over the 
financial crisis period and the role of institutional country risk factors. The 
combination of firm level data and country level indicators demonstrates the 
significant relationship between individual country specific factors and 
individual SME financing behaviour. The findings of this study would indicate 
that while country and institutional differences are important determinants of the 
use of trade credit financing among SMEs over the crisis, the influence of 
country level factors are interconnected with influence of firm level 
characteristics, particularly in the case of unlisted SMEs, which is the focus of 
this chapter. 
Specifically, this study demonstrates the important role of peer to peer financing 
within the SME sector. The increased levels of financing extended by cash rich 
SMEs over the crisis years played a significant role in financing financially 
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vulnerable SMEs for a period of time and ultimately, and most likely 
influencing their survival in many cases. The observed differences in both the 
number of debtor days across countries, sectors and years is also interesting. 
Banking concentration, the level of credit extended by the banking sector and 
the rate of interest rates charged on lending to SMEs is undoubtedly connected 
to the level of trade credit within the SME sector. SMEs are more likely to rely 
on trade credit financing if they are (a) experiencing difficulty in accessing bank 
financing for working capital purposes and (b) if the cost of bank finance as 
determined by the interest rate on short term loans is greater. Country specific 
factors including political stability and regulatory quality are both inversely 
related to the level of trade credit used among SMEs when holding all other 
factors constant. This is further reflected by the differences in results between 
legal origins, which are likely to influence both regulatory rules as regards 
creditor payment days and creditor rights. 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1. Discussion of the research 
 
This thesis aims to examine the impact of the financial crisis on the financing 
behaviour of SMEs. In addition the research aims to demonstrate the impact of 
the reduction in the availability of bank credit as a result of the financial crisis 
on SMEs. In chapter 2, the Pecking Order theory is tested as the conventional 
predictor of SME financing decisions by; (a) employing a novel test of the 
Pecking Order not previously applied to SMEs and (b) using a panel data 
sample examining the changes in SME financing behaviour over the trade cycle 
and incorporating the financial crisis. The study outlined in Chapter 2 
highlighted the growing levels of financial deleveraging among Irish and UK 
SMEs over the financial crisis, while also highlighting the increased role of 
trade credit finance and working capital management among SMEs. While it 
questions the suitability of traditional capital structure theories in explaining 
SME finance behaviour, it also highlights that in large firm studies a mixture of 
debt and equity are the primary sources of external finance, whereas in SMEs 
the choice is primarily between short-term debt finance and trade credit. 
In Chapter 3, the extent of trade credit use among SMEs is empirically tested 
and its role as a source of finance to SMEs is measured. The important role of 
this source of finance, although, highlighted in the literature has not been tested 
for SMEs based on their financial position entering the financial crisis. This 
chapter tests whether trade credit is a substitute for bank lending in times of 
financial crisis and whether financially stronger firms extend credit to 
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financially weaker firms over the financial crisis. While in Chapter 4, the 
research is extended to a European context where institutional, economic and 
financial factors and their impact on SME finance decisions are examined.  
 
The research highlights the differences in responses to the crisis internationally 
in terms of policy. While this research has not attempted to evaluate such policy 
schemes, there are a number of policy recommendations for SMEs that are 
worth consideration. 
5.2 Contributions of the research 
 
This thesis began with the primary aim of examining the applicability of 
existing capital structure theories in explaining SME financing decisions over 
the business cycle and financial crisis. This requires a comprehensive test of 
SME capital structure and working capital theory. From the existing literature it 
was evident that a) the Pecking Order theory had emerged as the primary 
descriptor of SME capital structure and finance decisions from both a theory 
(Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998) 
and empirical perspective (Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Berggren 
et al., 2000; Watson and Wilson., 2002; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010 and 
Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). The research began by questioning both of these 
conventional wisdoms, particularly in the context of a financial crisis, whereby 
access to bank finance is severely restricted and increased pressure is placed on 
the availability of internal finances and cash flow. The second fact observed 
from the literature within the field was the similarities in empirical strategies 
applied to test the applicability of the Pecking Order theory or otherwise. Within 
the literature, the empirical approach generally applied was based on leverage 
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regressions, reliant on correlations among variables as empirical evidence in 
support of theory. As pointed out by Leary and Roberts (2010) and Streubulaev 
(2007) the predications of various leverage regressions often have no power to 
distinguish between alternative theories. Myers (2001) concluded that 
empirically, it is possible to argue support for any of the capital structure 
theories due to contextual and the empirical approach applied, not to mention 
misspecification of findings in the absence of accounting for fixed effects 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2006). With the exception of emerging theories for SME 
financial lifecycle (Berger and Udell, 1998; Gregory et al, 2005, and Mac an 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2011) and theory specifically focused on high growth firms 
and start-ups (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010; Hogan and Hutson, 2005), the 
Pecking Order to this day remains the default theory of SME finance.  
This thesis challenges the Pecking Order theory and its strength as the default 
theory for SMEs by contributing to the literature in the field in terms of 
methodology, applying a flow of funds methodology for a sample of Irish and 
UK SMEs with panel data analysis. In addition, given its importance to SMEs, 
the methodology accounted for debt capacity, which hadn’t previously been 
accounted for within existing SME capital studies. While the predictions of the 
Pecking Order regarding firm profits, age, size tangibility and non-debt tax 
shields were all supported by the empirical evidence of this research, the 
findings obtained also suggested that alternative financing sources had increased 
in importance for SMEs over the crisis period, particularly trade credit. In the 
absence of the methodological approach applied in Chapter 2, this result may 
not have been apparent. 
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The findings obtained in Chapter 2 suggest that theoretical models ought to pay 
greater attention to the working capital of SMEs as opposed to the traditional 
theories and empirical strategy in SME finance literature to date which focused 
on the trade-off of debt versus equity and longer term finance decisions of 
SMEs. In addition, the findings obtained from the study conducted in Chapter 2 
were further supported by upcoming and new research in the SME finance field 
which focused more on short-term finance decisions of SMEs and working 
capital management. As highlight in Table 1.1 of Chapter 1 (illustrated below), 
a growing number of studies within SME finance began to examine the role of 
working capital and short-term financing decisions among SMEs. 
Existing panel studies using balance sheet firm level data on the working 
capital of SMEs 
Paper Database   
Countries 
Time 
Period 
No. of 
SMEs 
McGuinness(2015) Amadeus 15 
European 
Countries 
2004-
2012 
 
283,360 
Carbo-Valverde et 
al. (2012) 
Amadeus Spain 2004-
2008 
3,404 
Psillaki and 
Daskalikis(2009) 
Amadeus Four 
western 
countries 
1997-
2001 
11,654 
Martínez- Sola et 
al. (2013) 
SABI 
database(BVD) 
of Spanish 
SMEs 
Spain 2000-
2007 
11,337 
Banos-Cabellero, 
García- Tereul and 
Martínez-Solano 
(2012) 
SABI 
database(BVD) 
of Spanish 
SMEs 
Spain 2002-
2007 
1008 
Spanish 
SMEs 
Casey and 
O’Toole (2014) 
 
SAFE Data 
11 Western 
countries 
2009-
2011 
3,500 
 
One of the first studies to do this using actual firm level accounting data was 
Carbo-Valverde et al (2012) who empirically examined the role of trade credit 
finance in SME investment decisions. The paper found that trade credit played 
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an important role in the investment among credit constrained SMEs who were 
constrained in terms of access to bank finance. Likewise Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) and Berger and Udell (1998) highlighted the important role, yet under 
researched topic of trade credit within the SME finance field of literature. 
Research including Banos-Cabellero et al. (2013); Martínez- Sola et al. (2013) 
and Psillaki and Daskalikis (2009) are among some of the new wave of studies 
which examine the working capital and trade credit use among SMEs.  Among 
these, Vermoesen et al. (2013) examined the investment among a sample of 
Belgium SMEs over the crisis and found that investment was significantly 
hindered by the difficulty of SMEs to renew their loans due to a negative 
banking credit supply shock. With the exception of (Carbo-Valverde et al, 2012; 
Vermoesen et al., 2013 and Casey and O’Toole, 2014), the majority of existent 
studies that examined financing behaviour since the financial crisis were based 
on listed firms from emerging market economies, such as (Bastos and Pindado, 
2013 and Love et al., 2007) and not unlisted SMEs whom by their nature are 
more restricted in the sources of finance available to them (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997; Berger and Udell, 1998; Cowling et al, 2012; Beck et al, 2008 and 
Bernanke, 1983). While there are a number of reasons why the contextual 
setting of these studies are important and likely to impact on findings such 
research, as the differences between firm size and country of residence.  
This thesis is the first study that has examined the role of trade credit throughout 
a period of financial crisis across the Euro area using direct firm level 
accounting data, of which is comparable across regions.  
In Chapter 3, the research contributes to the empirical knowledge and evidence 
on trade credit use by testing for redistribution and substitution effects in the 
166 
 
SME sector.  The results show support for redistribution but also indicate some 
evidence of substitutability between bank finance for trade credit supporting the 
earlier predictions of Petersen and Rajan(1997) and Fishman and Love (2003). 
Previous research has outlined that trade credit contract terms depend upon 
many factors including length of time in which the firm and other firms do 
business (Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2006; Fishman and Love, 2003), the industry 
setting, and the ability of firms to monitor, reinforce payments and cut off future 
supplies (Love and Zaida, 2010). Research has also highlighted the many costs 
(Wilson and Summers, 2002) and benefits for firms  in using trade credit 
(Schwartz,1977) such as avoiding bankruptcy and ability to negotiate more 
favourable and flexible payment schedules with suppliers instead of banks 
(Huyghaebaert et al., 2007) and the ability to reduce overall borrowing costs 
(Fabbri and Klapper, 2009; Giannetti et al, 2011). Based on a sample of 1008 
Spanish SMEs over the period 2002-2007, Banos-Cabellero et al, (2012) 
demonstrated how trade credit finance could sustain and maximise profitability 
by balancing costs and benefits and using an optimal working capital strategy.  
Empirically however, little research has examined the theories of Redistribution 
and Substitution between trade credit and bank finance over the crisis period. 
The Redistribution concept, originally by Meltzer (1960) and later developed by 
Calomiris et al. (1995) argues that liquid firms could provide a cushion of 
support to financially constrained firms during periods of credit tightening (Bias 
and Gollier, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1998; Guarglia and Mateut, 2006), 
however, to the best of my knowledge this has not previously been tested in the 
case of SMEs using actual firm level accounting data. 
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Likewise, there is support for the Substitution of trade credit and bank credit in 
the literature (Bias and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingson, 2004 and Cunat, 
2007), however evidence among European SMEs over the crisis remains absent. 
In addition, another line of literature on financing since the crisis also points to 
evidence of a propagation of liquidity shocks. Boissay and Gropp (2007); 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Love and Zaida (2010) all predict a propagation 
of liquidity shocks within inter firm financing in the aftermath of a financial 
crisis. While the results of this thesis do show a reduction in overall levels of net 
credit, at the same time they indicate an enhanced role of trade credit for 
financially vulnerable SMEs over the crisis period. The study also controls for 
country effects in Chapter 4, which are likely to influence any potential 
substitutability between trade and bank credit (Demirguc Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001; Hernández-Cánovas and Koeter-Kant, 2011).  
This research contributes to existing literature in terms of its methodology and 
contextual setting. The findings obtained from Chapter 3 are of interest to SMEs 
policy makers and practitioners. Methodology wise, the use and combination of 
interactive dummy variables with firm fixed effects enables us to capture the 
level of extension and receipt of credit by SMEs over the period based on their 
financial position and this is new. Furthermore, the inclusion of a net credit 
variable allows for this.  Overall results demonstrate the importance of financial 
position of firms measured by short-term dependence on bank finance, sales, 
profitability, and cash resources available to the firm, including bank deposits, 
collateral and strength of cash flow. Results show that SMEs most vulnerable to 
the crisis, i.e. those with the highest short-term debt ratios extended significantly 
less credit thereafter, while receiving more in the form of trade credit. Results 
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obtained from Chapter 3 and 4 illustrate that older and larger firms appear to be 
net providers of credit, having extended more and received less over the crisis 
supporting the predictions of Berger and Udell (1998). While controlling for 
firm age, growth, size and industry sector, firms with the greatest levels of cash 
reserves are net providers of credit and provide significantly more credit to their 
business partners relative to pre-crisis periods. The study also includes a 
measure for the extension and receipt of in terms of quantity of credit based on 
accounts receivable and payables and the number of debtor and creditor days. 
Results obtained from Chapter 3 demonstrate changes in net number of days of 
credit as well as the quantity of credit, and a measure of the working capital 
requirement in terms of the length of days between firms’ receipt of payment 
and payment outlays. The results, highlighted in Chapter 3 however, do show 
cause for concern in the case of some micro firms being placed under strain in 
terms of repayments over the crisis. On average, however, financially stronger 
firms extended credit between 12 – 46 percent longer in terms of days over the 
crisis period. While this could be derived from an unwillingness to repay among 
customers, it could also be the allowance of financial flexibility in terms of 
repayments to constrained business partners with whom they expect to continue 
to do business. 
The inclusion and examination in relation to asset intangibility and receipt of 
trade credit was included in Chapter 3. This measure is quite important for 
SMEs, particularly those with whom would be most financially constrained due 
lack of collateral for their protection of their creditor (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Michaelas et al, 1999). Interestingly, results indicate that many of these received 
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significantly more credit in the form of inter firm financing, however we would 
suspect that this could be involuntary. 
The findings of Chapter 3 are further confirmed for a cross country European 
sample in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 not only illustrates the importance of 
macroeconomic and institutional factors in determining the outcomes for SMEs 
in terms of finance, but the financial vulnerability of firms entering the crisis 
was the most important determinant in outcomes for SMEs. The application of a 
large database and the use of robust panel data methodology in a European 
context is a significant contribution to the research field in Chapter 4. While a 
growing number of studies have analysed the importance of institutional and 
country level factors in influencing SME financing behaviour (Beck et al. 2003; 
Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009 and Joeveer, 2013) and the differences between 
listed and unlisted (Brav, 2009; Joeveer, 2013). This study is the first to 
examine the impact of the financial crisis on working capital among European 
SMEs using actual firm level financial data. Country effects hitherto have 
remained outside the remit of SME analysis due to data restrictions. Could it be 
that trade credit and relationship lending could mitigate country level 
institutional factors through on-going business information sharing? (Fishman 
and Love, 2003). 
Previous studies have found that institutional accounting standards and 
disclosure requirements vary significantly across regions (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008), as well as the availability and 
cost of access to finance for SMEs (Bass and Schrooten, 2002; Berger and 
Udell, 1998).  One of the aims of this research was to examine the relative 
importance of firm characteristics versus country specific and institutional 
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factors in determining the use of trade credit financing over the crisis. A recent 
study on SME debt finds that country specific factors are greater indicator of 
leverage for unlisted firms (Joeveer, 2013), and higher shareholder and creditor 
protection rights are associated with higher levels of leverage. As stated, the 
findings of this thesis demonstrate that net credit extension over the crisis period 
among the firms with the strongest financial position. They also show that net 
credit extension is highest in the common law countries of Ireland and the UK 
out of the sample of 15 countries. Despite the belief that trade credit use is 
associated with regions of lower financial development and likely to be more 
important across regions where creditor protection is weaker (Burkart and 
Ellingson, 2004). 
Research on European institutional and macroeconomic factors over the 
financial crisis period reveals that bank loan credit terms in periphery countries 
of Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal deteriorated significantly since the 
crisis. Increased bank market power is associated with lower levels of 
investment due to restricted loan supply, conditions and lending rates (Ryan et 
al., 2014).  Differences in capital buffers and banking sectors across regions 
were highlighted (De Bruychere et al., 2013), while Revest and Spio (2012) 
differentiated finance systems across Europe into banking based (German, 
France and Swedish) and market based systems such as the UK and predicted 
that countries in bank based regions should display greater reliance on networks 
and relationships with creditors. These factors are undoubtedly important in 
terms of finance availability within the SME sector across Europe.   
To take account of institutional differences in creditor rights and legal 
obligations of SMEs across regions, this study includes a variable to capture the 
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effect of regulatory quality and the rule of law and enforcement as well as a 
composite measure of economic, political and financial country level risk. 
Among the many findings, the results indicate that Common and French Civil 
law countries of Ireland, UK, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal all 
exhibited higher levels of net credit extension over German, Scandinavian and 
Socialist origin countries. A negative relation between levels of net credit 
extension economy wide and composite risk index measure was found, most 
likely indicating an overall negative impact of overall country level risk and 
level of credit and the transmission mechanism. Banking concentration, GDP 
growth and credit issued by banks are all found to be positively associated with 
the levels of inter-firm financing in the SME sector, while regulatory quality 
and political stability is observed to be inversely related to trade credit use when 
holding all other economic, financial and firm level observable and 
unobservable factors constant. 
Finally, SME survival was determined and influenced over the crisis by both the 
level of debt overhang among SMEs and SMEs access to trade credit when bank 
finance is restricted. This is a further contribution to the literature as no previous 
study has examined the relationship between SME survival and trade credit use 
over crisis.  
5. 2.1 Key contributions 
 
In sum, this research represents a significant advancement in the knowledge and 
literature on SME finance and behaviour in times of crisis.  
1. Empirically, this is the first study to examine working capital behaviour of 
SMEs in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis using comprehensive 
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panel data. From a data point of view a contribution is evident in sample 
size and time period as well as the number of observations.  
2. It is also the first to empirically demonstrate and quantify the redistribution 
effect in the case of SMEs over the financial crisis based on actual firm level 
accounting data. Significantly, the redistribution came about not from the 
increased ability to raise debt as indicated in large firm studies previously 
(Calomiris et al., 1995) but from cash reserves.  
3. The research demonstrated that the financial position is key in determining 
trade credit use. 
4. The inclusion of country, institutional and macroeconomic variables with 
firm level financial data is also an important empirical extension to SME 
panel data studies. 
5. In addition, the research is the first to demonstrate the relation between trade 
credit use and the probability of survival. SME survival was determined and 
influenced over the crisis by both the level of debt overhang among SMEs 
and SMEs access to trade credit when bank finance is restricted. 
More generally, this research posits a new approach to the analysis of SME 
financing based on measures of working capital and cash availability to replace 
the traditional debt/equity ratios. Thus it seeks to change the way we view and 
examine SME finance. The official statistics that show that levels of debt and 
equity financing are low reflects the prevalence of working capital rather than 
investment based financial decision making practices in SMEs. Thus a cash 
based indicator, such as net cash proves a more useful and relevant indicator of 
the firm’s financial position, as opposed to traditional measures of capital 
structure based on debt to equity ratios. 
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5.3 Limitations of the research and avenues for further research 
 
Despite the scope and contributions of the research, avenues for future research 
exist. It is important to include market power analysis, while from a policy 
perspective, there is much talk of credit guarantee schemes (CGS). Emerging 
evidence indicates a shift away from bank finance by the level of borrower 
discouragement. Nevertheless, a movement in policy towards a focus on 
encouraging inter-firm finance has also been ignored in literature until relatively 
recently (Martínez- Sola et al., 2013). 
As highlighted in each chapter of this thesis, there are significant additions to 
SME finance research, most notably with the benefit of a significant panel of 
SMEs. The benefits of this have been highlighted in Chapter 3 and 4. However, 
the research also points out certain limitations of this research and avenues for 
further research which is significantly warranted in this growing and important 
research field. 
To summarise, the limitations of this research are 
a) This research primarily focused on mature SMEs, many of which were of 
an average of 10 years of age. Given the diversity of SMEs and the 
dynamic nature of the sector, further research into the role of working 
capital and trade credit among young SMEs would be a valuable 
extension to this research. 
b) While survivorship is not the sole focus of this study, it would be 
interesting to examine survivorship in greater detail in future research, 
particularly how finance decisions and availability of finance impact on 
survivorship and investment among SMEs. Given these important 
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limitations, an extension of research would be helpful and would add to 
our knowledge in this field.  
c)  As stated in the introduction, a major benefit in this study is the use of 
panel data analysis. This research focused on mainly static panel data 
models, however with the inclusion of lagged values of variables. An 
extension of this methodology, particularly in the study of the use of 
trade credit would be dynamic panel data. Dynamic panel data estimation 
is particularly relevant given the habitual nature of trade credit use. i.e. a 
firm’s decision to use trade credit use is a function of their use of trade 
credit financing in past years. In dynamic panels, past values of the 
dependent variable are included as explanatory variables in the model. 
This introduces measurement error such as autocorrelation rendering 
estimation biased and inconsistent. Therefore a particular type of 
estimation procedure is required. With dynamic panel data, it is 
necessary to take account of potential autocorrelation between previous 
levels of the dependent variable.  
The inclusion of GMM improves consistency. OLS is inconsistent since the 
change in previous values of the dependent variable and changes in the error 
term are correlated. In dynamic panels, the problem is that traditional OLS 
estimator is inconsistent as (𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2) is correlated with (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1) 
Arrellano and Bond GMM estimator makes use of the orthogonality conditions 
to produce more efficient estimate, based on lagged values of instrumental 
variables. The Arrellano and Bond System GMM estimator is suitable for the 
data.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ + 𝛿𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡  
175 
 
The lag of the dependent variable will be correlated with the error term. Even 
if X is mean independent with 𝜇𝑖, lag of the dependent variable will be pre-
determined. So even if E (𝜇𝑖/𝑋𝑖) = 0 ∀𝑖𝑡  ; Cov (𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑖)  ≠ 0 ∀𝑖𝑡 , therefore 
OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent.  
The inclusion of the Arrellano and Bond System estimator is worth 
considering as trade credit is a habitual source of finance used by firms. 
Therefore, as robustness check, a dynamic model was estimated for one 
country (Italy due to data coverage) and yielded similar results to those 
obtained in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, confirming that the results obtained 
for trade credit are consistent with other estimation methods. Nevertheless, as 
an extension to this research, a dynamic panel model across a sample of 
European countries would be an addition to the literature on SME finance.  
5.3 Policy implications 
 
The policy implications of this research are important.  
1) Improve knowledge regarding credit worthiness, thereby reducing 
asymmetric information 
a) SME credit ratings could be useful in this regard. This could 
help reduce the reliance of banks on asset backed and collateral 
based lending. 
b) Improve the requirements for SME financial data disclosure. 
c) Focus on combining both demand and supply side financing 
information. This objective is also highlighted by the OECD (2013).  
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2)  The research conducted in this thesis points to significant peer to peer 
lending within the SME sector.  As a result, it is important that policy, 
particularly in the area of enterprise and job creation, should focus on peer to 
peer lending and utilise industry peer to peer lending information. This could 
improve the effectiveness in the SME lending process and reduce the incidents 
of credit rationing.  Access to export finance and invoice discounting schemes 
would be a useful addition, particularly in the Irish context. 
3)  Improve access to external credit markets in the economy and this 
finance obtained can be channelled to SMEs through the financial 
intermediation process. 
4) As we observe from the findings in Chapter 2, aversion to external 
equity finance is a major issue in the SME sector. Improving knowledge and 
access to equity finance for SMEs would be important for future growth and 
prosperity. 
5.3.1 Policies introduced in Ireland over the crisis 
 
In Ireland, since the start of the crisis a number of policy initiatives have been 
introduced. A targeted credit guarantee scheme was introduced in 2012 which 
provided a 75 percent State guarantee to banks against losses on loans to 
commercially viable firms with potential for job creation. The scheme was 
aimed at facilitating additional lending of between €10,000 to €1 million to 
SMEs that have been refused bank credit for either of two reasons, (a) 
insufficient collateral and/ or (b) perceived as higher risk under current risk 
177 
 
evaluation practices. The scheme charged a 2 percent annual premium which 
partially covers the scheme40.  
In addition to the CGS introduced in Ireland, The Strategic Banking 
Corporation (SBCI) is the latest initiative to facilitate the access to credit for 
commercially viable SMEs into the future and an independent Credit Review 
Office as well as a number of other schemes such as The Employment and 
Investment Incentive Scheme (EIIS) and the ‘Code of Conduct on Prompt 
Payments’, which is part of the government’s Action Plan for Jobs. This code is 
aimed to help promote and encourage best practice among businesses and 
improve the payment culture.  It is worth noting that many of these policies 
initiatives have focused on the supply side of finance to SMEs. 
5.4 Conclusions  
 
This research examines the impact of the financial crisis on the financing 
decisions and behaviour of SMEs. The research illustrates the important role of 
inter firm financing within SMEs and the impact of the banking crisis on 
financing behaviour. The study introduces a new direction for the study of SME 
finance based on short-term financing and working capital behaviour. It is the 
first study to empirically demonstrate and quantify the redistribution effect in 
the case of SMEs. SME survival was determined and influenced over the crisis 
by both the level of debt overhang among SMEs and access to trade credit. 
Empirically, this research demonstrates the effectiveness of panel data analysis 
using commercially available databases in a cross country SME context and sets 
the standard for data driven empirical research in the field going forward.   
                                                          
40 http://www.sfa.ie/Sectors/SFA/SFA.nsf/vPages/Advice~Financial_Management~launch-of-
the-credit-guarantee-scheme-20-11-2012?OpenDocument 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: From Chapter 2 
 
 A.1.  Industry sector classification for Irish and UK SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry sectors Number of SMEs Proportion in Irish Sample Proportion in Scottish sample
1 Agricultre, Fishing and Forestry 123 6 21
2 Mining Quarying and extraction 47 2 22
3 Food processing/ Manufacturing 1261 33 243
4 Copper metal production 35 2 4
5 Electricity and Utility, water and waste collection (Omitted) 0 0 0
6 Construction, real estate and related activities 715 47 95
7 Wholesale 1006 36 129
8 Retail trade 222 14 38
9 Public transport/ postal services (Omitted) 0 0 0
10 Hospitality and tourism 160 6 30
11 Broadcasting, publishing 112 6 12
12 Information technology 210 3 26
13 Banking and insurance related activities (Omitted) 0 0 0
14 Consultancy and research 92 8 13
15 Renting and leasing 62 2 21
16 Repair and maintanence and other 2 0 0
Total industry observations 4047 165 654
missing observations 1557 529 156
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A.2. Summary statistic (mean and medians for Irish and UK SMEs) 
 
 
A.3.1. Summary statistics for English SMEs 2004-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Means and (Medians) of sample variables for each year
Variables 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Change in total debt 3.23 2.9 1.99 0.95 -3.81 -1.37 1.76 0
(-.07) (-0.13) (-0.33) (-0.87) (-3.36) (-1.79) (-.23) (-0.95)
Total debt ratio 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.26) (0.27) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.24) (.24) (.24)
long term debt ratio .18 .18 .19 .18 .18 .19 .18 .19
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.10)
Short term debt ratio .20 .20 .20 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Deficit 12.51 10.62 10.02 6.14 -9.22 .07 7.64 2.24
(7.54) (6.17) (6.84) (1.86) (-11.28) (-2.07) (6.37) (1.36)
Firm age* 22 23 24 25 26 27 29 30
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (23) (24) (25)
number of employees 59 60 59 59 60 59 59 60
(45) (46) (45) (44) (45) (46) (45) (46)
Annual GDP per capita growth 2.1 1.2 2.1 3.0 -2.2 -5.3 .8 -0.1
Profitiability ratio* .04 -.03 .01 -.01 -.01 .03 .09 .09
(.08) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.08)
Tangibility* .33 .33 .32 .32 .32 .32 .32 .31
(.25) (.24) (.24) (.23) (.23) (.23) (.22) (.22)
Growth Oppertunities .10 .09 .08 .07 .08 .08 .08 .07
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Ndts .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Risk .17 .15 .14 .13 .12 .10 .10 .10
(.07) (.06) .06) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04)
* In the regression analysis, the log of these variables is used.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Med Max
Total assets 34,801 8,400,000 8,200,000 11,823 6,100,000 43,000,000
Total debt 14,365 3,200,000 4,700,000 10,047 1,600,000 78,000,000
Deficit 34,801 5 31 -90 3 244
Deficit squared 4,801 1,174 4,597 0 142 81,327
Firm age 34,801 27 21 1 21 141
number of employees 34,699 58 52 1 44 249
Annual GDP per capita growth 34,801 0.24 2.44 -5.00 1.00 3.00
EBIT 34,767 0.04 0.38 -3.10 0.08 2.65
longtermdebt 15,214 1,600,000 3,200,000 1,236 510,000 56,000,000
Tangibility 34,801 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.21 0.98
Turnover 29,138 14,000,000 16,000,000 7,916 9,800,000 100,000,000
Short-term debt 27,545 1,800,000 3,600,000 214 570,000 79,000,000
Change in total debt 12,983 0.77 14.60 -46.21 -0.79 96.04
longtermdebt ratio 15,214 0.18 0.27 0.00 0.09 2.04
Short term debt ratio 27,545 0.20 0.27 0.00 0.10 1.83
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A.3.2. Summary statistics for Irish SMEs 2004-2011 
 
 
A.3.3. Summary statistics for Scottish SMEs 2004-2011 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Med Max
Total assets 5,484 2,500,000 5,300,000 11,823 370,000 42,000,000
Total debt 1,043 1,500,000 2,600,000 10,047 460,000 20,000,000
Deficit 5,484 7.50 37.82 -89.54 2.24 244.10
Deficit squared 5,484 1,893.97 6,637.71 0.02 128.83 81,327.5
Firm age 5,484 17 14 1 14 133
number of employees 2,380 24 35 1 10 240
Annual GDP per capita growth 5,484 -0.24 3.83 -8.00 3.00 3.00
EBIT 5,447 0.03 0.58 -3.10 0.04 2.65
longtermdebt 1,346 960,000 1,900,000 1,236 220,000 17,000,000
Tangibility 5,484 0.46 0.34 0.00 0.43 0.98
Turnover 4,531 3,100,000 8,800,000 7,916 280,000 93,000,000
Short-term debt 2,296 620,000 1,900,000 214 37,272 24,000,000
Change in total debt 896 0.45 13.94 -46.09 -1.23 96.04
longtermdebt ratio 1,346 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.15 2.04
Short term debt ratio 2,296 0.15 0.25 0.00 0.05 1.83
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Med Max
Total assets 6,365 11,000,000 8,900,000 13,131 8,000,000 43,000,000
Total debt 2,917 4,100,000 6,100,000 10,699 2,100,000 66,000,000
Deficit 6,365 4.89 29.79 -89.54 3.04 244.10
Deficit squared 6,365 1,106.29 4,366.20 0.02 148.10 81,327.49
Firm age 6,365 30 23 1 23 124
number of employees 6,014 86 59 1 75 249
Annual GDP per capita growth 6,365 0.26 2.44 -5.00 1.00 3.00
EBIT 6,358 -0.04 0.48 -3.10 0.07 0.93
longtermdebt 3,038 2,200,000 4,700,000 1,236 720,000 65,000,000
Tangibility 6,365 0.34 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.98
Turnover 4,910 18,000,000 16,000,000 17,851 12,000,000 100,000,000
Short-term debt 5,182 2,300,000 4,400,000 214 800,000 76,000,000
Change in total debt 2,657 0.98 16.03 -46.21 -0.80 96.04
longtermdebt ratio 3,038 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.09 2.04
Short term debt ratio 5,182 0.20 0.26 0.00 0.10 1.83
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Table A.16 Change in total debt ratios by SME age 
 
Table A.17 Debt ratios of micro enterprises 
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Table A.18 Debt ratios of medium sized enterprises 
 
A.21.Summary of support for hypotheses in Empirical analysis 
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Summary of Support for the hypotheses in the Empirical Analysis.
Hypothesis Empirical Evidence Model Dependent variable
H1 Strongly supported Pooled OLS model, Fixed Effects, Fixed Effects plus time dummies Change in total debt variable, long term debt and short term debt
H2 Strongly supported Pooled OLS model, Fixed Effects, Fixed Effects plus time dummies Change in total debt variable, long term debt and short term debt
H3 Strongly rejected Fixed Effects model Total debt to total assets
H4 Weakly supported Pooled OLS model, Fixed Effects, Fixed Effects plus time dummies Change in total debt variable, long term debt and short term debt
H5 Strongly supported Fixed Effects model
H6 Strongly supported Pooled OlS Model Change in total debt variable
H7 Weakly supported Fixed Effects model Total debt to total assets
H8 Weakly supported Fixed Effects model long term debt to assets
H9 Weakly supported Fixed Effects model Short term debt to assets
* Strongly supported means that the estimated coefficient is in line with the direction of causation implied by the hypothesis and the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
* Weakly support means that the estimated coefficient is in line with the direction of causation implied by the hypothesis, however the estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
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Appendix B: From Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1    Crosstabulations of variables used in study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Trade Debtors (1) 1.00
Tradecreditors (2) 0.14 1.00
Net creditor (3) 0.63 -0.31 1.00
Trade creditorassets (4) 0.03 0.35 -0.36 1.00
Trade debtorassets (5) 0.58 0.02 0.44 0.18 1.00
Net credita (6) 0.30 -0.33 0.58 -0.86 0.34 1.00
Firm age (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
Cashta (8) -0.37 0.02 -0.25 -0.15 -0.58 -0.14 -0.03 1.00
Cashflowta (9) -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
Loansta (10) -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 1.00
Invest (11) -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00
Opprev (12) -0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.28 -0.03 -0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.43 -0.01 1.00
Total assets (13) 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.28 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 1.00
PcreditGDP (14) 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 1.00
irmoney market (15) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.29 1.00
intangibility (16) 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.00 1
Table 1.2  Average (mean) levels of trade credit extended by sector 
Industry sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average β
Food processing/manufacturing 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.16 .007**
Construction 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.2 0.18 .023**
Real estate 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.3 0.34 0.36 0.25 .036***
Wholesale 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.2 0.23 -.001
Retail trade 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.08 .002
Hospitality and Tourism 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 .004***
Business services 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 .004
Community services 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 .003**
 Average across years 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15
* Trade credit extended is calculated as trade  receivables divided by the total sales of the firm in each year
* β is the estimated coefficient  the regresssion TC = α + β1(year) +ε1, indicating  how much trade credit extended has reduced/ increased for each sector for each year of the 
sample from a simple pooled regression with no control varaibles.  Positive values of β indicate an increase in average levels of trade credit extended in a given sector over the 
sample period, while negative values of β indicate how much they have reduced. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% 
Table 1.3  Average (mean) levels of Net credit extended by sector 
Industry sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average β
Food processing/manufacturing 0.09 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.001 -0.0006 0.024 0.05 -0.014**
Construction 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.007 0.005 -0.03 0.03 -.0009*
Real estate 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.14 .020***
Wholesale 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.10 -.016***
Retail trade -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -.005**
Hospitality and Tourism 0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.011 -0.0002 -0.002 0.00 -.006*
Business services 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.066 0.06 .001
Community services 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.00 .0002
 Average across years 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
* Net credit is calculated as trade  receivables minus payables divided by the total sales of the firm in each year
* β is the estimated coefficient  the regresssion TC = α + β1(year) +ε1 , indicating  how much trade credit extended has reduced/ increased for each sector for each year of the sample
from a simple pooled regression with no control varaibles.  Positive values of β indicate an increase in average levels of trade credit extended in a given sector over the sample 
period, while negative values of β indicate how much they have reduced. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% 
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Appendix C: From Chapter 4 
Table324.12 Firm Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Level Variables Short description # obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
Net TC Trade receiveables minus payables scaled by sales 1,823,274 0.11 0.06 0.21
Netcredit/ Bank credit Receiveables minus payables scaled by bank debt outstanding 1,469,757 0.24 0.15 0.91
Trade credit receieved Accounts payable scaled firm input costs 1,707,963 0.81 0.15 3.54
Trade credit extended Accounts receiveable scaled by sales 1,828,115 0.2 0.14 0.22
Net received Accounts payable minus receivables over sales 1,562,915 -0.12 -0.07 0.23
Independent varaibles
Size Log of total assets ( Fixed and current assets) 2,418,248 13.83 13.88 1.68
Sales growth Firm sales in year1 - sales in year0/ sales in year 0 1,759,909 0.1 0.04 0.42
Firm age Number of years since incorporation 2,822,273 18 14 17
Loansta
Short-term financial debts and part of longterm financial debts 
payable within one year scaled by firm assets 693,615 0.11 0.01 0.25
Cashta Amount of cash in hands of firm and deposited in bank scaled 
by firm assts 2,021,025 0.18 0.1 0.21
Opprev Net sales plus other revenues scaled by firm assets 2,238,733 2.03 1.66 1.56
Invest Growth in firm investment measured in percent 2,069,019 0.5 -0.02 304.03
Employees Number of employees 2,065,852 25 12 37
Cashsa Total cash and deposits of firm scaled by sales 1,816,013 0.14 0.06 0.26
AP/ total debt Accounts payable to total debt 1,586,610 0.28 0.24 0.29
Debt/Assets Total debt to total assets 1,604,048 0.61 0.6 0.31
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